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While handcuffed, shackled, forced to excrete in their own clothes, personally
bathed by the warden, sleep deprived, food deprived, bribed with cigarettes or
food, and, in some cases, "accidentally" killed, a suspect in Japan is interrogated
and the world is beginning to acknowledge that such procedures amount to a
violation of human rights.' Adopted December 10, 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was the first international statement to use the term
"human rights" and to recognize the right to be free from torture, arbitrary arrest,
as well as the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 2 Although the
International community has concluded that suspects 3 should be commonly
afforded particular rights, there are many disparities from country to country as to
what rights are actually guaranteed.4 Overall, industrialized nations afford more
rights than do developing countries, with one exception.5 Japan, unlike most
* Bachelor of Criminal Justice and B.A. in Government from New Mexico State University in 2000.
J.D., University of Denver, College of Law, 2003. I would like to thank my colleagues on the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy for their tireless work and dedication to this journal.
1. See e.g., Amnesty International, Japan: No Advance on Human Rights, December 8, 2000
[hereinafter referred to as No Advance on Human Rights]; BAYLEY, infra note 5; Kitamura, infra note
10; Svan, infra note 63; See Japanese Warders Plead Innocent in Death of Inmate, Agence France-
Presse (March 1, 2003).
2. See United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (111), adopted Dec
10, 1948; Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights:
The Statusof The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights In National And International Law, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L 287, 289 (1996).
3. "Suspects" and "the accused" are both used in the analyzing the Japanese criminal justice
system. Although there are legal differences between these two groups, which will be important in
analyzing several of the international treaties regarding the rights of each, it is more important to note
that neither "suspects" nor "the accused" have yet been to trial, convicted, or sentenced. The primary
focus of this paper is on pre-trial procedures. Therefore, both "suspects" and "the accused" are relevant
groups.
4. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections And Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 252-53 (1993) (comparing national constitutions with respect to the rights of
suspects).
5. See BAYLEY, DAVID H., FORCES OF ORDER: POLICING MODERN JAPAN ix (University of
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industrialized nations, does not afford many of the same rights that Americans take
for granted such as the rights to bail, to remain silent, and to counsel.6 In fact, the
Japanese legal system has come under grave attack by many human rights
activists, including Amnesty International.7 Although the Japanese criminal justice
system still needs serious reform to provide greater protection to its accused, Japan
should nevertheless also be lauded for its efforts thus far. Many activists often
overlook the strides Japan has made toward reformation when demeaning Japan
for the abundant abuse found within its criminal justice system. Furthermore, any
analysis of the Japanese criminal justice system should consider the unique culture
of Japan.8 Imposing American or Western standards on the Japanese system would
be futile because Japanese and Western cultures sharply conflict. If any
reformation is to take place, it must fit within the Japanese culture and way of life.
The foregoing analysis is a study of the Japanese criminal justice system and
the rights of suspects and the accused. The main focus of the analysis is centered
on the lack of rights afforded suspects in Japan and the resulting human rights
violations found within the Japanese criminal justice system. Part II explores the
history of Japan and the development of Japanese law. Although Western culture
has greatly influenced the Japanese legal system, Japan has developed a unique
criminal justice system based on its unique culture. Part III analyzes the Japanese
legal system as well as the rights afforded its criminal suspects. As a point of
comparison, Japan is then compared to the American system and the rights
afforded suspects in America. While Part IV is an appraisal of the Japanese
system, Part V considers the rights of suspects and the accused in the International
arena as well as the International reaction to the Japanese system. Part V also
considers the founding of the International Criminal Court and how it may affect
the recognition of acceptable practices. The International Criminal Court is the
only international tribunal in which criminal procedures have been adopted.9
Therefore, it is the only international tribunal that may be even remotely compared
to an individual nation's criminal justice system. Part VI looks to the future of
human rights and the impact of International pressures as well as the development
of the International Criminal Court on the Japanese criminal justice system. Part
VII calls for reformation of the Japanese criminal justice system. Although Japan
has already begun some reform, further rectification is needed. In addition, any
reformation must fit into the Japanese way of life. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Part VIII regarding the effectiveness of the Japanese legal system and the future
of human rights in Japan.
California Press 1991) (1976).
6. Many of the rights that the Japanese Constitution guarantees its suspects and the accused are
not actually realized. See generally id. See also Ill. a. iv. Rights of the accused During Detention, infra
page 16. Compare U.S. Const. with Japan Const.
7. See e.g., Amnesty International, available at www.amnesty.org. (searching for "Japan") (last
visited May 31, 2003).
8. See I. b. Cultural Development, infra page 6.
9. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17th day of July 1998, art.
67(1 )(e), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ (last visited May 31, 2002)[hereinafter Rome Statute].
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Legal History
Scholars believe Japan has had some sort of a judicial system in place since
the fourth century, but Japan's modem legal history consists of three main eras,
which commence in the 17th century.
10 During the first stage, known as the
Tokugawa/Edo phase, Japan established many of the traditional legal institutions
employed today, including a primitive judicial system." After the fall of the
shogunate in 1867, an Emperor resurfaced as the controlling governmental entity
known as the Meiji government. 12 The Meiji government appointed judges for
criminal matters and in 1875 a Supreme Court of Justice was established.' 3 It was
during this time that torture was abolished as well as rendering an opinion "solely
upon confession," which was a common practice.' 4 In 1889, the Meiji Constitution
was formed, which provided for a more formal court system with district courts,
appellate courts, and local courts.' 5  A year later, the Code of Criminal
Investigation was reformed to become the Code of Criminal Procedure, and was
modeled after the French Code of Criminal Procedure established by Napoleon. 1
6
A sense of westernization began to develop initially as a result of borrowed
laws, both from France as well as Germany.' 7 Later, in 1854, trade treaties were
formed under pressure from U.S. warships.' 8 These treaties provided certain
privileges for foreigners.' 9 Japan viewed these treaties as a threat to their full
sovereignty.2° Therefore, the Emperor established a European legal order in order
to modify the treaties. 2' In 1894, "the extraterritorial treatment of foreigners [by
the treaties] was eliminated and the most-favored nation clause was based on the
principle of reciprocity. '22 Following the modification of the treaties, the Meiji
10. See A Guide to Court Procedures, History of Criminal Justice in Japan [hereinafter referred to
as History of Criminal Justice in Japan], at http://arapaho.nsuok.edu/-dreveskr/jap.html-ssi (selecting
Guide to Criminal Court Procedures) (last visited July 14, 2003). See also Harald Hohmann, Modern
Japanese Law: Legal History and Concept of Law, Public Law and Economic Law of Japan, 44 AM. J.
COMp. L. 151, 153 (1996) (summarizing the legal history of Japan).
II. Ichiro Kitamura, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Japan, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
263, 263 (1993).
12. See History of Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 9.
13. Kitamura, supra note 10, at 263.
14. History of Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 9.
15. See id. See also Kitamura, supra note 10, at 263.
16. See History of Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 9. See also Kitamura, supra note 10, at
263.
17. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 263. In 1922, Japan modeled their new Code of Criminal
Procedure after current German and French laws. In fact, the Meiji government was almost entirely
based upon the European culture. See History of Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 9.
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leaders believed that modem law could develop a strong economy and as a result,
the Meiji Constitution of 1889 was formed.23 It was intended "to encourage the
citizens to live in harmony with each other." 24 Therefore, a system in equity rather
than justice developed.25
After World War II, the United States helped the Japanese rebuild its
shattered country. In the process, American and Anglo-American culture had a
great influence on the development of the Japanese legal system.26 Americans
pushed Japanese leaders to change the Constitution, Code of Criminal Procedure,
and organization of the courts.2 7 The new laws were heavily influenced by
Western culture and all contained provisions, which "fully guarantee fundamental
human rights" including warrant requirements, terms regarding inadmissible
evidence and hearsay, and the implementation of a trial based upon an adversary
system.28 After the changes were made, a new Supreme Court was established and
the public prosecutor's office "held the main responsibility for investigation and
exclusively supervised prosecution and pre-trial proceedings. 29  In fact, the
Japanese prosecutor's office was once hailed as the "cornerstone of an inquisitorial
system of law enforcement. 30
Cultural Development
Because "western institutions were not copied faithfully" and the Japanese
incorporated "Franco-Germano-American ingredients," the Japanese legal system
developed much differently from that of the United States. 31 The unique Japanese
culture also played a major role in the development of the criminal justice
32system. For instance:
In the United States a person tends to be perceived by self and others as an
individual actor whose identity and sense of self stand apart from the community,
while in Japan a person is perceived by self and others as a contextual actor whose
identity is, in substantial part, defined by social relationships.
33
Because of these differences, Japan ultimately developed many different
23. See id.; Kitamura, supra note 10, at 263.
24. Hohmann, supra note 9, at 156.
25. See Joel Rosch, Institutionalizing Mediation: The Evolution Of The Civil Liberties Bureau In
Japan, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 243, 254 (1987).
26. Hohmann, supra note 9, at 153.
27. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 263-264.
28. See History of Criminal Justice in Japan, supra note 9.
29. Kitamura, supra note 10, at 264.
30. ld
31. Id.
32. Jessica Hardung, The Proposed Revisions to Japan's Juvenile Law: If Punishment Is Their
Answer, They Are Asking the Wrong Question, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 139, 139 (2000).
33. Hohman, supra note 9, at 158-59 (quoting V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY
JUSTICE. RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES XII1, 290 (New
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1992)).
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rights including the rights of suspects and how the accused are treated.34
First and foremost, it is vital to understand the cultural differences between
the United States and Japan. The differences are significant and any revision to be
made to the Japanese criminal justice system must be achieved within the context
of the Japanese culture.
The Japanese criminal justice system is thought to be a "family model., 35 It is
based "both on love (similar to a parent's love for a child) and mutual respect.,
36
For that reason, the primary aim of the Japanese criminal justice system is
correction rather than strictly punishment.3 7 Japanese officials hope to rehabilitate
their criminals and allow the offenders to re-enter society and become a part of the
"family" once again. 38  The Japanese "family model" is also an "inquisitive
family" that keeps tabs on its members, especially when they become suspects.39
Such a model leads to close community ties and moral responsibility, which is
reflected not only in the Japanese societal structure, but also in its laws and
criminal procedure.40 In fact, the importance of rehabilitation and focus on
familial ties is so strong that "the apprehension of offenders, their successful
prosecution, proof of guilt, and procedural fairness are secondary to the pervasive
concern for rehabilitation of offenders and their conformity to socially acceptable
conduct."'4I The procedures Japan employs to force suspects to conform to
Japanese society or to facilitate rehabilitation has come under grave attack by the
international community.
42
Because the Japanese community is remarkably closely-knit, its citizens find
sanctions that distinguish themselves from the community to be morally
reprehensible.43 For example, "confessing, apologizing, and throwing himself
upon the mercy of the authorities" is seen as firm punishment extracting
repentance.44 The citizen becomes eschewed from the rest of the community and
is greatly ashamed.45 Because of such moral considerations and tight community
ties, the Japanese suspect is most likely to be submissive to authority.46
34. Id. at 159.
35. Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV.
317,319-321 (1992).
36. Id. at 319.
37. See JOHN 0. HALEY, Introduction: Legal vs. Social Controls, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 2 (John 0. Haley ed., Kendall/Hunt Publ'g Co.
1998).
38. Id.
39. Foote, supra note 34, at 321.
40. See generally id.
41. HALEY, supra note 36, at 2.
42. See generally Section 11. a., infra page 9. Japan focuses their energy on extracting
confessions during the pre-trail phase of prosecution in the hopes of rehabilitating the suspect and
releasing him back into society. However, the police and prosecutors often violate human rights in
order to achieve that end result.
43. See Foote, supra note 34, at 344-345.
44. HALEY, supra note 36, at 2.
45. See id. See also Foote, supra note 34, at 344-345.
46. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 139.
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Moral considerations play a large role in the Japanese legal system.47 These
traditions and mores, based not on autonomy, but upon communal acceptance,
have played a significant role in forming the Japanese Code of Criminal
Procedure.48 Therefore, individual rights, including the rights of suspects, are
sacrificed for the good of the community.4 9 The United States, on the other hand,
tends to focus primarily on punishment and the individual. 50 The sharp distinction
between the American and Japanese criminal justice systems is due to cultural
differences. Many Americans, for example, are concerned with due process only
for fear of being handed a heavy punishment after conviction.5 In Japan, on the
other hand, a simple apology can often be seen as worse punishment than
imprisonment.52 Because of the dissimilarity of the two cultures, it is not feasible
to impose one society's practice on the other. To a great extent, imposing
American values on the Japanese will likely have deleterious effects.
53
A COMPARISON OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
Japan
Lesser Crimes
The Japanese criminal procedure and treatment of suspects, differs depending
on the seriousness of the crime. 4 Suspects of lesser crimes, including assault,
theft, fraud, embezzlement, and gambling, are rarely prosecuted at a formal trial. 55
In fact, over 70% of all criminal cases in Japan in 1990 did not go to trial.56
47. See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The Legal Order in Japan's Changing Society: Some
Observations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1190 (1963).
48. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 177. See also V. Lee Hamilton et al., Punishment and the
Individual in the United States and Japan, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 301, 303 (1988).
49. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 177.
50. See V. Lee Hamilton, supra note 47, at 304.
51. See Gil Sapir & Mark Giangrande, Right To Inspect And Test Breath Alcohol Machines:
Suspicion Ain't Proof 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 19 (1999) (focussing on due process rights when the
accused is convicted).
52. See HALEY, supra note 36, at 2; BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 127. See generally Hiroshi
Wagatsuma and Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United
States, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 461, 492 (1986).
53. Cultural differences are important to consider when determining the cruelty of a system. In a
culture where an apology is seen as a harsh sentence, pre-trial detention procedures, in which food and
sleep are withheld from the suspects and suspects are bribed into confessing, are considered unbearable.
Although Japan is compared to the United States, it is important to keep cultural differences in mind.
The comparison is made only to illustrate the differences in the criminal justice systems. Nevertheless,
Japan must afford its suspects fundamental human rights as discussed in Section Ill. a., infra page 9.
54. See e.g., BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 134.
55. See Foote, supra note 34, at 342.
56. See Japan: Criminal Procedure, at http://Icweb2.loc.gov (last visited July 14, 2003). Most of
these cases involved small or returned sums of money, victims that were unwilling to press any charges,
or accidental acts. See id.
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However, police must send any formal complaint, irrespective of its validity, to
prosecutors for further proceedings known as an "at-home basis. ' 57 Police are then
required to "counsel the suspect sternly and admonish him or her not to commit
crimes in the future."5 8 In order to "counsel" the suspect, police give strong
lectures. 59 In addition, they are required to "call in a member of the suspect's
family, the suspect's employer, or some other such responsible individual, counsel
that person to keep close watch over the suspect in the future, and even have that
person undertake in writing to provide such ongoing supervision., 60 The police
also persuade the suspect to make an apology or partake in some other type of
restitution. 6' These sanctions tend to ostracize the suspect from the community
and extract heavy punishment because social isolation often prevents individuals
from performing normal social endeavors.62 This is a sharp distinction from the
fines and informal court appearances that many American suspects accused of
misdemeanors are subjected. The lectures and counseling, even for lesser crimes,
illustrates the close community ties existing in Japan. Where the American system
is individualized and its citizens remain detached from one another, the Japanese
system more closely resembles a family in which the police are seen as a parent
reprimanding a child.
Critics tend to disregard the "at-home basis" proceedings and focus on the
procedures used to process more austere crimes such as murder and rape.63 It is
apparent from the discussion above that no human rights are violated during the
"at-home basis" proceeding. There are no claims of torture or violations of any
fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, a discussion of the "at-home basis"
proceedings illustrates the close familial ties of the Japanese culture.
Severe Crimes
The abusive nature of the Japanese criminal justice system and violation of
human rights becomes apparent when a suspect is accused of committing a more
serious crime. Once a suspect of a serious crime in Japan is identified, he is
detained in what is called a daiyo-kangoku or "substitute prison." 64 These prisons
are actually jails that are attached to police stations and act as detention centers
during interrogation and investigation procedures. 65 These detention facilities are
considered "one of the most peculiar detention systems in the modem world"




61. See id. See also BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 132-133.
62. See HALEY, supra note 36, at 3.
63. See generally Amnesty International, available at www.amnesty.org. (searching for "Japan")
(last visited May 31, 2003).
64. Jennifer H. Svan, Woodland Trial May Spotlight Flaws in Japanese Criminal Justice System,
STARS AND STRIPES (Sept. II, 2001), available at http://www.pstripes.com/01/sepOl/ed091l10b.html
(last visited May 31, 2003); BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 145.
65. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 145.
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because of the procedures involved in interrogating a suspect.66 In order to detain
a suspect in a daiyo-kangoku, judicial approval must be obtained; however,
typically less than 1% is ever denied.67
Although most suspects are detained for less than ten days, a suspect may be
detained for up to twenty-three days in a "substitute prison" before the prosecutor
decides whether or not to prosecute.68 Police, however, must decide whether to
"release or refer a suspect to the prosecutors within forty-eight hours after arrest.,
69
Once a suspect is referred to the prosecutor's office, prosecutors "then have
another twenty-four hours within which to decide whether to release the suspect or
go to court to seek a warrant for the suspect's detention. 7 °
This unique detention system is often referred to as "hostage justice" not only
because of the improbable chance that the accused will be allowed to post bail, but
also because of the lengthy detention times.71 The detention period in and of itself
is often brutal because it tends to sever many of the close familial ties that are vital
to any citizen of Japan.72
Detention Procedures
The Japanese detention system is riddled with abusive procedures, on which
most legal analysts focus. 73 After the suspect is detained, the Japanese criminal
proceeding then advances to the investigation stage.74 This is perhaps the most
crucial and important aspect of the entire proceeding because securing either a
guilty plea or judgment is fundamental to the Japanese legal culture.7 ' Therefore,
investigating police have "considerable and wide-ranging powers of coercion and
examination. 76  In fact, interrogations are completely unregulated in Japan.77
Japanese law dictates that law enforcement officials' right to interrogate trumps the
suspect's right to counsel.78 However, Japan contends that the length of detention
for interrogation purposes is limited to twenty-three days in order to balance the
66. Svan, supra note 63 (quoting the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA)). The
procedures are explained in further detail in subsequent paragraphs. See 111. a  iii., infra page 12.
67. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 145.
68. See id. at 144.
69. Foote, supra note 34, at 335.
70. Id.
71. Svan, supra note 63.
72. See generally Foote, supra note 34.
73. See Human Rights Watch, Prison Conditions in Japan, at
http://www.hrw.org/research/japan.html (last visited May 26, 2003) [hereinafter referred to as Prison
Conditions in Japan]. See generally Amnesty International, available at www.amnesty.org. (searching
for "Japan") (last visited May 31, 2003);
74. See generally Kitamura, supra note 10.
75. See Japan Const. art. 40 (allowing any person found innocent to sue the state). See generally
BAYLEY, supra note 5.
76. Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266.
77. See Svan, supra note 63.
78. See Foote, supra note 34, at 337-338.
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law enforcement officers' right to investigate with the suspect's right to counsel.79
Nevertheless, police may interrogate the suspect for the entire twenty-three days
while depriving the suspects of sleep and food and forbidding them from using a
restroom. 80  Despite any accusations that interrogations are done to torture the
suspect into confessing, police practices have not assuagedY8'
The goal of rigorous interrogation practices is to "obtain every relevant fact
from the suspect. 82 International organizations such as Human Rights Watch has
reported that suspects placed in the daiyo-kangoku "face severe pressure, often
involving physical abuse, in order to obtain confessions. ' ' s3 In order to extract
confessions, interrogators may "instill a kind of psychological attachment, through
a series of concentrated contacts and questionings that may include the use of
violent methods. 8 4  Such methods may include "isolation, lack of privacy,
interrupted sleep, and complete dependence on custodial staff.,8 5 Because of the
wide-ranging powers of the police during investigation, such inducement is rarely
found to be unfair by the judicial system.8 6 However, inducing the suspect to
confess has been found to be unfair in cases in which police have offered suspects
special food or cigarettes.8 7 In such cases, the confession may be deemed
involuntary. 8 In one case, the confession was deemed involuntary because "the
chief of the police station visited the suspect in his bath and undertook to wash his
back for him."8 9  In such extreme cases, the court may judge the confession
involuntary, and therefore inadmissible. 90 Police interrogate a suspect to determine
the "suspect's motives, family background and other personal circumstances, and
involvement in any other crimes."9' In line with the Japanese goal of reformation,
the information that police and prosecutors gather from such questioning will
determine what form of punishment will be best to reach specific prevention.92
In addition to police interrogations, suspects must also endure questioning
from prosecutors.93 Public prosecutors have the liberty of conducting independent
interrogations. 94 That is, their interrogations do not need to be in conjunction with
79. See Mr. Satoru Satoh, Letter Written in Response to the Article "Awkward Japan" in the
Washington Post; Daisuke Moriyama, Criminal Justice System in Japan: Present Situation and Issues
[hereinafter referred to as Criminal Justice System in Japan], February 1999, available at
http://www.eu.emb-japan.go.jp/interest/crimju.htm (last visited July 14, 2003).
80. See e.g., No Advance on Human Rights, supra note I; Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266; Svan,
supra note 63; Bayley, supra note 5, at 146.
81. See No Advance on Human Rights, supra note I.
82. Kitamura, supra note 10, at 267.
83. Prison Conditions in Japan, supra note 7 1.
84. Kitamura, supra note 10, at 267.






91. Foote, supra note 34, at 346.
92. See id. at 347.
93. See id.
94. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 267.
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police practices. 95  Unlike police interrogations, the prosecutor's authority is
statutorily devised.96 Like police procedures, however, prosecutorial investigation
practices have become highly criticized and have prompted "international
investigation as well as submissions to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
9 7
In particular, prosecutors are accused of abusing their wide-ranging powers of
detention and investigation by coercing suspects into confessing "through a
combination of isolation from outside support, prolonged and harassing
interrogation, demeaning physical conditions, and uncertain access to food, sleep,
and bathing." 98
Furthermore, prosecutors have almost unlimited discretion in deciding
whether or not to prosecute.99 The most important factors to consider include
"character, age, and situation of the offender."' l In addition to questioning the
suspect, prosecutors also "interview the victim or the victim's heirs... [and] may
also obtain information about the suspect's character and background from the
suspect's family and employer and from other members of the community."10 1
This not only adds to the "inquisitive family model," but also affords a form of
punishment for the suspect.'0 2 After such treatment and publicity, the community
will most likely recognize the suspect as a criminal, regardless of whether he is
truly innocent or not, and therefore shun him.'0 3
If a prosecutor decides not to prosecute a case, the "victim of the crime, or a
suitable proxy may demand a hearing regarding the prosecutor's decision."'04 A
"prosecution review commission" conducts such a hearing.'0 5 Although this is
unique to the Japanese legal system, its roots are in the American legal system.'6
It is actually a hybrid between the American grand jury system and the Japanese
legal culture. 0 7 Nevertheless, the Japanese legal system is essentially a system
controlled by the prosecutor.' Judges examine any statements made during
interrogations and then hand down a sentence.' 0 9 Trials are not seen as forums to
discover the truth."0 Instead, the judges simply review the suspects' file of
95. See id.
96. See Mark D. West, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan's Answer to the Problem of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 686 (1992) (discussing the authority of Japanese
prosecutors).
97. BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 146.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 134.
100. Id.
101. Foote, supra note 34, at 347.
102. See generally id.
103. See Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan: A Story of New Wine in Old
Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 127, 179 (1994).




108. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266.
109. See id. at 268-269.
110. See id. at 268.
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statements and verify evidence."' Therefore, the public prosecutor is seen as the
"king" of the criminal justice system." 2
Rights of the Accused During Detention
In order to assure greater protection of human rights for criminal suspects in
Japan, reform is needed. However, the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure and
Constitution currently promise many rights that are considered fundamental human
rights, including the right to bail, the right against self-incrimination, and the right
to counsel. '13 The problem with the Japanese criminal justice system is that few of
these rights are ever realized by detained suspects.
Although the right to bail is guaranteed in the Japanese Constitution, it is only
granted after formal charges have been filed and often proves to be a "hollow
promise."'"1 4 Because of the necessity of a confession before formal charges are
filed, confession becomes a condition for bail. ' 5 In addition, a suspect is typically
not granted bail when he denies the allegations because police and prosecutors
believe that the suspect is likely to destroy evidence and deter witnesses.' 16
Therefore, the main objective during detention is to obtain a confession and only
when a confession is obtained may bail be granted." 17
Japanese suspects are also afforded the right against self-incrimination., is
Nevertheless, police can continue to question them and any statement made by the
suspect can be used as evidence." 9 Even during detention, suspects cannot refuse
to answer questions presented to them by either the police or prosecutors. 20 This
questioning often lasts for the entire twenty-three days and can be carried on day or
night, often resulting in extreme fatigue and exhaustion for the suspect.' 2'
Although there is no statutory law upholding the legality of such interrogation,
substantial case law has admitted the lawfulness of such practice.'
22
Because of such rigorous interrogation practices, "the importance of counsel
for a suspect cannot be over-emphasized."'' 23 Although the right to counsel is
guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution, the suspect's right to counsel is also
greatly limited.' 24 During detention, access to counsel is at the sole discretion of
I 1. See id. at 268-269. See generally Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers To Conviction And
Two Models Of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973) (comparing
criminal procedures in adversarial and inquisitorial systems with regards to admitting evidence).
112. Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266.
113. See Japan Const., arts. 34-39; Japan Code of Criminal Procedure.
114. Svan, supra note 63.
115. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 145.
116. See Svan, supra note 63.
117. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 145.
118. See Japan Const. art. 38.
119. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266. See generally Damaska, supra note 109.
120. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266.
121. See id. See also Svan, supra note 63.
122. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266-267.
123. Ramlogan, supra note 101, at 194.
124. See Japan Const. art. 38.
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the police and prosecutors. 25 Defense attorneys must appear before the prosecutor
and ask for written permission. 126 Even after the prosecutor grants permission, the
police may deny access for various reasons.' 27 For example, a suspect's access to
counsel may be suspended while the suspect is "interrogated, moved, asleep,
bathing, and so forth."'128 Because of the emphasis on interrogation procedures,
defense counsel visits may be suspended due to interrogation practices.' 29 In fact,
defense attorneys have no right to be with their client during interrogation
procedures conducted in the "substitute prisons" and interrogations are rarely, if
ever, recorded. 30 Further, suspects may not refuse to answer interrogations simply
because their attorneys are absent.'
3'
Defense counsel is only formally assigned after legal proceedings are
undertaken, not during detention. 132 If the suspect appoints his attorney during his
detention, his attorney must then ask for permission to visit his client. 3 3  Public
prosecutors normally only allow two visits for every ten days of detention.' 34 In
addition, these visits are limited to fifteen minutes each.1
35
A Current Example Involving the United States
The case of Staff Sgt. Timothy Woodland exemplifies the arguments made in
this paper, namely that the rights of suspects in Japan are not afforded adequate
protection and, as a result, human rights are being violated. An American airman,
Staff Sgt. Timothy Woodland, was accused of raping a Japanese woman while
stationed in Okinawa. 36 Japan urged the United States to relinquish the airman so
that Japan could prosecute him for his crime.13 1 In fact, Japan requested that the
airman be turned over to Japanese officials prior to indictment, which is rare
except in cases dealing with "heinous crimes," including rape. 138 Recognizing the
danger in handing over American citizens to foreign nations, the United States
agonized over whether to comply with Japan's requests. 139  Because relations
125. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 145.




130. Svan, supra note 63.
131. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 146.
132. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 268.
133. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 146; Kitamura, supra note 10, at 268
134. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 268.
135. See id.
136. See US to Turn Over Rape Suspect to Japan, CHINAdaily, July 6, 2001, available at
http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn. (last visited May 27, 2003). This recent news story has brought many
of the Japanese criminal procedures to light in America and has instigated American concern for
Americans currently subjected to Japanese laws. See also Svan, supra note 63.
137. See US to Turn Over Rape Suspect to Japan, supra note 134.
138. Id. According to an agreement between the United States and Japan, the United States does
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between the United States and Japan were deteriorating rapidly, the United States
ultimately surrendered the airman. 140  At one point, the United States negotiated
with Japan to ensure that Woodland's rights, as a suspect, would be upheld.
14 1
They discussed such provisos as "a lawyer, interpreter and some limits on
questioning by Japanese police."' 142  Woodland was eventually convicted in a
Japanese court and sentenced to a Japanese prison where I I American servicemen
are currently serving time.
143
After the airman was convicted, the United States was appalled and now
seeks an appeal.' 4 4 It should be no surprise Japan found the airman guilty because
the Japanese adversarial system is designed to convict all suspects. Unlike
international or American standards, Japanese criminal procedures provide far
fewer safeguards to the accused. During Woodland's trial, his accuser never
addressed him, nor was he given the opportunity to confront her. 145 According to
Japanese law, the accused has no such right. 146 In addition, the prosecution may
appeal the first verdict in the hopes that the suspect is actually convicted. 47 In the
United States, on the other hand, it is the accused that is afforded the opportunity
to appeal a lOss.i48 In addition, both international practices and the American legal
system recognize the accused's right to challenge any witness against him.
49
The United States
The United States, unlike Japan, focuses on the individual.' 50 American
citizens do not have close community ties, as do Japanese citizens. 15' Instead,
Americans can easily detach themselves from the community, and socially-based
reprimands, such as an apology, would be a miniscule punishment. 52 In addition,
140. See Japan Mulls Revising US Forces Pact After Okinawa Rape, CHINAdaily, available at
http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/news/2001-07-06/18755.html (last visited May 27, 2003).
141. See US To Turn Over Rape Suspect To Japan, supra note 134.
142. Id.
143. See Howard W. French, Airman's Rape Conviction Fans Okinawa's Ire Over U.S. Bases, N.Y.
TIMES, March 29, 2002. See also Svan, supra note 63.
144. The airman is now serving out his sentence in a Japanese prison where the torture and cruel
treatment of inmates is profound. See French, supra note 141. See also US Airman Gets 32 Months
Jail, CHINAdaily, March 29, 2002, available at http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2002-03-
29/63203.html (last visited July 14, 2003). For example, just recently, the media reported that an
inmate in a Japanese prison was killed when the guards turned a high pressured hose on him. See
Japanese Warders Plead Innocent in Death of Inmate, Agence France-Presse (March 11, 2003).
145. See French, supra note 141.
146. See id.; Suvendrini Kakuchi, Japan's Battlers of Sex Abuse Confront Culture, Law, WOMEN'S
ENEWS, April 17, 2003, available at http://www.womensenews.org (last visited July 14, 2003).
Although the United States forbids certain evidence to be admitted in a rape case, the suspect still has a
right to address his accuser. See Fed. R. Evid. 412.
147. See Criminal Justice System in Japan, supra note 77.
148. See Fed. R. App. Pro. 4. Although this right is not Constitutionally protected, it is well
recognized by federal statutes and case law.
149. See Rome Statute at art. 67(1)(e). See also U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
150. See Hohmann, supra note 9, at 158.
151. See id.
152. See id., at 159; Wagatsuma, supra note 51, at 492.
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most American citizens tend to be angered, rather than embarrassed, by the legal
system. 153 The reason for such a discrepancy lies in the development of moral
considerations. Japanese citizens are more likely to have close community ties,
whereas American citizens are individualized. 54 Because of this difference, the
American legal system operates in a distinctly different fashion.155
Nevertheless, the United States affords many rights to its citizens that Japan
does not provide. Most of these rights can be found in the Bill of Rights. 156 The
first eight of those amendments primarily deal with the rights of suspects and
criminal offenders. 157  However, these rights were not always protected by
states.15 8  Instead, they were sparingly provided.' 59  With the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, states were forced to apply all fundamental Constitutional
guarantees. 160
Included in the Bill of Rights is the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees the
privilege against self-incrimination.' 61 That is, American citizens cannot be forced
to confess to crimes or testify against themselves in a court of law.
162
Approximately a century after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided the landmark case of Miranda v.
Arizona "in an attempt to bring an end to police use of coercion, threats,
psychological pressure, promises, and deception to get suspects to confess in
criminal cases."' 163  Miranda forced police officers at the time of arrest to tell
suspects that they had a right to remain silent as well as a right to counsel.1
64
When a suspect is initially detained, a Miranda warning is read to ensure that the
suspect is aware of these rights. 1
65
In addition, whether the suspect's confession is voluntarily given is subjected
to stricter standards in the United States than in Japan. In the United States, the
police and prosecutors are forbidden to use any violent, coercive methods.'
66
153. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 136.
154. See Hohmann, supra note 9, at 158-159.
155. See generally Hohmann, supra note 9.
156. See U.S. Const., amends. I-X.
157. See U.S. Const., amends. I-ViII. See also Stephen C. Thaman, Is America A Systematic
Violator of Human Rights in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 44 ST. LOuis L.J. 999, 1000
(2000).
158. See Thaman, supra note 155, at 1002.
159. See id. See also Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253
(1982).
160. See Israel, supra note 157, at 253. See also Thaman, supra note 155, at 1002.
161. See US Const, amend. V
162. See id.
163. Thaman, supra note 155, at 1009. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). This case has come under heightened scrutiny in recent years. Many legal
scholars fear that this case will soon be overturned reducing a suspect's protection to remain silent and
demand counsel before questioning. See e.g., Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free To Disgard Miranda,
112 YALE L.J. 447 (2002); George C. Thomas IlI and Richard A. Leo, The Effects Of Miranda v.
Arizona: "Embedded" In Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203 (2002).
164. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
165. See id
166. See id. at 506; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
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Nevertheless, suspects often feel coerced to confess. 167  Those confessions have
often been found to be false, resulting in many innocent persons being
convicted. 168  To ensure fairness and justice, American courts have deemed
confessions obtained as a result of coercive measures to be inadmissible. 169 in
furtherance of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, if a suspect is
questioned, he may choose to remain silent, and has a right to do so.
170
Also included in the Constitution is the right to counsel. 17  This guarantee
was also included in the Miranda warning.' 72 A suspect not only has the right to
refuse to answer questions, but also may demand that his attorney be present
during the entire pre-trial period. 173 The United States, unlike Japan, guarantees
the right to counsel even during interrogation. 174 In the United States, a suspect
may refuse to answer any questions without an attorney present. 175 In addition, the
defense attorney does not need to obtain permission from either the prosecutor or
the police before seeing his client.' 76  Instead, the prosecution must first seek
permission from defense counsel before continuing to question the suspect. 77 In
fact, once the suspect requests an attorney, all interrogation must cease until the
suspect speaks to an attorney. 17
8
Before being questioned without an attorney present, a suspect must waive
both his right to remain silent and to consult with a lawyer. 179 Because of such
Constitutional guarantees, there seems to be many more restrictions on
interrogation procedures in the United States than in Japan. The purpose of
interrogation in the United States also differs from that of Japan. Unlike Japan, the
main focus of the interrogation period is to determine the facts surrounding the
case. Although police and prosecutors would like to procure a confession, it is not
necessary to obtain a confession before trial. "0
When a suspect in the United States is arraigned, the court may choose to set
(1978). See also Thaman, supra note 155, at 1000; Andrew Pace, Fifteenth Annual Review Of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-1985: Confessions, 74 GEO. L.J.
593, 594 (1986).
167. See Thaman, supra note 155, at 1009; Pace, supra note 164, at 594.
168. Judges have often found that the mere presence of the police and the pre-trial process are
coercive in and of themselves. This may add to the number of false confessions. See Thaman, supra
note 155, at 1009.
169. See id.
170. Seeid.
171. See U.S. Const, amend V and VI.
172. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-468.
173. See Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law & Literature, 8 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1,20 (1996).
174. See generally David A. Suess, Paternalism Versus Pugnacity: The Right to Counsel in Japan
and the United States, 72 IND. L.J. 291 (1996).
175. See id. at 293.
176. See People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148 (1963).
177. See Suess, supra note 172, at 294-295.
178. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981).
179. See Thaman, supra note 155, at 1009.
180. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 145.
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bail.' 18  The purpose of bail in the United States is to ensure the offender's
appearance in a court.' 8' Therefore, a confession is not necessary before bail is
granted. Most people are allowed to post bail, except for offenders of heinous
crimes, including murder. In those cases, the suspects are detained in jail cells
until trial begins. Although American prosecutors also have wide discretion, their
decision to prosecute does not rest as heavily on criminological reasons like the
prosecutors in Japan. 183 Rather, most of the cases that are not prosecuted lack
sufficient evidence. 
8 4
The United States and Japan practice rather different pre-trial procedures.
Although they are both strong, democratic, and industrialized nations, they each
treat their suspects quite differently. This difference may be due to cultural
influences, and the difference between a closely-knit community in Japan, and the
need to recognize the individual in the United States. Whatever the cause, the
Japanese system is quite distinct from most other democratic, industrialized
nations. 115
APPRAISAL OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM
The Japanese have had tremendous success with their legal system, despite, or
perhaps because of, the abusive procedures. 8 6 In 1985, it was estimated that "four
or five times fewer offenses are committed in Japan than in Western countries."'1
8 7
The percentage of arrests also affords a great disparity.18 8 In Japan, the percentage
of charges that led to arrests is 64.2% while it is 20.9% in the United States.'
8 9
Once a citizen is arrested, he is referred to one of several types of courts.' 9 In
Japan, 92.4% of the 65,553 persons accused and brought before the district court
were tried within six months.' 91 In addition, only 0.14% of the total 81,093
persons accused were acquitted.192  The conviction rate totals approximately
99.86%. 193
18 1. See Gina Barry, Appellate Procedure / International Law-United States v. Kirby: The Case
For Appellate Review of Grants of Bail By District Court Judges in International Extradition Cases, 21
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 596 (1999).
182. Bayley, supra note 5, at 145.
183. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 134-135.
184. See id.
185. It is important to note, however, that the United States and Japan are the only two democratic,
industrialized nations that still employ the death penalty. Nevertheless, the United States sentences
convicts to death and carries through with their execution at a much higher rate that does Japan. See
Thaman, supra note 155, at 1000.
186. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 265-66.
187. See id. at 265.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See An Overview of the Judicial System: Court System of Japan, at
http://www.courts.go.jp/engish/soshikie_ .html (last visited May 31,2003).
191. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 266.
192. See id.
193. See id The conviction rate for miscellaneous charges is comparable (99.88%). Id.
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These numbers suggest that what was once the "family model" has become a
model for "precision justice," leading to both efficiency and success in the
Japanese legal system. 194 In addition, there tends to be "an excessive tendency to
praise the 'Japanese methods' of operation and administration."' 95 However, this
system has also been highly criticized. Many critics have questioned whether this
level of efficiency justifies a system of diminished rights for suspects. In fact, the
Japanese system is criticized for both "the insufficient guarantee of due process
and the risk of violations of the rights and freedoms of suspects."'
196
The treatment of suspects is a grave concern for the International community
not because of what might the suspect undergo if he is ever convicted, but merely
because the pre-trial treatment itself is horrendous. 197  The rights of suspects
afforded by Japan have been highly criticized in recent years.19s Japanese citizens
are afforded far fewer rights as suspects in order for the Japanese system to work
more efficiently.'99 The Japanese legal system is a "system that is prepared to
sacrifice [individual] rights at the altar of successful conviction statistics.",2°°
High conviction and clearance rates suggest "judicial review does no more
than verify investigative results. 22 ' Such criticism has prompted investigation into
the Japanese legal system. Legal scrutiny has found that "abuses and errors
sometimes resulting from the humiliating methods employed by investigators and
the small degree of control exercised by the judges," are responsible for such high
rates. 202 Although legal scholars in the international arena are amazed by such
efficiency in the Japanese legal system, they are now questioning its process.
Because of such problems, some have deemed the Japanese system "abnormal,"
"diseased," and even "hopeless."
203
194. Id.
195. Id. at 289.
196. Id. at 268. As discussed in Section Ill. a. of this paper, Japan's criminal justice system is
scrutinized for its lack of fundamental human rights including the right to bail, right against self-
incrimination, and right to remain silent. Further, the Japanese police and prosecutors often violates
human rights during interrogation by subjecting the suspects to cruel treatment such as withholding
food and water, depriving them of sleep, and bribing suspects with cigarettes or special food. See
BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 146.
197. See Foote, supra note 34, at 317-18 (arguing that the Japanese criminal justice system is
actually lenient because few convicts are sentenced to prison and those that are only receive short
terms). See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 146.
198. See Ramlogan, supra note 101, at 127. Although many cases have recently evolved
demonstrating the lack of rights afforded Japanese suspects, the Japanese system always has been
highly criticized for its pre-trial detention procedures, which is discussed later in this paper. See VI. a.
International Scrutiny and Its Effect, infra page 3 1.
199. See Ramlogan, supra note 101, at 127.
200. Id. at 159. A case in 1983 showed that a judge was willing to allow police officers to conduct
a search a full two hours after the crime occurred in order to find incriminating evidence to sustain a
conviction. Id.
201. Kitamura, supra note 10, at 268-269.
202. Id. at 269.
203. Foote, supra note 34, at 319 (quoting Ryuichi Hirano, Genko keyjisosho no shindan [Diagnosis
of Current Crimiani Procedure], in 4 DANDO SHIGEMITSU HAKASE KOKI SHUKAGU RONBUNSHU
[COLLECTION OF WORKS TO COMMEMORATE THE SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY OF DR. SHIGEMITSU DANDO]
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An International Reaction
International Human Rights Background
Since 1948 and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
an international customary law relating to criminal procedure has been developing,
most of which Japan has not honored.2°4 Among other concerns, the use of
imprisonment for pre-trial detention purposes has been limited by the International
community. 20 5 The Tokyo Rules, adopted by the United Nations, state that "pre-
trial detention shall be used as a means of last resort in criminal proceedings. 2 °6
Ironically, Japan uses a detention system for up to twenty-three days in order to
conduct interrogations before trial.20 7 The Tokyo Rules further provide that "pre-
trial detention shall last no longer than necessary... and shall be administered
humanely and with respect for the inherent dignity of human beings." 208 In Japan,
however, coercive measures are taken during pre-trial detention in order to extract
confessions.
20 9
Many nations have recognized the right to a fair trial and procedures.
Included in these rights is the inadmissibility of certain evidence because of the
manner in which it was obtained. Evidence that is obtained by torture is excluded
under The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment and by the American Convention on Human Rights.210
Furthermore, The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the American Convention on Human
Rights provide that "confessions of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is
made without coercion of any kind., 21 1 Many national constitutions provide
similar protection; however, the Japanese system uses coercion in order to extract
confessions of guilt.
2 12
A number of nations have also recognized the right to counsel. Both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 21 3 and the Body of Principles
407 (Yasuhara Hiraba et at. Eds., 1985), translated in 22 LAW IN JAPAN 129 (1989)).
204. Brian P. Menard, Book Review, Evidence of Compliance In International Law, Human Rights,
and Japanese Law: The Impact of International Law on Japanese Law, 40 VA J. INT'L L. 763, 772
(2000).
205. See e.g., United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures [hereinafter
referred to as The Tokyo Rules], U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 100, at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/110 (1991).
206. Id.
207. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 144.
208. The Tokyo Rules, supra note 202.
209. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 267.
210. See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85; 26 June 1987, No. 2484, Adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1984. See also Bassiouni, supra note 4, at
269.
211. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 269.
212. See Kitamura, supra note 10, at 267.
213. International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, U.N.T.S. No. 14668, vol 999 (1976).
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for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
214
require that anyone accused of a crime be afforded the right to counsel. The
International community has recognized this right as fundamental to the idea of
defense and due process. 2'5 Although the right to the presence of counsel during
all stages of the proceedings has not been guaranteed by most nations, some,
however, do provide for the "right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings" and
can be implied in others, "which provide for the right to defense at all stages of the
proceedings.216 Nevertheless, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights guarantees the accused the right to counsel "in the determination of any
criminal charge against him. 21 7  Among other rights, the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides counsel to
"everyone charged with a criminal offense, 21 8 and The Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the
American Convention on Human Rights guarantees counsel "during the
proceedings" to those "accused of a serious crime. 21 9 In addition, the Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment guarantees "the right to counsel during the preliminary investigation
period. 22 °
In Japan, on the other hand, a suspect is not guaranteed the right to counsel
and can be interrogated without a defense attorney present. 22 , In fact, the defense
attorney must receive permission from both the prosecutor as well as the police
before he can see or talk to his client during the pre-trial period.222 Although these
fundamental rights have been recognized internationally, they have not been
implemented into the Japanese system. Many Americans may argue that the right
to counsel is only necessary where the accused is tried and punished. However, it
is important to understand the extent of abusive procedures and lack of protection
that exist in the pre-trial phase of the Japanese criminal justice system. Regardless
of whether any sentence is eventually handed down, every human should be
afforded human rights.223
214. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. res. 43/173, annex, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 298, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988).
215. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 284-5.
216. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 285.
217. Id. at 284.
218. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS no. 005),
open for signature by the members of the Council of Europe, in Rome, on 4 November 1950, Entry into
force: 3 September 1953, Article 6.
219. United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, supra note 207. See also Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 284.
220. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 284.
221. See BAYLEY, supra note 5, at 146.
222. See id.
223. See Foote, supra note 34, at 317-19 (urging that because few convicts are sentenced to prison
and those that are only receive a short term, the Japanese criminal justice system is actually lenient).
The major concern with the Japanese criminal justice system is not the amount of convicts that actually
go to prison, but the abusive procedures that they endure during the pre-trial period and, where
applicable, in prison after being sentenced. See generally Amnesty International, available at
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The International Criminal Court (ICC)
In addition to the passage of the numerous Conventions relating to the rights
of suspects and the accused, the construction of the ICC has forced many nations
to come together to agree on one criminal procedure standard to be used in
international criminal matters. In setting up the ICC, the U.N. Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court recognized the
importance of guaranteeing the rights of suspects.224 Many of the rights already
recognized by the abovementioned Conventions were also implemented in the
criminal procedures of the ICC.225  Although the ICC is designed to deal
exclusively with war criminals and crimes of genocide, it is the only international
court with a set of criminal procedures.22 6 Therefore, it is the only international
tribunal worth noting.
According to the Rome Statute, the legal process is initiated by a prosecutor.
227 After receiving information that a crime may have been committed, the
prosecutor may investigate the crime and analyze the seriousness of the crime. 22 8
Once the prosecutor determines that further investigation is warranted, he submits
a request for investigative authority to the Pre-Trial Chamber.229 If the initial
request is denied, the prosecutor is free to gather new information and collect new
230evidence to submit a new request. Once the investigation commences, suspects
231are guaranteed certain rights under the Rome Statute.
After the suspect is indicted and trial has commenced, further rights are
guaranteed to ensure the safety of the accused as well as a fair and impartial
trial.232 The rules dealing with trial procedure are found in Part 6 of the Rome
Statute and include the following: the right to be informed of the charges against
him; adequate time and tools to prepare a defense with the assistance of counsel of
the accused's choosing and to speak to his counsel in confidence; to challenge any
witness against him and to question his own witnesses on his own behalf; and the
www.amnesty.org. (searching for "Japan") (last visited May 31, 2003).
224. See Christopher Keith Hall, Current Development: The First Two Sessions of the UN
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91 Am. J. Int'l. L.
177, 178 (1997).
225. See Rome Statute.
226. See Rome Statute, art. 5.1.
227. Although the ICC has adopted its own set of procedures to be used, those rules must yield to
the rules and procedures delineated in the Rome Statute. See United Nations Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court PCNICC/2000/I/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 2000). Therefore, this section of
the article primarily addresses the Rome Statute.
228. See Rome Statute, art. 15.
229. See id.
230. See id., at art. 84.1 .a.
231. See generally id., at art. 55. Article 55 delineates rights of persons during investigations. Id.
In addition, the Rome statute gives further rights to those suspects who are to be investigated by either
the Prosecutor or a national authority. Pursuant to Part 9 of the Rome Statute, a nation may request to
prosecute/investigate the crime. Id.
232. See id., at art. 67
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right to remain silent.
233
Strikingly similar rights are also delineated in the American Constitution and
are guaranteed to any suspect in an American court.234 With a total of 139
signatories and 87 parties ratifying the Rome Statute and agreeing upon the stated
procedures, including Japan, the Rome Statute arguably represents the first sign of
emerging international customary law in the realm of criminal procedure. 235
The Future for Suspects in Japan
International Scrutiny and Its Effect
In upholding international standards outlined in the Rome Statute and other
Conventions, international organizations, including Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch have begrudged Japan to consider changing its system. 236 It
was reported on Japan's abusive practices that suspects "face routine violations of
human rights from the moment of arrest through the end of their prison term" and
the "penal facilities are overcrowded and secretive and abuse of prisoners is
widespread.237  Amnesty International has also discovered that the rules of
detention facilities are kept secretive in order to maintain "security. 238 Amnesty
International has labeled the Japanese criminal justice system as "cruel, inhuman
and degrading and must be stopped.,
239
Amnesty International has also scrutinized Japan's use of the death penalty.240
Again, the procedures used in executing an inmate are kept secretive and the
prisoner is usually only given two hours notice that he will be executed. 24' Even
the United Nations Human Rights Committee has had grave concerns over the
233. See id.
234. See U.S. Const, Amends. IV - VI. Nevertheless, the United States has vehemently opposed
the creation of the ICC based on its jurisdictional scope. See also Remigius Chibueze, United States
Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of "Operation Enduring Freedom, " 9 ANN.
SURV. INT'L & COMP. L 19, 31 (2003).
235. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ (last
visited Jan. 6, 2002); Joel F. England, The Response of the United States to the International Criminal
Court: Rejection, Ratification or Something Else?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 941,946 (2001).
236. See Prison Conditions in Japan, supra note 71; Amnesty International, Japan's Human Rights
Record Must Be Challenged, October 26, 1998, available at http://web.amnesty.org (last visited May
28, 2003).
237. See Prison Conditions in Japan, supra note 71; Amnesty International, Japan: Prison Abuses
Must Stop [hereinafter referred to as Prison Abuses Must Stop], public statement, November 20, 2002,
available at http://web.amnesty.org (last visited May 28, 2003) (focusing on the Japanese prison
system).
238. Prison Abuses Must Stop, supra note 232. See also No Advance on Human Rights, supra note
I.
239. See Prison Abuses Must Stop, supra note 232.
240. See No Advance on Human Rights, supra note 1.
241. See Amnesty International, Japan: Executions - Continuing the Secret and Cruel Practice
[hereinafter referred to as Continuing the Secret and Cruel Practice], public statement, June 21, 2001,
available at http://web.amnesty.org (last visited May 28, 2003).
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application of the death penalty in Japan.242 The nation's failure to notify the
prisoner's family or lawyer of the prisoner's execution violates the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.243
AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFICACY OF THE SYSTEM
In 2001, over 2.5 million crimes were committed in Japan, a 12% increase
24from the previous year. 4 Nevertheless, the rate of defendants who confess has
remained the same.245 Approximately 92% of all defendants disposed of in 1996
confessed.246 This rate is the same for 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.247 This steady
and high rate of confessions leaves foreigners bewildered and suspicious of the
Japanese system.248 The international community has come to question the cruel
treatment of suspects and the accused in Japan. Although the closely-knit Japanese
community is attributed to a high and even confession rate over the years, scholars
fear that the coercive nature of the Japanese legal system is to blame.249
It has become increasingly apparent that the current Japanese criminal
procedures violate human rights and there is no doubt that reform is necessary to
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of criminal suspects in Japan. While
substantial and extensive reform is essential to protect suspects of crimes in Japan,
the Japanese criminal justice system is not entirely despondent and an appropriate
analysis should recognize the prevalence of both despair and hope. A comparison
of historical crime and arrest rates to those of recent years reveals that Japan's
reliance on detention practices has dramatically decreased. 250  This is especially
important considering that most abusive procedures take place either within the
prison system itself or within the "substitution prisons" during detention.251
In 1984, 1,588,693 crimes were reported to Japanese police and 1,002,923
242. See id; Jason Crane, Japan to United Nations: We Don't Need No Stinkin' Human Rights!
[hereinafter referred to as Japan to United Nations], TABLOID, November I1, 1998, available at
http://www.tabloid.net (last visited May 28, 2003).
243. See Continuing the Secret and Cruel Practice, supra note 236; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 210.
244. See Statistical Handbook of Japan 2002, available at http://www.stat.go.jp/ (last visited Jan. 4,
2003).
245. See A Guide to Court Procedures, Table 2: Annual Comparison of Rate of Defendants Who




249. See generally Amnesty International, available at www.amnesty.org. (searching for "Japan")
(last visited May 31, 2003).
250. See Japan Information Network, Statistics: Criminal Offenses, available at
http://jin.jcic.or.jp/stat/stats/14CRM2l .html (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
251. See e.g., Japanese Warders Plead Innocent in Death of Inmate, supra note I. While the crime
rate has risen, arrest rates have dramatically fallen. It is not the "superefficient" system it once was: the
"good arrest rate (up to 70%) and an even better conviction rate (nearly 100%)." Stephan Hauser, The
Times, They Are A 'Changin', available at http://www.tokyo.to/backissues/sepOO/editorial/editor.htm
(last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
VOL. 31:4
JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
arrests were made.252 That is, just over 63% of all crimes reported led to arrests;
however, this rate has continued to decline while the Japanese crime rate, like the
crime rate in most other nations, has steadily increased.253 An all time high of
2,735,612 crimes were reported to Japanese officials in 2001 while only 542,115
arrests were made.254 That is, a mere 20% of all crimes reported led to arrests.
This downward trend suggests that the once strict and efficient Japanese criminal
justice system is becoming more lenient. While a less efficient criminal justice
system does not necessarily call for celebration, it does dispel many fears that
detainees, suspects, or the accused will be mistreated. Simply stated, they cannot
be subject to cruel treatment when they are not in police or state custody. This
downtrend in arrest and conviction rates, therefore, should not be seen as a sign of
failure. Although the Japanese system seems flawed from a statistical standpoint,
the risk of cruel treatment has declined, and the human rights of all Japanese
citizens are more secure.
Reformation
In response to the profuse cruelty found within Japanese system, Amnesty
International and other international organizations including the United Nations
have urged Japan to abide by a "code of conduct which conforms with
international standards. 256 In 1999, Japan agreed to uphold the ideals outlined in
the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 257 This step was seen internationally as a
step toward protecting human rights in Japan, especially to those who have been
suspected or accused of a crime.258 Although the Japanese people have acceded to
the Convention, the Japanese system remains riddled with arbitrary and abusive
procedures. As recent as November, 2002, Amnesty International has reported that
Japan continues to employ strict disciplinary measures and arbitrary rules,
including forcing inmates and detainees to sit in certain positions for hours at a
time. 259  The organization further reported that "inmates are held in metal or
leather handcuffs, forced to eat like an animal, and to excrete through a hole cut in
their pants. 26°
As stated above, imposing Western standards upon the Japanese culture will
not succeed in aiding in Japanese reformation. Any reformation that takes place




256. No Advance on Human Rights, supra note 1.
257. See United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 207.
258. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Welcomes Japans Accession to the
Convention Against Torture, public statement, July 30, 1999, available at http://web.amnesty.org (last
visited May 28, 2003).
259. See No Advance on Human Rights, supra note 1.
260. Id. Such arbitrary rules and harsh punishments are dealt out to those detained because they are
suspected or accused of a crime as well as to prisoners who have been convicted. See id.
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must be in alignment with Japanese traditions and customs. The first necessary
step is to reform its Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure. The Japanese
Constitution allows wrongfully accused individuals to seek redress from the
state.261 This provision places heavy emphasis on the police and prosecution in
ensuring a guilty plea or verdict. The government officials do not have the liberty
to search for truth and justice, especially if that means finding the suspect not
guilty. 262  Instead, the Japanese government is solely focused on a finding of
guilt.263 Such a system easily leads to abuse.
Japan, however, has recently formed a Judicial Reform Council to consider
"bold reform of the present judicial system" 264 as well as a Research Commission
on the Constitution.265 On July 6, 1999, the Japanese House of Representatives
Committee on Rules and Administration formed the Research Commission, but
limited their authority.266 The Commission cannot actually submit bills to the Diet
267in order to initiate a change in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Research
Commission was instructed to conduct research regarding the current Japanese
Constitution over a five-year period.268  Although many are skeptical that the
formation and work of these committees will actually result in more rights for
suspects and the accused in Japan, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction.269
It is evidence that Japan, along with the international community, recognizes that
their criminal justice system is flawed and a sign that it is willing to consider new
procedures.
CONCLUSIONS
As a direct result of its culture, the Japanese criminal justice system often
sacrifices the safety and well being of its accused for efficiency and legal order.
One study showed that "Japan's clearance rate - the percentage of reported crimes
that are solved - is among the highest in the world., 270 Furthermore, its conviction
rate is over 99.8%.271 In addition, fewer than 5% are sent to prison and most of
those who do serve prison sentences serve less than two years.272 On the other
hand, the United States sentences more than 30% of offenders to prison for an
average of four and one-half years.273 While these rates demand praise of the
261. See Japan Const., art. 40.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. Svan, supra note 63.
265. See Research Commission on the Constitution of the House of Representatives, available at





269. See Svan, supra note 63.
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Japanese system, some scholars remain skeptical. Although the Japanese criminal
justice system seems to work quite well in controlling crime, it also violates human
rights. Suspects are taken advantage of and treated poorly for the good of society
and the security of the nation.
Despite its lack of protection and safeguards against cruel and ill treatment,
Japan continues to sanction its legal system.274 In response to an editorial printed
in the Washington Post regarding the treatment of suspects in Japan, the Minister
for Public Affairs for the Embassy of Japan in the United States of America, Mr.
Satoru Satoh, wrote the Washington Post assuring them that the article included
"misunderstandings relating to Japan, which lead to erroneous conclusions. ' 275 He
went on to state that the Japanese system "ensures due process and fairness" and
described the safeguards granted under the Japanese Criminal Procedure Code.276
Indeed, the Japanese Constitution itself guarantees that an arrest may only be
made after a "competent judicial officer" has issued a warrant or while the offense
is being committed.277 The Constitution further asserts that any person being
arrested or detained must be informed of the charges and must be allowed to seek
counsel.278 A person cannot be held without cause; searches and seizures must be
reasonable; torture and cruel punishments are forbidden; a speedy, public trial
before an impartial tribunal is guaranteed; cross-examination of all witnesses is
assured; the right to remain silent is promised, and confessions obtained under
torture or undue pressure or not admissible in court.279 Japan's Code of Criminal
Procedure further delineates rights that suspects and the accused are to be
granted.28°
The problem with the Japanese legal system is not what it claims to provide to
suspects. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Criminal Procedure Code,
and various other statutes are many. Unfortunately, the reality of the practice does
not mirror the procedures described in any of the laws. There is no doubt that, on
paper, the rights of the accused and suspects are numerous and comply with
international standards. Nevertheless, there are repeated incidents of cruel and ill
treatment. Until the Japanese practices come in line with these standards, its
system will continue to be ridiculed.
It is equally important to allow Japan to reform their system within the
context of their culture. Because of the drastic cultural differences, imposing
Western standards on the Japanese system would be futile. The values held by
each society are distinctly different and one cannot operate within the framework
of the other. Japan should therefore be allowed to rectify their system in a way
that their society can accept and tolerate. Any revision to be made to the Japanese
criminal justice system must be achieved within the ambiance of the Japanese way
274. See, e.g., Satoh, supra note 77; Japan to United Nations, supra note 237.
275. Satoh, supra note 77.
276. Id.
277. Japan Const., art. 33.
278. Id at art. 34.
279. See Japan Const., arts. 34-39.
280. See generally Japan Code of Criminal Procedure.
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of life.
With new international light shown upon the Japanese legal realities and the
new standards championed in the ICC, the Japanese system is beginning to take a
turn for the better. Although the Japanese criminal justice system remains under
close scrutiny and continues to be chastised, many critics are simultaneously
ignoring the recent trend in arrest rates and creation of new committees, which
promise to reform the Japanese criminal procedure. While Japan should be praised
for its pains thus far, it should also be encouraged to continue to work within its
own cultural context toward a system that grants its criminal suspects and the
accused far greater protection and human rights.
LESSONS FROM CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF A STRONG
JUDICIARY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR SUCCESSFUL
HUMANITARIAN AID
Scot W. Greenwood
Armed conflict between sovereign states creates many problematic issues that
civilized societies must address. Reconstruction of war torn nations is restricted by
human rights violations, both during and following armed conflict, and the
difficulty of providing humanitarian aid to refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs).' These problems often go hand in hand, as most refugees and
IDPs are the victims of human rights violations suffered at the hands of conflicting
parties. In recent years, many conflict areas have received humanitarian aid and
benefited from the involvement of foreign governments to the extent that "nation-
building" has become a common term associated with humanitarian aid in post-
conflict situations. However, due to the complexity of many of the problems faced
by refugees and IDPs, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and nation-building
efforts as a whole is variable.
One of the most important elements to ensure that humanitarian aid is
successful is the need to maintain protection for refugees and IDPs while
assistance is being provided. Protection for refugees and IDPs must be provided
concurrently with humanitarian efforts to facilitate proper reintegration with
society.4 More importantly, ensuring that a legal system is in place to adequately
address human rights violations is an essential component to providing protection
and ensuring that humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts have sustainable,
long-term positive effects.5  The necessary protection that must accompany
"J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 2003; B.S. Purdue University, 1996. Scot W. Greenwood
is an associate with the law firm of Retherford, Mullen, Johnson & Bruce, LLC in Colorado Springs,
Colorado. The author would like to thank Paolo Artini, Henry Lovat, and Rachel Bayani for the
opportunity and their aid in studying these issues firsthand in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1. See DAVID A. KORN, EXODUS WITHIN BORDERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRISIS OF
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 3 (1999).
2. See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO), NATO's ROLE IN RELATION TO THE
CONFLICT IN KOsovo (July 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited
July 17, 2003).
3. See KORN,supra note 1, at 100-101.
4. See id. at 100.
5. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (LCHR), Kosovo: PROTECTION AND PEACE-
BUILDING. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES. RETURNEES. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS. AND
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returning refugees and IDPs cannot be adequately maintained if ongoing human
rights violations go unpunished and unresolved.6 Refugees and IDPs will not feel
safe and secure within the society in which they are attempting to be reintegrated
without an effective legal system that addresses human rights claims. 7 The efforts
of humanitarian aid organizations will founder without the presence of an effective
judiciary.8 The sense of protection provided by a just and functioning legal system
will enable humanitarian aid efforts to reach their maximum potential. 9
The necessity of protecting human rights with a functioning judiciary in order
to support successful humanitarian aid effects can be evidenced by an examination
of three recent post-conflict situations, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),
Kosovo, and East Timor. This article will briefly describe the conflicts that
occurred in these areas, the human rights violations associated with these areas,
and the major problems with the judicial systems of these areas following the
cessation of hostilities that allowed on-going human rights violations to occur.
The applicable human rights law and judicial mechanisms employed regarding
MINORITIES 4 (1999), available at http://www.lchr.org/archives/arc-refs/feature/kosovo/peacebuilding
.htm (last visited July, 17, 2003). Physical safety and other protection concerns can only be addressed
in the presence of a functioning civil authority and security presence. Id. In the case of Kosovo, the
initial absence of these institutions resulted in serious threats to the human rights protection situation of
refugees, returnees, IDPs, and minorities, as well as effecting long-term prospects for reconciliation and
future peaceful co-existence. Id. The delayed arrival of a functioning civil administration under the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) allowed for escalation of violence and crime to occur
with virtual impunity, thus making the security situation more precarious. Id.
6. "The failure to address past and ongoing violations of international humanitarian and human
rights law promptly and effectively, and to create a sense of law and order, can impede the broader
objectives of a humanitarian operation." Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a
Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 47
(2001). "A functioning judicial system can positively affect reconciliation and confidence-building
efforts within often highly traumatized post-crisis societies, not least because it can bring justice to
those responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law." Id. at 60.
7. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 46-47. "The lack of adequate law enforcement and the failure
to remove criminal offenders can inevitably affect both the authority of the mission and the local
population's willingness to respect the rule of law." Id. at 60. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (LCHR), KOsovO: A FRAGILE PEACE (2000), available at
http://www.lchr.org/archives/arcrefs/feature/kosovo/kosovofeature.htm (last visited July 17, 2003)
[Hereinafter LCHR: KOSOVO]. "The lack of effective judicial and policing mechanisms is a key factor
in perpetuating a climate of insecurity in Kosovo." Id.
8. The humanitarian experience gained from Kosovo has proven that, although the initial strategy
of the operations of giving priority to traditional peace-building efforts (including ensuring peace and
security and facilitating refugee return), the administration of justice must be considered a top priority
from the outset. Hansjorg Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 47. "When post-conflict reconstruction fails,
international donors are discouraged, confidence is undermined within the society, and the very
professional and business people needed for reconstruction may leave." KORN, supra note 1, at 119.
9. For humanitarian aid efforts to be successful on a society wide basis (i.e. "nation-building"),
they must be able to "function within a framework of law and order," and there must be a judiciary that
can perform "minimal judicial and prosecutorial functions" established at the earliest stages. See
Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 47-48. Successful humanitarian aid operations have been shown to
"generate confidence between opposing parties or lessen tension between them, for instance by
alleviating human sufferings on both sides." Tatsuro Kunugi, The Strategy of Humanitarian Assistance,
24 U.N. CHRON. 54 (1987).
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protection of human rights in these areas will also be examined, with particular
emphasis placed on the need for a strong judicial system in aiding these
mechanisms to function. Also presented is (i) evidence that the protection of
human rights is an important component in allowing humanitarian aid and nation
building efforts to be successful and (ii) evidence demonstrating that the
international community must play a vital role in strengthening the judicial
systems of these post-conflict areas.
Lastly, this paper will examine the importance of insuring a strong,
functioning judicial system to protect the human rights of refugees and IDPs in the
context of two more recent conflicts, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. This article
will demonstrate the vital role played by the international community in rebuilding
post-conflict judiciaries; specifically, for any post-conflict judicial system to
adequately protect human rights and allow for successful humanitarian aid efforts,
discussion will highlight the necessity of international community involvement in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Following the succession of the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia from the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991,10 the wars that followed
this succession and the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent nations
by the international community, BiH declared its own independence from the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on April 5, 1992." Following this
declaration of independence, various ethnic groups vied for territorial control
within BiH, most notably Bosnian Serbs, who desired to remain with Serbia to
form a "greater Serbian" nation, and Croats, who desired Herzegovina to become
part of newly independent Croatia.12 This conflict was finally resolved with the
10. Slovenia and Croatia succeeded from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on June 25,
1991 following the results of an earlier national referendum. Bola Ajibola, Human Rights in the
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 189 (1997).
1I. See MISHA GLENNY, THE BALKANS: NATIONALISM, WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1804-
1999 638 (1999). In January of 1992, Bosnia - Herzegovina (BiH) and Macedonia informed the
European Community that they sought recognition as independent states, however BiH was denied at
this time. Ajibola, supra note 10, at 189. "Bosnia-Herzegovina was the third largest republic in former
Yugoslavia with an estimated population of 4.35 million. It had the most diverse population of the
republics with no one nationality comprising a majority. Ethnic Muslims: a South Slavic, Serb-Croat
speaking people of Islamic faith, have a plurality comprising 43.7 percent; next are the ethnic Serbs
with 31.3 percent, and Croats with 17.3 percent. Approximately 5.5 percent of the population of
Bosnia-Herzegovina consider themselves ethnic Yugoslavs. The ethnic distribution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina before 1993 was quite diverse and different nationalities were not concentrated in any
particular area." Id. at 190.
12. See GLENNY, supra note II, at 638. "Six months after the outbreak of the war, the Yugoslav
crisis had assumed serious international dimensions. The United States, Germany, Britain and France,
Greece, Turkey, Russia, Iran and a number of Middle Eastern countries all pursued widely different
policies with regard to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The difficulty in reconciling these became
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signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (GFAP) in Paris on December 14, 1995.13 However, by the time the
fighting had halted, it displaced an estimated 640,000 to 800,000 refugees and
IDPs.
14
The GFAP not only ended four years of conflict within BiH, but also ended a
conflict "marked by brutal human rights violations on a scale not witnessed in
Europe since the end of World War Il."'5  Human rights violations involving
violence, such as rape and murder were common during the conflict, however,
violent human rights abuses continued throughout BiH following the formal end of
the conflict. Many of these abuses were experienced by refugees and IDPs
returning to their homes following the signing of the GFAP, which guaranteed all
displaced persons the right to return to their pre-war home of origin.' 6 Refugees
and IDPs were subjected to ethnic discrimination, political intimidation, and
discrimination in terms of employment, education, and violent abuses throughout
BiH. 17 More specifically, minority returnees and IDPs that returned to their former
places of displacement were subjected to human rights abuses and thus could not
adequately be re-integrated into a functioning civil society.
For example, in the northwestern Bosnian city of Velika Kladusa, a city that
experienced one of the highest refugee return rates in BiH following the end of the
conflict, returnees and IDPs that had been associated with the Demokratska
Narodna Zajednica (DNZ) political party were subjected to ongoing human rights
abuses.' 8 Supporters of the DNZ had actively fought against the Fifth Corps of the
insuperable when violence broke out in Bosnia, three months after the peacekeepers arrived in Croatia
in January 1992. With encouragement from the Americans, lzetbegovid opted for independence on 5
April, an injudicious move for a government with limited military resources and two potential enemies.
The Bosnian Serbs rejected the declaration and the fighting began." Id.
13. Brett Dakin, The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. The Republika Srpska:
Human Rights in a Mulit-Ethnic Bosnia, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 247 (2002). See Christine
Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton
Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 103 (2001). "The reconstruction envisaged by the GFA required
attention to the 'most difficult problems of a modem society'.... The GFA attempts to address these
problems through three strategies: provision for democratic elections; international controls to ensure
compliance with its vision; and human rights guarantees." Id. at 106. The negotiations for the GFAP
were conducted in November, 1995 at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, and as a
result, the GFAP is commonly referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement. Dakin, supra, at 247.
14. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ENVOY - EXTERNAL RELATIONS UNIT, BH REFUGEES IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
June 1996.
15. Dakin, supra note 13, at 247.
16. This is evidenced by the Constitution of the Federation of BiH which states, "All refugees and
displaced persons have the right to freely return to their homes of origin." Ajibola, supra note 10, at
193.
17. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, Human Rights Officer and Head of Velika Kladusa
Field Office, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Velika Kladusa, BiH (June 7,
2001); Interview with Kanson Dean, Velika Kladusa Station Commander, International Police Task
Force, in Velika Kladusa, BiH (June 7, 2001); Interview with Husein Delid, Mayor, Velika Kladusa, in
Velika Kladusa, BiH (June 7, 2001).
18. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17; Interview with Kanson Dean, supra
note 17; Interview with Husein Deli, supra note 17. The Demokratska Narodna Zajednica (DNZ) was
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Bosnian Army during the war. Following the return of DNZ affiliated individuals,
tensions remained high between supporters of the Bosnian army and supporters of
the DNZ.' 9 In the Summer of 2001, over five years after the signing of the GFAP,
human rights violations continued to occur involving the local citizenry, largely
associated with the DNZ (90%), and the local police force, which is affiliated with
the Party of Democratic Action-the primary political wing of the opposition to
Fikret Abdid's former army.2° Human rights abuses by Velika Kladusa police
became so widespread that the local citizens trusted only the international
community and felt that only the local International Police Task Force (IPTF)
presence kept the local police from initiating acts of revenge.2'
In Velika Kladusa, DNZ affiliated returnees and IDPs also experienced
human rights violations in other areas. Teachers affiliated with DNZ in the Velika
Kladusa region were denied available jobs, even though the applicants were
completely qualified (some having received teaching awards).22 Job postings were
still advertised following the rejection of qualified DNZ-affiliated applicants.23
Children of DNZ affiliated returnees were also removed from the local school and
were not allowed to attend class based upon their parent's political affiliation.
24
These abuses are violations of the applicable human rights laws in place in Bil
and could be countered by the presence of a strong judiciary enforcing these
human rights laws. Although a mechanism had been created under the GFAP to
investigate and address human rights violations, one of the primary causes of these
on-going abuses was that the judicial system in BiH was too weak to enforce the
applicable law.25 The international community needed to address this issue and
take steps to strengthen the judiciary. Before discussing this GFAP judicial
mechanism, the steps taken to strengthen its effectiveness, .and the impact of
strengthening the judiciary on refugee return and humanitarian aid efforts, the
applicable human rights law in BiH requires examination.
a political party created in part by Fikret Abdid. Sarajevo Government; Muslim Rebel Fikret Abdic
Returns to Politics with a New Party, British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 3, 1996, EE/D255 I/A. Fikret Abdit was a former Bosnian businessman who started Agrokomerc,
an agricultural firm that was one of the largest food processing companies in the former Yugoslavia.
Id; Fikret Abdic Reaffirms Faith in Zagreb and Belgrade Peace Declarations, British Broadcasting
Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 3, 1993, EE/1836/C. During the conflict, Bosnians
loyal to Fikret Abdid in and around the city of Bihad took up arms and fought against the Fifth Corps of
the Bosnian army. Bihac; Belgrade TV Says Rebel Muslims Refugees are Returning to Velika Kladusa,
British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 25, 1995, EE/2286/C; Samantha
Power, U.N. Fears for Civilians in Bihac, UPI, Aug. 1I, 1994, LEXts, Nexis Library, UPI File. As a
result, many Bosnians returning to the area fae hostility either because they fought with Abdid's army
or they are affiliated with DNZ. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17; Interview with
Kanson Dean, supra note 17.
19. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Interview with Kanson Dean, supra note 17.
22. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id; Interview with Husein Delid, supra note 17.
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Applicable Human Rights Law in BiH
The Constitution of BiH, contained within Annex 4 of the GFAP,
incorporates international human rights instruments directly into enforceable
domestic law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
26
The GFAP provides that the governing bodies established under the treaty, "shall
secure to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms."2 7  Such rights "will be
secured by adhering to a number of treaties including the European Convention
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).,, 28  "An
extensive annex of conventions is also incorporated as law .... " which includes
the ICCPR, the 1966 and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto and the 1966 Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 29 According to Ajibola:
The instruments themselves were carefully selected with a view to ensuring that
only those of United Nations or world-wide significance were incorporated. An
additional feature is that with the exception of the Universal Declaration (which is
of fundamental importance), all others are prescriptive and are intended to impose
legal obligations. By incorporating them directly into the Constitution, they are
enforceable domestically and require no separate incorporating legislation.
30
In fact, "the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), including its Protocols, is directly applicable law
and has priority over all other law at both the national and entity level."'" The
Constitution of BiH also requires that the country become or remain "a party to
listed U.N. and regional human rights instruments, including treaties that are not
yet in force and treaties that have attracted significant reservations from other state
parties., 32 Thus, laws guaranteeing internationally recognized standards of human
rights are now in place in BiH and directly applicable as domestic law. 33  The
26. See Chinkin & Paradine, supra note 13, at 107; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) collectively constitute the
"International Bill of Rights." Carla Bongiomo, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human
Rights Law to the United Nations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623,635 (2002).
27. Henry Perrit, Jr. & Christopher Lhulier, Focus on Cyberlaw: Information Access Based on
International Human Rights Laws, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 899,911 (1997).
28. Id.
29. Timothy W. Waters, The Naked Land: The Dayton Accords, Property Disputes, and Bosnia's
Real Constitution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 517, 530 n. 40 (1999).
30. Ajibola, supra note 10, at 192.
3 1. Waters, supra note 29, at 530. The governmental structure created under the GFAP includes a
national level federal govemment and two subordinate government "entities," the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Id.
32. Chinkin & Paradine, supra note 13, at 107.
33. "Each of these instruments is immediately enforceable at the domestic level, making Bosnia's
system of human rights protection stronger, at least on paper, than that of most countries." Dakin,
supra note 13, at 248. The UDHR was deemed to be applicable during the conflict preceding the
signing of the GFAP. See Geoffrey S. DeWeese, The Failure of the International Court of Justice to
Effectively Enforce the Genocide Convention, 26 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 625, 635 (1998). Bosnia
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international community had taken the initial step in strengthening the judicial
system in BiH by determining the human rights law to be applied following the
conflict.
The next section will examine the judicial mechanism created under the
GFAP to address violations of human rights in BiH. This section will be followed
by a discussion of the effectiveness of this judicial mechanism, the necessity of the
presence of the international community in allowing this mechanism to function,
and the impact of increased judicial enforcement of human rights violations on the
success of humanitarian aid efforts.
The Commission on Human Rights
The Agreement on Human Rights, contained in Annex 6 of the GFAP,
established the Commission on Human Rights, which is composed of the Human
Rights Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber.34 According to Dakin:
The Ombudsman, appointed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), is responsible for investigating alleged or apparent violations of
human rights guaranteed by the constituent agreements of the Dayton Peace
Agreement. Following any investigation, the Ombudsman may issue a report
setting out his or her findings and legal conclusions, facilitate a friendly
settlement, or refer the case to the Human Rights Chamber.
35
The Human Rights Chamber issues decisions that are binding within all of the
governmental entities in BiH.36 The Human Rights Chamber allows individuals,
associations, non-governmental organizations, and governments to bring a private
right of action against all three of the governmental bodies in BiH.37 Before an
application to the Human Rights Chamber is accepted, "the Chamber must
consider if effective remedies are available to the applicant through relevant
petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on March 20, 1993, claiming that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia had violated the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907,
the UDHR, the UN Charter, and other principals of customary international law. Id. at 634. In ruling
on these claims, the ICJ "determined that both Bosnia and Yugoslavia had succeeded to the
commitments of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Id. at 635. Thus, by succession,
the UDHR had been applicable in Bosnia before the GFAP was signed and the Bosnian Constitution
drafted.
34. Dakin, supra note 13, at 249. "The Ombudsman system, which is of Scandinavian origin, has
been employed and it has had a varying degree of success in many countries outside its native
environment. Its success largely depends on how persistent (one might say stubborn) the Ombudsman
is in unearthing abuses and pursuing remedies of redress." Ajibola, supra note 10, at 194.
35. Dakin, supra note 13, at 249.
36. Id. The judges of the Human Rights Chamber represent the people of BiH in the following
manner: "six judges are Bosnian (two Muslims and two Croats appointed by the Federation, and two
Serbs appointed by the Republika Srpska), while the remaining eight judges, appointed by the Council
of Europe, are citizens of countries other than Bosnia or any neighboring state." Id. The president of
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domestic courts or administrative agencies. ' 3  Once the Chamber accepts an
application, it requests written observations from the two parties involved.39
Following the receipt of the written observations, the Chamber deliberates and
chooses a course of action, which can include the facilitation of friendly
settlement, the adoption and delivery of a legally binding decision, or the ordering
of the respondent party to take provisional measures. 40  The Chamber handles
cases involving the right of individuals to return to their pre-war homes and "has
also issued decisions in cases concerning torture and detention, the death penalty
(which it declared illegal), employment discrimination, pension rights, and
environmental degradation.'
Thus, the Human Rights Agreement created a system in Bosnia to specifically
address human rights violations. However, violations continued to persist
following the establishment of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Human
Rights Chamber, primarily as a result of lack of enforcement and overall judicial
weakness. This mechanism could not function properly without the international
community providing for enforcement of the Human Rights Chamber decisions
and strengthening of the overall judicial system.
The Enforcement Problem, the Ferhadya Mosque Decision, and the
Strengthening of the Judiciary by the International Community
The Human Rights Chamber has no enforcement body to carry out its
decisions and it must therefore rely on the good faith of the respondent party for
enforcement.42 Therefore, the Human Rights Chamber must rely on other
international bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Stabilization Force, the IPTF, the OSCE, and the United Nations (UN) Office of
the High Representative to provide enforcement of the Human Rights Chamber
decisions. 43 This lack of enforcement has caused decisions of the Human Rights
Chamber to go unimplemented, however, following an overall strengthening of the
judicial system throughout BiH, "implementation rates have steadily increased
since the Chamber's first decision was issued in 1996, but the Chamber still
struggles to achieve full compliance. 44  It appears from the necessity of
international enforcement of the Human Rights Chamber's decision regarding the
Ferhadija Mosque, that without a strengthening of the judicial system by the
international community, the Chamber would not be able to adequately address
human rights violations in BiH. 45
38. Id. at 251.
39. Id.
40. Id. "A provisional measure allows the Chamber to stop the respondent party's activity of
which the applicant complains while the Chamber further deliberates on the merits of the case." Id. at
255.
41. Id. at 252. "As of December 2001, 8481 applications had been registered with the Chamber."
Id. As of that time, the Chamber had issued 1033 decisions. Id.
42. Id. at 259.
43. Id. at 259-260.
44. See Dakin, supra note 13, at 260.
45. See id. at 267-268.
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The Ferhadija Mosque, destroyed during the conflict, was one of the largest
and most famous mosques in Bosnia. Permits for its reconstruction had been
repeatedly denied following a Human Rights Chamber decision holding that
disallowing reconstruction was a violation of the right of Muslims to freely
manifest their religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the ECHR.46 Following this
decision, the respondent party, the Republika Srpska, initially failed to grant the
reconstruction permit.47 Thus, the respondent party did not adequately address an
on-going violation of human rights. Therefore, the goal of humanitarian aid
agencies in restoring a civil society was being undermined by the refusal to protect
the fundamental human right of returnees to "freely manifest their religion." The
judgment of the Human Rights Chamber was eventually implemented following
"persuasive action against the Republika Srpska by the international
community.
48
The authorities of the Republika Srpska eventually issued the permit to
reconstruct the Ferhadija Mosque;49 however, judicial enforcement had to be
strengthened by the international community before the decision would be
honored. This case demonstrates that in order for humanitarian aid efforts to be a
success, there lies a need for a strong judiciary with the purpose of enforcing
human rights laws. If the judiciary was unable to enforce the decision of Human
Rights Chamber regarding the Ferhadija Mosque, violations of the right to freely
manifest one's religion would continue and the goal of restoring a civil society
where human rights are protected would be unobtainable. In this case, the
international community had to provide the enforcement to strengthen the judiciary
and render the decision of the Human Rights Chamber effective. Lacking the
presence of a strong judiciary to enforce the decisions of the Human Rights
Chamber, this mechanism would be inadequate in protecting the human rights of
individuals in BiH, especially refugees returning to areas where they are a
minority. A strong judiciary must be present in BiH, especially considering that
there exists an agreement, which merges the Human Rights Chamber with the BiH
court system. 50
As for wide scale human rights abuses, such as those described in Velika
Kladusa, the High Representative 51 has recognized the need for a strong judiciary
46. Id. at 259.
47. Id. at 267.
48. See id. at 268. "Some members of the Islamic Community argued that the only way to begin
reconstruction would be for the High Representative to simply impose the Chamber's decision on the
local authorities." Id. at 267.
49. Id. at 268. The permit for the Mosque's reconstruction was granted on March 24, 2001. See
Human Rights Co-ordination Center, HRCC Human Rights Report: 01 September 2000 - 31 March
2001 1 (2001).
50. See Dakin, supra note 13, at 265. Under an agreement signed on November 10, 2000, the
Human Rights Chamber is to operate in the same manner as it has since 1995 until December 31, 2003.
See Human Rights Co-ordination Center, supra note 49, at 49.
51. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is the working arm of the United Nations High
Representative. With the complete backing of the international community, the High Representative
represents the highest rule of law currently existing in BiR. The High Representative has the authority
to enact laws that are binding on the government entities and citizens of BiH. See http://www.ohr.intl.
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in protecting the human rights of returnees and IDPs. In December 2000, "the
High Representative established the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) to
provide a consolidated, comprehensive, and assertive approach to the identification
and implementation of reforms to the justice sector. ' , 52 The IJC "has become the
lead international agency for judicial reform and promotion of the rule of law
throughout BiH, and will co-ordinate, consolidate and accelerate reform
activities. 53  Furthermore, training in human rights law was employed to help
guard minority returnees from human rights abuses:
A comprehensive three-year training program on the ECHR and European legal
standards was initiated in June 2000 by the Council of Europe with one year of
funding provided by the United States of America. Between September 2000 and
June 2001 over 250 judges and prosecutors will have attended a one week training
course, out of which a selected few will therefore receive specialized training on
how to conduct training courses themselves. Despite the fact that the ECHR has
been part of domestic law since, at least, December 1995, most judges were
ignorant of both the substance of the Convention and its status in the country.
Strengthening the functioning and independence of the judiciary through
developing local capacity is an important element of this programme.
54
Mandated by the international community, these improvements to the
judiciary will help address widespread human rights abuses in BiH.
The positive effect of the international community's bolstering of the
enforcement of Human Rights Chamber decisions and overall strengthening of the
judiciary on refugee and IDP return can be demonstrated by the increase in the
number of property claims that were resolved by the government.
"In February and March 2001, the Human Rights Chamber ruled that the non-
enforcement of the decisions of the (CRPC) [Commission for Real Property
Claims] constitutes a violation under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and awarded the CRPC decision-
holders non-pecuniary damages. The Human Rights Chamber's decisions further
protect the rights of CRPC decision-holders... With the consistent pressure of the
International Community, more and more displaced persons and refugees have
been able to return with the assistance of CRPC decisions, which operated as a
check on a domestic system which is not yet fully impartial or independent.
55"
Thus, as demonstrated above, a strong judiciary is crucial to the success of
humanitarian aid efforts. As a result of the international community strengthening
the judiciary by enforcing the Human Rights Chamber decisions and reforming
domestic judicial institutions, protection of the human rights of refugees and I DPs
has increased. In addition, their prospects for integration into a post-war civil
society have greatly improved.
52. See Human Rights Co-ordination Center, supra note 49, at 16.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id. at 46. The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees




The Conflict in Kosovo
Kosovo is a small region within Serbia and Montenegro, the state formerly
known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 56 Located in southern
Serbia, the province of Kosovo is bordered by Montenegro, Albania, and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 7 Totaling around 90 percent of the
inhabitants of Kosovo in 1991, ethnic Albanians comprised the majority of the
population. 58
High tensions between Serbs and Albanians flared in 1998 and resulted in
open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanians,
organized into the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 59 Throughout 1998, over
1,500 Kosovar Albanians were killed and more than 400,000 people were driven
from their homes. 60 The international community soon became concerned over the
situation in Kosovo. Considering the impacts that had resulted to the former
republics of Yugoslavia from earlier wars, NATO threatened the use of air strikes
unless Serbian leaders accepted an agreement that would limit the presence of
Serbian troops in Kosovo. 61 Under this pressure, President Milogevid agreed to
withdraw the bulk of Serbian and Yugoslav army forces from the region, thus
preventing the air strikes.62 However, tensions again flared at the beginning of
1999 and the continuation of the threat of air bombardment resulted in the ill-fated
Rambouillet Agreement of February 1999.63
The negotiations known as the Rambouillet Agreement ended problematically
with the Kosovar Albanian delegation signing the proposed agreement and the
Serbian delegation refusing to sign. 64 Following the rejection of the Rambouillet
Agreement, Serbian military forces began to increase their efforts against the
56. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL ENVOY - EXTERNAL RELATIONS UNIT, BH REFUGEES IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, June 1996. Following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Id. On
February 4, 2003 the Yugoslav parliament approved a constitution creating the state of Serbia and
Montenegro and formally dissolving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Jean-Eudes Barrier, Serbia
and Montenegro on Thin Ice: Djukanovic, Agence France Presse, Feb. 7, 2003.
57. See NATO, supra note 2.
58. The National Composition of Yugoslavia's Population, 1991, YUGOSLAV SURVEY 1, 3-24
(1992).
59. See NATO, supra note 2. The KLA was demilitarized and officially disbanded on September
20, 1999, thus it no longer formally exists. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A FRAGILE
PEACE: LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR JUSTICE IN KOSOVO 16 (1999), available at
http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/kosovofull1099.htm (last visited June 20, 2003) [hereinafter A
FRAGILE PEACE].
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ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 65 This acceleration of artillery and manpower caused
thousands more to flee their homes as refugees and IDPs.66 On March 23, 1999,
air strikes initiated by NATO began against the FRY.67
The air campaign lasted a total of seventy-seven days and ended on June 10,
1999 with the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. 6 8 Following this
withdrawal, NATO changed its mission objectives to returning refugees and IDPs
to their homes and restoring a lasting peace in Kosovo.69 This mission was to be
carried out under the auspices of the UN, which had sanctioned Yugoslavia's
acceptance of a peaceful solution by announcing the Security Council's intention
to deploy an international civil and security presence in Kosovo.70 The UN
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established on principles that it would end the
violence in Kosovo, demilitarize the KLA, deploy an international security force,
establish a political process providing for self government, establish an interim
administration, and facilitate the safe return of all refugees. 71 The Kosovo Security
Force (KFOR) was deployed simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Federal
Republic military presence.72 During the course of the ethnic cleansing, thousands
of ethnic Albanian Kosovars were killed "by Serb forces and tens of thousands
more were subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, rape, and other human rights
crimes., 73 Once peace was finally restored in Kosovo, refugees began to return at
a speed unparalleled following past conflicts. 74 By the time the first official UN
sanctioned return of 300 ethnic Albanians to Kosovo occurred on June 28, 1999,
"nearly half of the 860,000 refugees who fled to Albania and Macedonia had
already ignored warnings of danger and returned home. 75
Following the conflict, humanitarian aid reached Kosovo and efforts to
restore a civil society and increase the general welfare began.76 However, human
rights violations were widespread, causing many refugees and IDPs not to return.
In fact some fled abuse, frustrating humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts.
77
For example, upon the return of refugees to their homes, many Serbs remaining in
Kosovo were driven north due to reprisals or fear of ethnic Albanians. 78 The
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that









73. LCHR: Kosovo, supra note 7, at 2.
74. See id.
75. Kosovo Refugees Go Home, THE MIRROR, June 29, 1999, at 2.
76. See NATO, supra note 2.
77. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 2.




troops during June 1999.79 In September 1999, the number of Serbs left in Kosovo
was estimated at around 97,000 and it is estimated that by October 1999, 75
percent of Kosovo's Serbs had left the province.80 Those that remained in Kosovo
were subject to the fear and perpetration of ongoing human rights violations.8'
Preceding the cessation of violence in Kosovo, Serbs and other minorities were
reportedly confined to their apartments 24 hours a day, or at least, could not leave
82their enclaves without KFOR escorts. Because the human rights of these Serbs
could not be protected, their access to markets, health care, and other services were
seriously restricted, which forced them almost entirely to depend on direct
assistance delivered by UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations. 3 This
situation demonstrates that the initial weakness of the legal system established by
UNMIK was eroding efforts of humanitarian organizations to provide effective
humanitarian aid. 4 A sense that human rights were not being protected and
remedies for violations were unavailable had undermined the sense of protection
that must accompany humanitarian efforts in order for them to be successful.
8 5
Applicable Human Rights Law in Kosovo
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999) authorized the
Special Representative of the Secretary General to determine the laws that were
applicable within the framework of the newly established legal system.86 This
resulted in Regulation No. 1999/I on the Authority of the Interim Administration
in Kosovo, which stipulates:
The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall
continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with the standards
referred to in section 2(16), the fulfillment of the mandate given to UNMIK under
UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), or the present or any other
regulation issued by UNMIK.
87
UNMIK's interpretation was that those provisions of FRY and Serbian laws
in force on March 23, 1999, "insofar as they were consistent with internationally
79. Id.
80. A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 2.
81. See id. "Serbs continue to be the primary target of violent attacks, including killings, beatings
and forced evictions, which are often followed by the looting and torching of houses. In addition,
threats and intimidation against Serbs continue to be reported almost daily by UNHCR and KFOR." Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 60. "The inability to react swiftly to crime and public unrest,
particularly in postconflict situations when criminal activity tends to increase, and the failure to detain
and convict suspected criminals promptly and fairly, can quickly erode the public's confidence in the
United Nations .... Thus, the establishment of effective judicial institutions can be critical to the long-
term success of a mission and the sustainability of its governance and democratic-institution-building
efforts." id. at 60.
85. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 2-3.
86. See id. at 4.
87. See id.
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recognized human rights standards," constituted the law that was to be applied to
human rights violations.8 8 However, this applicable law was contested by Kosovar
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers who refused to apply the Serbian Criminal
Code.8 9 They saw it as discriminatory and argued that the applicable law should
include the Kosovo Criminal Code, which had been in force until it was revoked
by the Serbian Parliament in 1989.90 These members of the legal system saw the
revocation of the Kosovo Criminal Code as unconstitutional in relation to the FRY
Constitution and, therefore, illegitimate. 91  Less resistance was shown to the
application of the FRY Criminal Code because it had applied to all parts of
Yugoslavia before 1991 and had been passed in 1977 with the participation of
Kosovo.92 To resolve this dispute, the UN:
adopted Regulations 1999/24 and 1999/25, which identified applicable law to be
the law in force in Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989, and repealed the provision of
Regulation 1999/1 applying contemporary FRY/Serbian law. With this decision,
JNMIK identified an acceptable body of law and effectively ended the question
of which law to apply. However, this decision was not made, nor was the issue
resolved, until the transitional administration had been on-ground for six
months.
93
Thus, law that had been in force in Kosovo was applied to the extent that it
met international standards for human rights protections. International standards
became substituted where the law of Kosovo did not meet this level of protection.94
It should be noted that during the conflict in BiH, the International Court of Justice
had determined that Yugoslavia, and thus the province of Kosovo, was bound to
the agreements that were been previously entered into by the former Socialist
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Interestingly, the Kosovo Criminal Code does not contain provisions covering war crimes
or crimes against humanity while the FRY Code details provisions covering these crimes. Id.
91. Id. During the period of Titoist Yugoslavia, which was assembled following World War II
and lasted until the late 1980s, Kosovo existed as an autonomous province within Serbia and
participated within the Yugoslav parliament. See MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE
THIRD BALKAN WAR 31-33 (1996). In the wake of the collapse of communism and the removal of
Soviet influence in Yugoslavia, Serbian leader Slobodan Miloevid stripped Kosovo of its autonomy in
1989 and brought it directly under the control of Belgrade. See NATO, supra note 2. The Kosovar
Albanians were left under the control of the Serbian government, with which ethnic Albanians had little
sympathy. See id.; F.H. Knelman, Kosovo: A Retrospective, 32(2) PEACE RES. 48 (2000). "There is no
question that the general mood of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo welcomed separation and
sympathized with the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army]." Id. at 52.
92. A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 4.
93. Wendy S. Betts et al., The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the
Lessons-Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 375
(2001).
94. The law established to handle human rights violations in Kosovo was formulated by "[ulsing
the code of criminal procedure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as its basis, but applying those
laws within the framework of recognized international human rights standards." Strohmeyer, supra
note 6, at 49.
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which included the UDHR.95
Therefore, the law to be domestically applied to human rights violations in
Kosovo was consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards.
However, unlike in BiH, a judicial mechanism similar to the Human Rights
Commission was not established. Instead, human rights violations were addressed
by the newly established UNMIK judicial system applying domestic law that
included human rights protections that met international standards. The next
section will discuss the problems encountered under this system, steps taken to
remedy these problems, and the effects of a stronger judiciary on human rights
protections and their effects on refugee and IDP return.
The Problem with the Judiciary in Kosovo, Remedies to Address these Problems,
and the Effects of a Stronger Judiciary
The newly established judicial system in Kosovo faced the major problem of
the lack of a basic legal framework.96 This included confusion as to applicable
law, 97 the lack of resources, and the lack of a physical infrastructure.98  The
previous administration that had governed Kosovo was completely driven out,
therefore, an operating judicial system had to be constructed from the ground up.99
The personnel required to administer judicial functions had fled the province or
were "tainted by their perceived affiliation with the previous regime;" the
courthouses and facilities had been destroyed, looted, and mined; and the laws that
were in existence were "politically charged and no longer acceptable to the
population and the new political classes."'' °  To remedy these problems, the
international community had to strengthen the newly established judiciary by
95. See DeWeese, supra note 33, at 634.
96. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 58.
97. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 7. At the end of September 1999, the LCHR sent a
delegation to Kosovo to assess the effectiveness of the legal system that the international committee had
established in Kosovo. Id. at 1. The LCHR opinion resulting from this mission stated that, "The fair
and effective functioning of the judiciary, and respect for its role within a democratic society, are
cornerstones for a viable future in Kosovo based on the rule of law. As a consequence, laying the
groundwork for an independent and impartial justice system is an essential task for UNMIK - and one
of its most pressing challenges. The persistent lack of effective judicial institutions is a key factor in
perpetuating a climate of insecurity in Kosovo. The impact is severe: in the absence of any effective
deterrent, the level of crime and violence continues to be high. This applies to ethnically motivated
crime against minorities, including murders, abductions, beatings, looting, arson, forced evictions,
threats and intimidation, and increasingly also to organized criminal activities which impact on the
security situation of all inhabitants of Kosovo. Moreover, enabling the domestic justice system to
administer justice with regard to the crimes committed in Kosovo under the previous regime, most
notably war crimes and crimes against humanity after March 1998, is of utmost importance for the
future of Kosovo. If justice is seen to be done in such cases, tensions between Kosavar Albanians and
others, particularly Serbs, may decrease, improving the conditions for dialogue, and, eventually, for
peaceful co-existence in Kosovo. If justice is not seen to be done, this will inevitably increase the
tension between the Albanian and Serb communities." Id. at 7.
98. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 57.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 48.
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deciding the question of applicable law, creating a new legal framework, and
rebuilding the legal infrastructure. Otherwise, human rights violations would not
be sufficiently addressed and returnees, especially Serbs, would continue to flee
the province following return.
A major problem that UNMIK encountered early in the process of
establishing a legal framework was the question of applicable law.' 0' The
application of disputed law could cause discrepancies in rulings, which could
weaken the confidence of refugees and IDPs in regard to whether they would
receive a respectable trial and judgment. 10 2 If the fear that a high margin of error
existed in regard to legal proceedings, a sense of security would be hard to
maintain. A flood of appeals due to error could also overload a system already
under strain and further weaken confidence in the judiciary. ,
In the power vacuum present following the end of the hostilities in Kosovo,
the judiciary had no clear guidance on what law to apply until the United Nations
resolved the problem by issuing Regulations 1999/24 and 1999/25.03 As
described above, this action by the international community established the
applicable domestic law to be consistently applied to human rights violations in
Kosovo. This strengthened the judiciary and increased the level of human rights
protection for individuals in Kosovo.
Another problem that hampered the development of a legal framework in
Kosovo was the lack of substantial resources dedicated to development of an
effective and just judiciary.104 Once the applicable law was established, it was
deemed of paramount importance that the resulting codes be translated into all
necessary languages and that the laws be reviewed to ensure compliance with the
standards set forth by the international community. 0 5 Furthermore, a system to
print and distribute the body of applicable law was recommended to increase
reliance on the proper law and reduce the possibilities of procedural error.
0 6
Translation of draft legislation formulated following the conflict was
constricted due to the absence of personnel that possessed the necessary language
and specialist knowledge. 0 7 Four months following the withdrawal of the FRY
military presence, UNMIK was not equipped with the financial resources needed
to hire qualified translators.'08 This facilitated a period of time in which applicable
law was still uncertain and allowed the KLA to fill the power vacuum with an
authority that most refugees and IDPs were unlikely to trust.'09  Adequate
101. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 5.
102. See id. at 5. Suspects may have been arrested following one set of legal principles and then
had a differing set of principles applied during subsequent hearings, therefore, the possibility of
procedural error could be quite high. Id.
103. See Betts et al., supra note 94, at 375.
104. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 3.
105. See id. at 5.
106. See id. at 6.
107. Id.
108. See id at 3.
1 09. See id.; Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 49.
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resources were also needed to ensure that qualified personnel were made available
to the newly established judiciary to reduce the possibility of procedural error and
ensure the fairness of proceedings." 0 Without proper resources, the international
community struggled to strengthen the presence of the newly established judicial
system that would address the human rights issues that plagued returning refugees
and IDPs. The need to allocate resources was made apparent by these problems
and the international community had to respond by providing funds for the
judiciary.
The physical infrastructure of the judicial system also had to be
reconstructed."' According to Strohmeyer:
In Kosovo, virtually all public buildings, including the courts, had to be cleared of
mines and booby traps before they could be reclaimed for public purposes. In the
course of the conflict, files had been dislocated, official forms and stationary had
been destroyed, and valuable office equipment had been appropriated by the
withdrawing security apparatus. The situation was so grave that the first UN-
appointed judges and prosecutors had to bring their own dated typewriters to the
initial hearings to be able to draft decisions and court records." 
2
Thus, the international community had to rebuild the physical infrastructure,
as well as provide the resources for the legal framework, and decide the question
of applicable law. However, once the international community solved these
problems, the judicial system became stronger and more effective in protecting the
human rights of refugees and IDPs." 3 The presence of a stronger judiciary in
Kosovo had positive effects on the humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts
initiated by the international community. This is evidenced by the gradual
reduction in both the number of returnees, especially Serbs, leaving the province,
and in the levels of post-conflict violence." 14 As a result of the strengthening of the
judiciary in Kosovo and the increased protection of human rights, a sense of civil
responsibility and a semblance of normalcy has returned to the province, thus
improving the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts of the
international community.
110. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 55. "The scarcity of experienced legal personnel affected the
legal-assistance sector as well." Id.
11. See id. at 57.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 60.
114. See id. "In Kosovo, a total of 14,878 criminal offenses were reported from January to August
2000 alone; over the same period 3,734 people were arrested. Thus, the establishment of effective
judicial institutions can be critical to the long term success of a mission and the sustainability of its
governance and democratic-institution-building efforts." Id.
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EAST TIMOR
The Conflict in East Timor
On August 30, 1999, East Timor voted to (i) reject a proposal for special
autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia and (ii) seek independence."1
5
"Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration militias, at times with
the support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of
violence, looting, and arson throughout the entire territory."'"1 6  Indonesia was
responsible for maintaining peace in the territory, however, the lack of effective
response led to many people being killed and as many as 500,000 being driven
from their homes as refugees and IDPs."17  After the start of the violence,
Indonesian armed forces and police effectively withdrew completely from the
territory." 8  The UN Security Council then adopted Resolution 1272 (1999) to
establish the United Nations Temporary Administration for East Timor
(UNTAET), "an integrated, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation fully
responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to
independence." 119
Refugees soon began to arrive after this resolution. In the first half of 2000,
more than 167,000 refugees returned from other areas of Indonesia, while an
estimated 85,000 to 120,000 remained in camps in West Timor. 120 In the wake of
returns, human rights violations were widespread. 121  "Many East Timorese
returning from West Timor were abused for alleged militia links by local officials
of the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT)... and by members
115. UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION FOR EAST TIMOR (UNTAET), EAST TIMOR -





119. Id. "UNTAET was given 'all legislative and executive authority, including the administration
ofjustice."' Bongiorno, supra note 26, at 628.
120. UNTAET, supra note 116.
121. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2001: EAST TIMOR:
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/asia/etimor.html (last
visited July 21, 2003). For example, one East Timorese woman reported that she was driven from her
home by militia violence and witnessed the beheading of an East Timorese man by the Indonesian
National Army. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Eyewitness Accounts by Timorese Refugees, (1999)
available at http://www.etan.org/et99c/october/ 7-23/21eyewit.htm (last visited July 21, 2003). The
woman, who was displaced to Australia, has experienced sleeplessness and weight loss as a result of
witnessing the execution. Id. A student, also displaced to Australia after voting in the referendum for
independence, reported observing Indonesian soldiers and police shooting people and burning houses.
Id. As a result of witnessing these atrocities the student claims that, "I still get nightmares and panic
attacks when I see someone wearing a black T-shirt. I still feel frightened and jumpy all the time,
especially when I see someone with a gun. I felt like a hunted animal. I have difficulty pushing my
mind to remember things and then I remember things I want to forget. I cannot rest. I cannot sleep."
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of the former guerilla army, Falintil."'122  Furthermore, Protestant, Muslim, and
ethnic Chinese minorities also suffered human rights abuses for their alleged "ties
to the Indonesian power structure." ' A functioning judiciary was needed to
address these human rights violations. UNTAET was in a position similar to that
of Kosovo, in that a functioning judiciary needed to be established from the ground
Up.124 Again, the judicial infrastructure had to be re-built with limited resources
and the question of applicable human rights law needed to be decided. 125  These
responsibilities were shouldered by the international community.
Applicable Human Rights Law in East Timor
As in Kosovo, UNTAET had assumed initial responsibility for complete
administration of the judicial system; therefore, UNTAET had the authority to
determine the applicable law to be applied domestically to adjudicate human rights
violations. 126 "Because almost all of East Timor's lawyers had been trained in
Indonesian universities, UNTAET decided in November 1999 that Indonesian law
would be the applicable law except where it conflicted with international
standards."' 127  Unlike the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Indonesia was not a signatory nation to the ICCPR or the ICESCR. 12  Therefore,
the International Bill of Human Rights was not applicable in East Timor until
UNTAET established the applicable law following the move for independence.
Thus, applicable domestic law in East Timor regarding human rights
violations met international standards, however, the infrastructure problems kept
the judicial system from operating effectively. When the first East Timorese
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders were ready to begin operation on January
7, 2000, the court building was not ready and there was no place to house
122. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122. The National Council of East Timorese




125. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 50. "The preexisting judicial infrastructure in East Timor
was virtually destroyed. Most court buildings had been torched and looted, and all court equipment
furniture, registers, records, archives, and - indispensable to legal practice - law books, case files, and
other legal resources dislocated or burned. In addition, all judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and many
judicial support staff who were perceived as being members de facto of the administrative and
intellectual privileged classes, or who had been publicly sympathetic to the Indonesian regime, had fled
East Timor after the results of the popular consultation were announced. Fewer than ten lawyers were
estimated to have remained, and these were believed to be so inexperienced as to be unequal to the task
of serving in a new East Timorese justice system. In this situation, it quickly became apparent to
UNTAET officials that a justice system in East Timor, including the necessary regulatory framework,
first had to be built- and built within the shortest possible time - before it could be administered, as
called for in Security Council Resolution 1272." Id.
126. See Bongiorno, supra note 26, at 628.
127. Human Rights Watch, supra note 122.
128. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 5
(2002).
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suspects.1 29 Investigations into violations, including killings, were slow because it
took time to rebuild the judicial system. 30 Initially, investigations into rape cases
were virtually non-existent; "serious investigations into rape as an element of
crimes against humanity only began in July.' 3' Therefore, the newly established
judiciary was not effectively addressing human rights violations. In order to
alleviate some of the burden on this barely functioning system, the establishment
of the National Return and Reconciliation Commission was proposed. 32  This
judicial mechanism would strengthen the overall judiciary by allowing minor
human rights violations to be addressed. 3 3  This judicial mechanism will be
described in the next section, followed by a discussion of its impacts on the East
Timorese judicial system and its effects on humanitarian aid efforts.
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor
The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor
(Commission) was originally formulated in June 2000 by the CNRT Congress.
"[B]y August, a coordinating committee led by UNTAET was considering a plan
that would allow perpetrators of lesser offenses, such as arson or looting to make a
full confession of their misdeeds before the commission."'' 34 "Traditional justice
mechanisms at the local level would then assign the perpetrator to some form of
community service, but the misdeeds, the confession, and the 'sentence' would be
registered with the formal court system."' 135  The text of the regulation that
established the Commission was approved by the National Council of East Timor
in June 2001.136 The first meeting of the National Commissioners took place on
February 4, 2002. 37 This mechanism allowed for lesser human rights abuses to be
addressed at the local level. Thus, the more formal judicial system was not
129. Human Rights Watch, supra note 122. The court building had been destroyed by militias and
was not ready until March. Id. "At one point, UNTAET's own police stopped making any arrests of
suspected criminals, including those involved in the 1999 violence, because it had no place to put them;
the one detention center in the entire country, a former Ministry of Tourism building, had long since
exceeded capacity, and the main prison in the capital, Dili, was only rehabilitated in May." Id
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, Background (2002)
available at http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/bgd.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
133. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 122.
134. Id.; Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, supra note 133. The
Commission has three main functions: I) Truth Seeking: The Commission will seek the truth regarding
human rights violations in East Timor within the context of the political conflicts. Id. The Commission
will establish a truth-telling mechanism for perpetrators to describe, acknowledge, and record human
rights abuses. Id. 2) Community Reconciliation: The Commission will facilitate a method for dealing
with past cases of lesser crimes such as looting, burning and minor assault. In each case, a panel
comprised of a Regional Commissioner and local community leaders will mediate between victims and
perpetrators to reach agreement on an act of reconciliation to be carried out by the perpetrator. Id. 3)
Recommendations to Government: The Commission will report on human rights and make
recommendations to the government for further action regarding the protection of human rights. Id.
135. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 122.




burdened with these claims and could concentrate its limited resources on more
serious violations. The success of the Commission can be demonstrated by the fact
that (i) the transition period in East Timor has been stabilized and (ii) East Timor
became an independent country on May 20, 2002.3s The utilization of this judicial
mechanism strengthened the overall judicial system of East Timor and provided a
means for returnees to quickly and adequately address human rights abuses. This
allowed humanitarian and nation-building efforts to be successful, as is evidenced
by their efforts culminating in the acceptance by the UN, and the world, of East
Timor as the world's newest nation.
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
The Conflict in Afghanistan
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on
September II, 2001, the United States began the war on terrorism. A major event
in this war was the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and
supported al-Qaeda terrorists bent on attacking U.S. and Western interests at home
and abroad. Military action against the Taliban regime began on October 7, 2001,
which led to the eventual removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan by year's end and
the establishment of an interim administrative government led by Hamid Karzai.
139
After the establishment of the new government in Afghanistan, security
remained one of the most pressing problems facing Afghan refugees and IDPs
returning to Afghanistan. In February 2002, a United Nations representative stated
that "'security continues to be of the foremost concern."' 140 This security problem
was demonstrated during the return of refugees that followed the establishment of
the interim government. 14 1 Afghan refugees and IDPs were in a situation where
138. See UNTAET, Completed Peacekeeping Operations, East Timor: UNTAET (2002) available
at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
139. See The Patient Accumulation of Successes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 9; A Little
More Clearing Up To Do, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 1I. Talks in Bonn, Germany between
four Afghan factions on December 5, 2001 led to the agreement establishing the interim government to
be headed by Mr. Karzai. Afghanistan's Government: Suddenly, in Bonn, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8,
2001, at 18. These talks also led to the affirmation that a tribal council, the loya jirga, would convene
in June of 2002 in order to further define the shape and future of the Afghan government. See William
Riley, UN Official: Security No. I Afghan Problem, UPI, Feb. 27, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
Although the Taliban was removed from power in Kabul within two months from the beginning of the
conflict, fighting against aI-Qaeda persisted in Afghanistan until the spring of 2002. See Satellites and
Horsemen, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9,2002, at 27.
140. Riley, supra note 140. Security was initially provided by the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), which operated primarily in Kabul. See Afghanistan: Guns Before Butter, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2002, at 13. Outside of Kabul, however, security was deficient as Afghanistan
lacked a functional national army or police force. Id.
141. See Riley, supra note 140. "... [A] new wave of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan
highlighted a chronic lack of stability in the region. Hundreds continued to arrive everyday, many of
them, according to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, ethnic Pashtuns fleeing
human rights abuses." Id.
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security was not properly provided and the risk of human rights abuses existed.
Thus, to develop a sense of security and successful humanitarian aid efforts, a
strong judiciary bolstered by the international community is necessary.
The Role of the International Community in the Afghan Judiciary
The need for a strong judiciary and the necessity of the involvement of the
international community in Afghanistan to allow for proper post-conflict
humanitarian aid has been recognized. 142 Early in the development of the interim
government in Afghanistan, "[t]he interim authority and the office of Lakhdar
Brahimi, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's special representative, had turned their
attention to the establishment of the Judicial Commission and the Human Rights
Commission, which would provide for the foundations of the rule of law."'143 This
focus on strengthening the judiciary was implemented in conjunction with
activities by non-governmental organizations and the interim Afghan government
to facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes. 144 Furthermore, the
UN established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to oversee
post-conflict humanitarian aid activities within the borders of Afghanistan.
45
Thus, to protect the human rights of Afghan refugees and IDPs, the international
community recognized the need for quickly establishing a strong judiciary and
took steps to promote its foundation.
International donor support for Afghan reconstruction has been quite large.
As of October 1, 2001, the U.S. had committed 840 million dollars for
humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts. 14 6 This includes the majority of the
297 million dollars pledge by the United States at the Tokyo Donors' Conference
in January 2002, where the international community as a whole pledged 5 billion
dollars for Afghanistan. 147 Of the monies donated by the United States, 5 million
dollars has been given to promote the work of three commissions established by
the Afghan government "to draft a new constitution, promote judicial reform, and
encourage respect for human rights."'149 Considering that the international
142. See Harold Hongju Koh, The U.S. Can't Allow Justice to Be Another War Casualty, LOS
ANGELES TiMES, Dec. 17, 2001, pt. 2, p. II. "The precise shape of the emerging Afghan judicial
system, created under the transitional administration now headed by interim Prime Minister Hamid
Karzai, remains to be determined. Whatever happens, United Nations transitional support and
involvement will be necessary to stabilize the post-conflict environment, to address pressing
humanitarian needs of returning refugees, to promote the Bonn process of building a representative
post-Taliban government and to address justice, accountability and truth telling about past human rights
abuses by all parties to the Afghan conflict." Id.
143. Riley, supra note 140.
144. Id.
145. See STATE DEPARTMENT, State Department Documents U.S. Support for Afghan Women and
Children; Report to Congress on Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001, Federal Information
and News Dispatch, Inc., June 12, 2002.
146. See STATE DEPARTMENT, Fact Sheet: Rebuilding Afghanistan; U.S. Support for Afghan
Reconstruction Totals $840 Million, Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc., January 10, 2003.
147. Id.
148. Id. The U.S. has also contributed to the reformation of the judiciary "by providing
infrastructure for legal professionals and support for effective functioning of the courts." Id. The
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community has recognized the importance of an effective judiciary to allow for
successful humanitarian aid, this support should translate into a solution to the
security problem initially faced by refugees and IDPs in Afghanistan and allow for
the humanitarian aid efforts of the international community to be effective.
The Conflict in Iraq
Upon the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations passed UN
Security Council Resolution 687, which provided for a cease-fire of hostilities and
the formation of a UN inspection program to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). 149 This UN action lead to the creation of the UN Special
Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq (UNSCOM), which worked in tandem
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to dismantle Iraq's nuclear
and other WMD programs. 150 However, the Iraqi regime continually frustrated the
efforts of UNSCOM and the IAEA, eventually leading to the cessation of
inspections in 1998.'1' The expulsion of the UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 spelled
an end to UN inspection of Iraqi WMD programs at that time. However, UN
Resolution 1284 later established the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission
(UNMOVIC).' 52 This inspection commission was seen as a weaker version of
UNSCOM and did not lead to an inspection program that ultimately disarmed
Iraq. 1
53
In November of 2003, the UN reaffirmed its 12-year-old instruction to Iraq to
disarm with the unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441. 4 This
resolution allowed weapons inspectors to return to Baghdad on November 27,
2002.'5' Resolution 1441 threatened serious consequences if Iraq failed to disarm.
The United States felt that this resolution provided the authority it needed to justify
military action to implement the disarmament of Iraq.' 56  The United States
indicated that it would consider the disarmament of Iraq using military force with a
Italian government, however, is taking the lead role in rebuilding the judiciary. Id.
149. See KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ 52
(2002).
150. Id. at 61-62. During these initial inspections, discoveries prompted Iraq to admit that it had
been attempting to develop nuclear weapons, as well as tum over large quantities of weapons developed
under other WMD programs. Id. at 62.
151. See Burden of Proof THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 13. The Iraqi National Assembly
voted to end cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors on August 4, 1998. POLLACK, supra note
150, at 90. By October of that year, Baghdad announced it would no longer co-operate with the
inspectors. Id. at 91.
152. POLLACK, supra note 150, at 100.
153. Id. at 234-235. The purpose of the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission
(UNMOVIC) was to determine the tasks remaining for the disarmament of Iraq and to determine the
progress made toward reaching those goals. Id. at 100.
154. Burden of Proof, supra note 152, at 13.
155. See Special Report: Dealing With Iraq, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8,2003, at 24.
156. Burden of Proof, supra note 152, at 13. As for inspectors, under Resolution 1441 Iraq
"promised the weapons inspectors immediate, unimpeded and private access." Special Report: Dealing
with Iraq, supra note 156, at 24.
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coalition of allies.' 57 Conversely, the United States also expressed support for
further UN resolutions that would have sanctioned military action against Iraq.1
58
However, lacking UN resolutions sanctioning immediate military action, the
United States, leading a "coalition of the willing" to remove the regime of Saddam
Hussein, attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003.159
Prior to the use of military force against Iraq, fears existed that a climate
where the human rights of refugees and IDPs could be abused would be created.
60
For example, following the Gulf War, the destabilization of the Iraqi regime
prompted an uprising of Kurds in northern Iraq that led to the displacement of a
massive number of refugees and horrific human rights violations.16' Furthermore,
Iraqi society is traditionally tribal in nature. 6 2 Following the armed conflict, tribal
rivalries and divisions could cause the widespread abuse of human rights. Thus,
the conflict in Iraq could potentially give rise to the same types of problems
experienced in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor-namely, returning refugees and
IDPs being subjected to human rights abuses with no judiciary in place strong
enough to protect their rights.
The Role of the International Community in the Iraqi Judiciary
The legal system that existed in Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein was
characterized by one UN report as "incompatible with human rights because
President Saddam Hussein controlled the judiciary, the armed forces, police, and
politics."'' 63 The pre-conflict legal system in Iraq was comprised of two separate
systems: one of civil law, and one of Islamic law that operated "through separate
courts with different jurisdictions."' 164 As is evidenced by the poor human rights
record of the Iraqi regime, this system was unable to address human rights
violations. 65 In fact, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iraq stated
in 1997 "that there was no rule of law in Iraq."' 66 Given the status of the pre-
157. id.
158. See id. at 25.
159. See In the Fog of War, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2003, at II.
160. See The Coming Dash for Safety, THE ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA, Economist.com, Mar. 4,
2003, available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?StorylD=1620357 (last
visited July 21, 2003). "America is talking of up to 2 million people uprooted internally by the war.
The United Nations refugee agency, the UNHCR, is planning for 600,000 to 1.5 million refugees, plus 2
million more displaced within Iraq." Id.
161. See POLLACK, supra note 150, at 51. The Iraqi regime killed as many as 20,000 Kurds in
Kurdistan and drove more than 500,000 from their homes. Id. Conflict also erupted in other areas of
the country leading to the deaths of an estimated 30,000 to 60,000 Shi'ah Muslims. Id.
162. See id. at 112-114.
163. UN Says Human Rights Abuses Worsening in Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 3, 1999.
164. Iraq: Country Profile, Middle E. Rev. World of Info., Oct. 2, 2002.
165. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1992, U.S. Department of
State Dispatch, March 1993. "The Iraqi regime's abysmal record on human rights continued without
improvement in 1992. Systematic violations of human rights in virtually all categories continued.
There were mass executions of political opponents, widespread use of torture, extreme repression of
ethnic groups, disappearances, denial of due process, and arbitrary detention." Id.
166. UN Commission Adopts Measures on Humanitarian Standards, Slavery, Women and Girls,
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conflict legal system and its inability to handle human rights abuses, the judicial
system, following the removal of Saddam Hussein, must be equipped to adequately
address human rights violations occurring in Iraq. 67  As in the post-conflict
situations described above, the presence of the international community is vital to
ensuring that a strong judiciary is maintained to protect the human rights of
refugees and IDPs. As demonstrated, the international community must be willing
to devote the initial resources and expertise developed from strengthening the
judiciaries in other post-conflict situations to the judicial system in Iraq in order for
humanitarian aid efforts to be successful.
Prior to the conflict in Iraq, the United States had not firmly stated its
commitment to "nation-building" in Iraq following a military action.168 At that
time, Ari Fleischer, the White House Press Secretary, responded to a question
regarding the use of US troops for nation-building and whether the president has
changed his position on nation-building by stating that, ".. .[T]he president
continues to believe that the purpose of the military should be to fight and to win
wars."' 169 However, Fleischer went on to state:
Our government, broadly speaking, has a variety, however, of agencies that
are well-situated, whose mission is to help protect the peace after a war is fought.
And by that I mean in the event that there is a war with Iraq, the president has
made it very plain in numerous conversations to foreign leaders that immediately
upon military action, if it comes to military action, plans are in place to provide
humanitarian aid and relief for the people of Iraq.
170
Thus, it appeared that the US was willing to provide assistance to Iraq
following any armed conflict precipitated by US action. 17
Following the conflict, the US led coalition has demonstrated a commitment
Justice Issues, M2 Presswire, Apr. 15, 1997. As applicable human rights law, Iraq has signed and
ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR. See United Nations, supra note 129, at 5. However, Iraq has not
adopted the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR. Id.
167. While meeting to discuss the possibilities for governing a post-Saddam Iraq, Iraqi opposition
leaders have already identified the need to reform the Iraqi legal system. See Plans Made to Bring Iraqi
Leader to Justice, THE IRISH NEWS LTD., Dec. 16, 2002, at 8.
168. See Ari Fleischer Holds White House Briefing, FDCH Political Transcripts, Feb. 6, 2003.
169. Id.
170. Id. However, Roy Gutman, senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, director of
American University's Crimes of War Project, and Newsweek magazine's chief diplomatic
correspondent has stated, "the Pentagon is already 'blue-skying' the coming conflict, even suggesting
that troops could be out of Iraq in 60 to 90 days. This administration is 'viscerally opposed to nation-
building..."' Ann McFeatters, Iraqi Civilian Toll, Postwar Trauma Apt to be More Dire than in 1991,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTrE, Feb. 12, 2003, at A12. Gutman further adds that although the
administration opposes nation-building "it is exactly the direction the president is going with his Iraq
policy." Id.
171. The United States has been working with a civilian UN administrator on plans to flood the
country with food and medicine and to rebuild the infrastructure following the conflict. Iraq's
Humanitarian Needs: If Things Go Badly . ., THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 26. Non-governmental
Organizations (NGOs) have been gathering in Jordan and have been "told that an American
Humanitarian Operations Center may be established in Jordan or Kuwait, and that 'safe havens' would
be established for NGOs in Iraq." Id.
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to providing the humanitarian aid necessary to rebuild Iraq. An interim
administrative government, headed by American Paul Bremer, has been
established and reconstruction efforts are underway. 172  However, during the
period immediately following the conflict, Iraq was plagued with widespread
looting. Violence and instability continue to threaten humanitarian aid efforts,
reconstruction, and the formation of government. 173  Thus, the international
community needs to increase the level of its cooperation and assistance in order to
allow for humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts to be successful in Iraq.
174
This assistance must, at the forefront, include the establishment a strong
judiciary or immediate help in reforming the existing judiciary to meet
international standards of human rights protection and address human rights
violations suffered by refugees and IDPs.175  Regardless of whether a specific
mechanism to protect human rights is employed, as described in regards to BiH
and East Timor, if the international community does not lend its efforts to facilitate
a functioning judiciary capable of protecting human rights, humanitarian aid and
nation-building efforts will ultimately be unsuccessful. According to Tarek Ben
Halim, "Successful nation-building in Iraq is vital for real stability in the
region."176
CONCLUSIONS
Recently, military actions by the international community have been justified
as necessary for humanitarian reasons. If the international community continues to
allow interference with the sovereignty of states, it must be ready to ensure that the
results promised will indeed come to fruition. In order for humanitarian aid and
"nation-building" efforts by the international community to succeed, a strong
judicial system must be in place in post-conflict areas that ensures human rights
are protected. The need for a strong judicial system is evidenced particularly by
the situation in BiH and Kosovo. The methods employed to address human rights
violations in these areas were ineffective prior to the strengthening of the judicial
system by the international community. When the judicial systems and
172. See Post-war Reconstruction: False Start, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 2003, at 24. The interim
government was initially headed by General Jay Garner, however, General Garner was replaced in May
2003 by Paul Bremer, the former head of counter-terrorism in the State Department, as the head of the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq. Id.
173. Id. Six weeks after the occupation of Baghdad, looting still continued with the majority of
looters unpunished. See Freedom, But Without Law and Order, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 50.
174. A UN Security Counsel resolution is expected to be passed in early June 2003 that would
increase UN responsibilities in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. See Iraq and the UN: Making It
Legit, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 52.
175. Prior to the conflict, the US State Department had already initiated the Future of Iraq Project,
which has brought about 30 exiled Iraqi judges and lawyers together to read a report of
recommendations for reforming Iraq's legal system. See Caryle Murphy, Area's Exiles Plot a Model
Iraq; Talk of War Propels Groups as They Plan a Shift to Democracy, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2003,
at B I.
176. Tarek Ben Halim, Waging a "Good War"for Arabs; If Democracy Takes Root in Iraq, It Can
Sweep Across the Middle East, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 9,2003, at M5.
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mechanisms for protecting human rights were weak, refugees and IDPs returning
to their homes experienced on-going human rights violations that undermined the
effectiveness of humanitarian aid efforts. After the international community
solved the major problems with the judiciary in both BiH and Kosovo, increased
protection of human rights was provided, and humanitarian aid efforts became
more successful in allowing returnees to live in a peaceful, sustainable society.
Applicable human rights laws must be quickly determined and resources must be
made available to carryout important judicial tasks. When mechanisms such as the
Human Rights Chamber are employed, the judiciary must be made strong enough
in its own right to enforce the decisions of these bodies. The international
community must provide the needed aid to strengthen the judiciary in a post-
conflict situation.
The use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in East Timor allowed
human rights violations to be handled in an efficient manner at the local level.
This aided the re-establishment of the rule of law and hastened a return to normal
society in a post-conflict situation. East Timor is a definitive example of how a
strong judiciary addressing human rights violations can lead to the successful and
speedy establishment of a civil society in post conflict situations. Once again, the
role of the international community was vital in assuring the presence of a strong
judiciary.
Humanitarian aid efforts can only be said to be truly successful if refugees
and IDPs can return to lives that are somewhat comparable to lives they were
forced to leave because of armed conflict. If human rights violations are not
quickly addressed and adequate protection against on-going violations is not
provided, then return to a civil life is more difficult. Protection of human rights is
an essential constituent of a civilized society and there is no question that they are
essential to all citizens of that society, be they refugees or IDPs. As is
demonstrated by the post-conflict situations in BiH, Kosovo, and East Timor, a
strong judicial system that protects human rights is a key factor in ensuring that
humanitarian aid and "nation-building" efforts are successful. The need for the
presence of the international community to facilitate a functioning judiciary,
regardless of any specific judicial mechanism employed, is unquestionable.
In Afghanistan, the need for a strong judiciary was quickly identified and
funds were made readily available by the international community. Past conflicts
and the conflict in Afghanistan have taught the international community not to
ignore this need when providing humanitarian aid to refugees and IDPs and
rebuilding war-torn societies. For example, following the conflict in Afghanistan,
the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN stated:
Now more than in the past, we recognize the need to address in a coherent
fashion the multiple problems facing societies emerging from conflict: security,
political reconciliation, human rights, restoration of judicial institutions and the
rule of law, disarmament and reintegration of armed combatants but also
reconstruction, return of refugees, employment creation, restoration of civil
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services and many more.
177
In the case of Iraq, the pre-existing judicial system was unable to deal with
human rights violations. Whether the system is completely replaced or completely
reformed following the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, the judicial system
is under an even greater strain and will require strengthening by the international
community. The international community must be intimately involved and not
abandon Iraqi refugees and IDPs to a situation where no judiciary is in place that
can adequately protect them from human rights violations following the conflict.
To do so would cause the humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts of the
international community in Iraq to be unsuccessful.
177. UN Deputy Secretary-General Outlines 'Dominant Concepts' in Development Policy at
Interaction CEO Retreat, M2 Presswire, Dec. 11, 2002.
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THE RECENT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO END
COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
Karene Jullien*
On February 15 1995, English writer John Stamford faced charges in Belgium
for illicit publication and encouraging sexual exploitation of children., How could
an ex-Anglican Pastor be involved with child pornography or child prostitution?
Stamford was the publisher and editor of Spartacus, the first tourist guide
catering to homosexuals. Available since 1970, the book was an instant success.
It was presented in more than 150 countries, translated into five languages and sold
more than 60,000 copies per year for 25 years.2 Even with the original controversy
surrounding the publication, it was not apparent that Stamford was involved with
commercial sexual exploitation of children until an encoded message, hidden
within the guide, was later discovered to be oriented toward pedophiles.
Stamford's indictment was one of the first public legal efforts to deter sexual
exploitation of children in the world. However, it took 13 years for the authorities
to take action. From 1981, the organization Terre des Hommes had been
denouncing Stamford's activities and had repeatedly asked Interpol to investigate.3
Today, it has been established that Stamford was not only the editor of Spartacus,
the tourist guide, but was also the head of "Spartacus," a pedophile organization.
With approximately 30,000 members worldwide, the ring shared addresses, home
movies, photos, etc.4 Stamford never lived to be convicted; he died of a heart
attack in jail in December 1995.5 With his death, all investigation on the
* The author is a French international student with a J.D. 2003, from the University of Denver, College
of Law; admitted to the New York Bar. She received a B.S. in Business Adminstration in 1999 from
the University of Central Florida, Orlando. I wish to thank my parents for their constant support.
I. Jacqueline Remy, Christophe Agnus, Sylviane Stein, La p~dophilie - Enqudte sur un sujet
tabou, L'Express, Feb. 2, 1995 [hereinafter Remy, Lapedophilie].
Stamford was risking up to one year of imprisonment.
2. Spartakus & Spartacus, May 8, 2001, Rdseau International pour la Digniti Humaine, par
l'information et l'action contre la pddocriminalitd, available at http://www.dignaction.org/Fspart.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2003), [hereinafter Spartakus & Spartacus].
3. Serge Garde, Histoire secr&te. Un ripertoire photographique et un cidgrom restent inexploitds
dans la lute contre les riseaux transnationaux, Le Web de L"Humanitd, Feb. 24, 2000, available at
http://www.humanite.presse.fryournal/2000/2000-O
2/ 20 00 -02 -2 4/2 0 0 0 -02 -2 4-O18.html (last visited Jan.
3, 2003)[hereinafter Garde, Histoire Secrete].
4. Thomas Sancton, Partout dans le monde, des garqons et des filles sont maltraitis dans un
commerce m~chant de sexe maintenant encouragg par des riseaux informatiques. Que pouvons-nous
faire pour combattre lefldau?, TEMPS International, Vol. 148, Num. II, Sept. 2, 1996, available at
http://www.rosenczveig.com/presse/temps.htm (last visited Jan.3, 2003).
5. See Garde, Histoire Secrite, supra note 3.
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"Spartacus Organization" ended. Moreover, there is nowadays a new edition of
Spartacus, published by Bruno Gmflnder Handels, from Berlin, which is available
over the Internet or in different bookstores in Europe.6 We are then inclined to
wonder if any real progress has been made in the effort to end the commercial
sexual exploitation of children.
Commercial sexual exploitation of children is not a recent problem but it has
gained more public interest over the last decade. Up until the late 80's, with a
mixture of indifference, apathy, denial, or even cynism, child labor and more
specifically child prostitution was not an issue of major concern, at either national
or international levels. 7  However, in 1989, the United Nations adopted the
Convention on the Rights of the Child ("UNCRC") explicitly prohibiting child
prostitution and illegal sexual practices with children under the age of 18.8 Since
then, an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental organizations
have been pressuring both governments and the general public to take steps against
the commercial sexual exploitation of children. In 1990, the international
campaign "End Child Prostitution in Asia Tourism" ("ECPAT") was launched in
Thailand. In 1996, the organization arranged the first World Congress against
commercial sexual exploitation of children, in Stockholm, Sweden. 9 In 1999, the
International Labour Organization ("ILO") adopted the Convention 182, directed
against the Worst Forms of Child Labour and child exploitation." °
These are examples of international efforts that took place during the last
decade to mark an end to the commercial sexual exploitation of children. The
subject is not taboo anymore. International organizations have influenced some
governments to take actions to protect the children. Many industrialized countries
in Europe, the United States of America, and Australia have adopted new laws or
extended their existing legislatures to authorize their local courts to prosecute
citizens having sexual intercourse with minors" outside their home countries.'
2
Currently, there are over twenty countries with extraterritorial legislations
prohibiting the sexual exploitation of children. 3  Simultaneously, developing
6. See Spartakus & Spartacus, supra note 2.
7. Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable; Report submitted to the 86th Session (1998) of the
International Labour Conference, (first published 1996), International Labour Organization,
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/englishlstandards/ipec/publ/policy/target/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
8. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art.34 (1989).
9. World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, Aug. 31, 1996, United
States Embassy in Stockholm available at http://www.usis.usemb.se/children/csec/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2003).
10. l.L.O. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (C182) (1999). Article 3 specifically
prohibits any sexual exploitation.
II. "Minor" for the purpose of this discussion is defined by the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child, in Article 1, as a "human being below the age of 18 years."
12. Margaret A. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists at Home: Do laws in Sweden, Australia,
and the United States safeguard the rights of children as mandated by international law?, 18 Fordham
Int'l L.J. 1852, 1857-58 (1995) [hereinafter Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists).
13. Daniel Edelson. The Prosecution of Persons Who Sexually Exploit Children in Countries
Other Than The;- Own: A Mod41for Amending Existing Legislation, 25 Fordham Int'l L.J. 483, 496
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countries such as Brazil and Thailand have reinforced their laws and social
programs to protect children, to treat them as victims rather than offenders. 14
This paper analyzes how effectively the new legal reforms prevent or deter
commercial sexual exploitation of children. Part I summarizes how child
prostitution and trafficking have developed. It explains how economic, social, and
cultural conditions favored the sexual abuse of children. Part 11 focuses on specific
actions taken by the international community to protect children and prevent
sexual abuse. Part III explains how different governments intend to fight and
prosecute sex tourism. Finally, part IV raises the limits of national and
international laws against child prostitution and makes recommendations.
I - CHILD SEX TOURISM AND OTHER COMMERCIAL SEXUAL USE OF
CHILDREN: CAUSES AND CONDITIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT
Sex tourism, child trafficking, and sexual slavery are all linked to the
longstanding issue of child prostitution. Even if the international community has
outlawed such form of prostitution since the early 20'h century, 5 the phenomenon
was spreading. Child prostitution reached the peak of its popularity in the late 50's
when foreigners (mostly from rich industrialized countries), addicted to sexual
intercourse with young boys and girls under the age of 14, discovered a "market"
in Asia. In Sri Lanka and Thailand, children could be bought for a few cents for
the night, the week, or the whole length of the business/pleasure trip.'
6
Today, it is almost impossible to pinpoint exactly how many children are used
as sexual distractions due to the absence of accurate and reliable data.'
7
Governments of the developing world tend to minimize the numbers while child
advocacy organizations tend to inflate them. In Asia, UNICEF reported that one
million children are involved in prostitution; 18 while the ECPAT reports there are
over three million in India alone.' 9 One thing is sure; the problem is not located
(2001) [hereinafter Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation].
14. Hdlia Barbosa, Family Perspectives: Social and Economical Origins, Causes, Prevention and
Care in Brazil, ECPAT Brazil, available at http://www.unesco.org/webworld
/childscreen/documents/barbosa.rtf (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Barbosa, Family
Perspectives]. Barbosa explains how Brazil laws include the protection of children.
15. In 1924, the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nation adopted the five-point declaration of
children's rights, known as the Declaration of Geneva.
16. Maureen Seneviratne, Family, Social and Economic Perspective: Origins, Prevention and
Care: Sexual Abuse of Children, available at http://www.unesco.org/webworld
/ci_publications/Detailed/137.shtm (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Seneviratne, Family, Social
and Economic Perspective].
17. See Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1862-64, listing numbers of child
prostitutes in different countries and how estimates vary according to the sources.
18. Figure estimated by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) available at
http://worldzone.net/family/dreammagicl/Unicoms?MultitudeOfChildren.htm (last visited June I1,
2003).
19. See Roz Prober and Mark Erik Hecht, Child Advocates Unite Against a Global Rise in Child
Exploitation, Human Rights Tribune, Vol. 6, No.4 (Dec. 1999), available at
http://www.hri.ca/tribune/viewArticle.asp?D=2531 (last visited June II, 2003).
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only in Asia. The phenomenon has spread to Latin America, Africa, Eastern
Europe, and even to western developed countries such as the United States.
20
While industrialized nations blame developing governments for their laxism
and failure to act against the sexual use of children, developing countries blame
industrialized governments for letting their nationals create a large demand. It is
true that without a demand there would not be a supply and that some governments
allow child prostitution in order to attract the revenue from such tourism.
However, the problem is more complex.
Socio-economic background of the supplying countries
Child prostitution is principally present in underdeveloped or developing
countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. It is not a
coincidence that such states do not have a stable or strong economy. They share
the common traits of high unemployment rates, great discrepancy of revenue
between the higher and lower income, absence of a middle class, and a low GDP
per capita. A large part of the population is undernourished or malnourished and is
21dying of the consequences of malnutrition. In addition, the poor level of sanitary
22conditions increases the high mortality rates.
Still, minors constitute a large percentage of the population. For example,
Brazil counts 40 percent of its population as being under the age of 18.23 Most of
the children are not enrolled in school and work legally or illegally to bring
revenues to their family. Despite the fact that all countries - other than Somalia
and the United States - have signed and recognized the Convention, few can fulfill
their responsibility to provide free education for children of age to attend primary
and elementary school.24 Even where free education is available, most children do
not have the luxury to attend schools; they have little or no formal academic
instruction.25
Many live in rural areas where living conditions are sparse. Parents raise their
children from a young age to work in the fields and to do domestic work of the
family. 26 The number of these children used to labor from an early age amounts to
20. The UNICEF estimates that 300.000 children are involved in prostitution in the United States;
figure available at http://worldzone.net/family/dreammagicl/Unicoms?MultitudeOfChildren.htm (last
visited June 1I, 2003).
21. See Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14, stating that Brazil is the 5" greatest world
food producer but 74"' in quality of life.
22. Id. The mortality rate of children under the age of five is 44 percent in Brazil
23. Id.
24. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art.28 (1989).
25. UNICEF, Children out of school: A cost and cause of child labour, (1996), available at
http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/download/fctsgrfs.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2003). In 1996, The UNICEF
reported that 47 percent of children of age to attend elementary school in Sub-Saharan Africa did not go
to school. This number falls to 34 percent in East Asia and Pacific, and 12 percent in Latin America
and the Caribbean.
26. UNICEF, A working day in the life of a 10-year-old girl in Nepal, (1997), available at
http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/download/fctsgrfs.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
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400 million worldwide." They know of no other style of living.
In more urban areas, the poorest part of the population lives in ghettos or in
the streets. Some children were even born in the street, not knowing the luxury of
a personal house or apartment. To live, they engage themselves in any legal or
illegal activities that allow them to acquire money, food, or clothing.
28
This low social-economic background leads children to fight for their
survival. In this context, sexual traffic and commerce flourishes by exploiting the
misery of famished families. The majority of young boys and girls who,
voluntarily or involuntarily, engage in prostitution do so for minimum economic
revenues. They are the most vulnerable segment of the social pyramid and easily
allured by promises of ajob or better opportunities. They believe the "recruiter" is
offering great job opportunities but end up in brothels or in the street.29 Others just
discover that selling their body is an easy way to obtain quick and easy money.
They are self-employed or work in gangs, sharing the same living quarters.
30
Cultural background of the children involved in prostitution and governmental
overlook
Children are often viewed as assets by their families, as a way to gather some
revenue and share the work. It is not uncommon in extremely poor regions that
parents sell their sons or daughters, or exchange them for luxuries such as meat, or
farm animals. Some parents just do not think of the consequences; others hope for
a better life for their children working as maids or handymen in richer households.
Whether or not parents are consciously acting for their own benefit or are under the
misconception that they are providing greater opportunities for their kids, few ever
see or hear about their child again.
The child's self esteem is also undermined by years of abuse suffered at
home. Studies indicate that minors engaged in prostitution have often experienced
incest and sexual abuse during the first years of their lives. 3' They are oppressed,
abandoned, and generally used to violence. Moreover, in patriarchal societies such
as Sri Lanka, such topics are simply not discussed because they are considered
"dirty", "indecent", or merely too common to openly report or converse about.32
Child abuse is just swept under the carpet and crimes against children are not
reported. Young girls are particularly at risk since they grow up with the belief
that they are inferior as females. They witness abuse against their own mothers.
They do not question their role in society and believe in their duty to serve men.
They live in a prejudiced society where men have all the rights but women are
27. UNICEF, The State of the World Children, Shadowy figures, (1997), available at
http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/download/fctsgrfs.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
28. European Conference on Street Children Worldwide, Letter of Summary, Oct. 1996, available
at http://www.hri.ca/children/reports/ecscw.shtmI (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
29. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
30. Seneviratne, Family, Social and Economic Perspective, supra note 16.
31. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
32. Seneviratne, Family, Social and Economic Perspective, supra note 16.
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discriminated against. Obliged to live on "under-employment," they are often
forced to establish sexual relations with their bosses in order to keep their job.33
For those minors engaged in sexual activities, it is "normal" to be used for such
purposes. They also see themselves as guilty perpetrators of crimes instead of
victims. They fear arrest and prosecution.34  Unfortunately, those children are
often guilty of theft or drug use, in addition to prostitution.
Governments are also to blame for the status quo of indifference or denial
toward the sexual exploitation of children. Quite often, sex tourism is a large part
of the revenue for the country.35 Some villages depend upon child prostitution to
36fill a common public fund used to finance schools, roads and equipment.
Therefore, states look the other way instead of taking action to end the
phenomenon. In addition, corruption is common at all levels, from the police
officer to the judge. Law enforcement personnel often use sex tourism to inflate
their own revenues.
Governments lack commitment to guarantee the basic rights of the juvenile
population. Even if they passed laws and statutes to warranty to each child the
right to life, health, nutrition, education, liberty, or safeguard from neglect,37 they
often do not have the means to enforce and assure such rights. Governments do
not have the monetary resources to assure minimal social welfare services. Most
of the time, those regimes are in a precarious situation, without political or
economic stability. Threatened by instability, they have numerous priority issues
to resolve before allocating their spare resources to the younger population's
welfare.
To summarize, families, society, and governments might be offended or
saddened, or they might be indifferent. In any case, they benefit from child
prostitution and are then reluctant to take meaningful steps towards resolving of
the problem. Children are left to provide for themselves and sometimes for their
families. Seizing the opportunity, promising a better world, the recruiters can
33. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
34. See Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1852 & note 5. Healy related the
story of Rosario (II or 12 years old) who died after one of her clients broke a vibrator in her vagina.
Rosario fled from the doctor's office, scared of being arrested and going to prison, if she had to explain
how she got the vaginal infection. She never got the pieces of vibrator removed and died after 7 months
of agonizing pain.
35. Roger J.R. Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse and Exploitation of Children: Challenges in
Implementing Children's Human Rights, 60 Brook. L. Rev. 959, 981(1994) [hereinafter Levesque,
Sexual Use, Abuse].
36. Id. at 981.
37. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14, giving the example of Brazil, which in addition to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, has adopted Article 227 in its Federal Constitution, which
states:
"It is the duty of the Family, of the Society and of the State to assure with absolute
priority to the child and adolescent the right to life, health, nutrition, education, leisure,
professionalism, culture, dignity, respect, liberty, home and community life, and to
safeguard them from all forms of neglect, discrimination, exploitation, violence, cruelty
and oppression."
However, Barbosa explains that the government does not enforce its policy.
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easily organize the prostitution market and sexual traffic.
Developing countries' responsibilities
It has been argued that child prostitution of a massive nature originated in
Thailand, the Philippines, and Taiwan during the Viet Nam War.38  While the
troops were stationed in these countries they made use of bars and massage parlors
for rest and recreation. These places were often frequented by underage
prostitutes. Just after the war, the governments used the sex industry to promote
tourism. They made no effort to limit prostitution at that time and tourists from
Japan, Europe, and Australia came to experience the "charms" of the countries.
Nobody talked about pedophilia then. In the late 70's, early 80's, travel agencies
started to organize sex tours catering to men from industrialized nations. They
went to Asia to engage in sexual intercourse with minors at a minimum risk. Such
practices were unlawful and a great risk in their home countries. Thailand became
popular for its young girls39 and Sri Lanka for its young boys.40 Prostitution was
not only legal but became a great source of revenue for the states which therefore
did not really care about the age of the prostitute or the consequences to the
children. Rapidly, surrounding countries used the same niche to attract tourism to
their countries. Children were purchased or abducted and then sold in Asia to
serve men from the western world. Today, China, Burma, Laos, Vietnam, India,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan are all involved in the commercial sexual exploitation of
children one way or another.4'
Unlike the Asian market, the Latin American market developed mostly
because of the local demand and then spread to cater to North American
customers. Street children became engaged, voluntarily or involuntarily, in
prostitution to service the upper class of their home countries. Many adolescents,
bought or kidnapped from Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil, or Salvador, ended up in
brothels located in the gold mining regions of the Amazon, highly populated by
males.42 Sex tourism happens in major cities in Latin America, like Rio de Janeiro,
where businessmen from the United States, Canada, and Europe, while visiting or
making deals seize the opportunity offered by the sex market.
43
38. Healy, Prosecuting ChildSex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1864.
39. See Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 979, explaining that "children below
sixteen years of age make up 40% of the total number of prostitutes in Thailand... and some are as
young as ten."
40. Id. at 979. "In Sri Lanka, about 30,000 boys aged six to fifteen are thought to work as
prostitutes."
41. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1862-64. Thailand has between
200,000 and 250,000 prostitutes under the age of 18, including children who have been purchased or
abducted from Burma, Laos, and China. The Philippines has between 50,000 and 60,000 child
prostitutes; Taiwan has approximately 70,000. In Sri Lanka, the number varies between 10,000 and
15,000. ECPAT reported 200,000 to 500,000 in China, 2,000 in Cambodia, and 6,000 in Vietnam. In
India, there are about 400,000 to 500,000 children involved in the sex trade. Finally, Bangladesh
admitted the existence of 10,000 child prostitutes between the age of 12 and 16 in 1985.
42. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
43. See Edelson, A Model for Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 483, reporting the
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The Eastern European market is newer, starting after the downfall of the
communist regimes at the beginning of the 90's. Sex rings were organized by
local mafia, between Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary. The
demand is local or from businessmen from Western Europe. Again sex is not the
main objective for the trip, but the opportunity is easily accessible. The European
market is also more "high tech," and available on the Internet. On special web
pages, you can book company for your trip the same way you reserve a hotel
room.
4
For many years, industrialized countries did not take any action to prevent or
control the behavior of their nationals in other countries. Adopting the "ostrich
tactic," developed nations denied any responsibility. They could be embarrassed,
even ashamed, but since the crimes took place far from their territorial limits, they
believed that it was the receiving countries' responsibility to act. Since the
adoption of the Convention and the implication of many child advocacy
organizations, western governments are acting against sexual exploitation of
children worldwide. The first regional organization to face up to its responsibility
was the Council of Europe, which in 1988 addressed the problem of child
prostitution and the involvement of Europeans. The Council made
recommendations to all European countries to establish extraterritorial jurisdictions
in order to allow courts to prosecute nationals for crimes committed outside their
countries.4 5 In May 1990, in Thailand, churches, women's rights organizations,
and charitable services organized ECPAT. The campaign openly blamed the
developed countries for providing the demand necessary to maintain the sexual
exploitation of children and asked the governments to join and help the fight
against child prostitution around the world.46
II - INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
1) ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention
One of the first conventions adopted by the international community,
designed to protect children, was the Declaration of Geneva, adopted in 1924 by
the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, which did not consider the issue of
child prostitution at that point. In 1973, the ILO adopted the Minimum Age
Convention 138 ("C 138"), meant to replace all prior existing conventions, which
statement of a retired U.S. schoolteacher bragging about his 'adventures' while visiting Latin America;
"On this trip, I've had sex with a 14 year-old girl in Mexico and a 15 year-old in
Columbia. I'm helping them financially. If they don't have sex with me, they may not
have enough food. If someone has a problem with me doing this, let UNICEF feed
them. I've never paid more than $20 to these young women, and that allows them to eat
for a week."
44. Christophe Agnus, Le Minitel de la Honte, L'Express, Feb. 2, 1995.
45. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1886.
46. Jacqueline Remy, Halte au Tourism Sexuel, L'Express, Feb. 2, 1995.
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imposed a minimum working age according to specific economic sectors. By the
end of October 2000, 102 ILO member States had ratified C 138, binding the
parties to act toward the abolition of child labour.48 Article 3 obligates members to
raise the minimum age to 18 year-old for any "type of employment or work which
by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to jeopardize
the health, safety or morals of young persons., 49 Although prostitution can easily
be included as a work jeopardizing the "health, safety or morals" of any child, the
Convention failed to link sexual exploitation to "work." In addition, the same
article provides for exceptions, allowing minimum age to be as lowas 16 years of
age.50
Because C 138 failed to properly address the issue of sexual exploitation of
children, ILO implemented the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention ("C
182") in 1999,"' urging each of the members to take "immediate and effective
measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child
5 2
labour as a matter of urgency. 53  Such "labour" includes sexual exploitation.54
Twelve months after ratification, a member State is bound under international law
to align its national regulations and practices to the requirement of the
Convention. 55 In addition, the state must report regularly to the ILO regarding the
application of C 182 and be accountable for allegations of violation.56 Even if a
State has not yet ratified C 182, it can still be required to report about its situation
and efforts made toward the abolition of the worst forms of child labour under the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work adopted in 1998.
57
ILO then has a very wide jurisdiction over its member States and can impose
standards and regulations upon them to end commercial sexual exploitation of
children.
47. I.L.O. C138 Minimum Age Convention (1973). Article 3(1) specified:
"The minimum age for any type of employment or work which by its nature or
circumstances was likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons
should not be less than 18 years." Article 7(l)(a) and (b) stated "that national laws could
permit employment or work of persons 13 to 15 years of age on light work not likely to
be harmfil to their health or development, and not such as to prejudice their attendance
at school, their participation in vocational orientation or training programmes."
48. I.L.O., ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention comes into force: Convention provides
new legal tool to combat most exploitative and dangerous forms of child labour, Nov. 17 2000,
ILO/00/43/ available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2000/43.htm (last visited on
Jan. 3, 2003) [hereinafter ILO/ 00/43].
49. I.L.O. C138 Minimum Age Convention art 3(l) (1973).
50. I.L.O. C138 Minimum Age Convention art 3(3) (1973).
5 I. By June 2003, C 182 has been ratified by 141 countries, including Thailand, Sri Lanka, Brazil,
European Union members, Australia, and the United States. The complete list of ratification status is
available at http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/english/convdisp I.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
52. I.L.O.,C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 2;
"For the purpose of this Convention, the term child shall apply to all persons under the age of 18."
53. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art I (1999).
54. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 3(b)(1999).
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Article 7(1) of C 182, conveys into a government the obligation to apply "all
necessary measures,... including the provision and application of penal
sanctions" to enforce the Convention, 8 which aims at securing "the prohibition
and elimination of the worst forms of child labour," 59 including "the use, procuring
or offering of a child for prostitution," 6 as well as "the sale and trafficking of
children .... and forced or compulsory labour.",6 1  Under these principles, a
member State is obligated not only to condemn child prostitution but also to adopt
and enforce laws effectively eliminating it. This international commitment is
mostly important for receiving countries. Because of the broad language of article
3, the Convention impresses upon governments the responsibility to sanction all
participants in the sex trade, sanctioning any person who "use," "procure," or
"offer" a child for prostitution.62 This would include the parents. According to the
Center for the Protection of Children's Rights, in 1989, 63% of girls under sixteen
63were brought to prostitution by their own parents. The possibility of facing
criminal charges in a court of law could deter parents from becoming accomplices
to the exploitation of their children, and diminish the supply.
While the Convention engages members to prosecute adults involved in
exploitation of children, it also reinforces that the child is to be protected and
treated as a victim. Article 7(2) mandates states to "take effective and time-bound
measures to (a) prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of child
labour, and (b) provide necessary and appropriate assistance for the removal of the
children ... and for their rehabilitation and social integration." 64  In addition,
governments are to "identify and reach out to children at special risks. 65
Developing countries are now bound by international law not only to stop child
prostitution but also to prevent the involvement of further children.
Through the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
(IPEC), ILO has published a Handbook for Parliamentarians to guide member
States in their fight against child labour.66 The organization has set out seven
measures by which parliaments can contribute to the elimination of the worst
forms of child labour, including adoption and enforcement of legislation,
establishment of programmes to prevent the involvement of children, providing the
financing and human resources necessary, and mobilization of the public opinion.
67
Countries are welcomed to request the help of ILO or IPEC in order to implement
Convention 182 into their national legislation and social programs.
58. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 7(1) (1999).
59. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 1 (1999).
60. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 3(b) (1999).
61. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 3(a) (1999).
62. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 3(b) (1999).
63. Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 980.
64. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 7(2)(a)&(b) (1999).
65. I.L.O. C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art 7(l)(d) (1999).
66. I.L.O., Eliminating the Worst Forms of Child Labour: A Practical Guide to ILO Convention
182, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 3-2002, available athttp://www.ilo.orgpjublic/english/
standards/ipec/publ/ipu 2002 Pb wcb.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
67. Id.
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2) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
The most important achievement in the field of children's rights is the UN
Convention on the Right of the Child, adopted in 1989. For the first time, non-
governmental organizations oriented toward human rights and child advocacy
participated in the drafting. 68  The purpose of the Convention was not only to
guarantee basics rights to the children, but also to implement instruments to
provide and monitor such rights. 69 The Convention established the creation of a
Committee on the Rights of the Child 70 whose purpose is to oversee and control
progress made by member states.71 The major advantage of the UNCRC is that it
is the most widely ratified International Convention, binding nation states to its
implementation.72
Article 34 explicitly mandates State Parties to protect their children from
sexual exploitation, urging them to implement measures to prevent the inducement
of a child in sexual activity, prostitution, pornography, or other unlawful sexual
practices. 73  In addition Article 3574 and 3675 require governments to assure the
protection against abduction, sale or trafficking in children, and against any form
of exploitation prejudicial to the child's welfare. Furthermore, Article 32
recognizes "the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and
from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous... or to be harmful to the
child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development. '76 By
its very nature, prostitution qualifies as "hazardous" or "harmful." Lastly, Article
39 specifies that the child is mostly a victim and states must facilitate his or her
physical and psychological recovery, and reintegration into society.77
68. See Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1876.
69. Part 11 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 42 to 45) is oriented toward
implementation and monitoring of those rights.
70. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art.43 (1989).
71. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art.44 (1989).
72. To date, only two states failed to ratify the UNCRC: Somalia and the United States.
73. Article 34:
States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate
national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:
The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;
The exploitative uses of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual
practices;
The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.
74. Article 35:
States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to
prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.
75. Article 36:
States Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to
any aspects of the child's welfare.
76. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art.32 (1989).
77. Article 39:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation,
or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
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The combination of those articles imposes upon signatories a heightened
level of dedication and commitment toward the protection of children from sexual
exploitation and abuse. In addition, the Convention makes it clear that all states
shall undertake "national, bilateral, and multilateral measures" in addressing the
problem.78 Accordingly, it seems appropriate for State Parties to create new laws
prohibiting the sexual exploitation of children in their home country, criminalizing
any person benefiting from child prostitution, as well as extending jurisdiction to
cover citizen's actions abroad, using children for sex or pornography.79 On the
other hand, critics of the UNCRC have declared that the meaning of "exploitive
use" could be left open for interpretation, allowing children to be used for sex so
long as they consent.80 However, the Convention could then be combined with the
UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which compels Parties "to punish any
person who ... procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution,
another person, even with the consent of that person or exploits the prostitution of
another person, even with the consent of that person." 81 Member States who
ratified both conventions are under international obligation to penalize organizers
of the sex trade, even if the children came to prostitutions voluntarily.
The most significant limitation of the Convention is that it does not provide
for mechanisms to allow children, NGO's, or child advocates to present personal
complaints and lacks remedies in case of confrontation. The Convention is mostly
oriented towards cooperation. It is up to State Parties to establish and implement
measures for the protection of the children. Despite its limits, the UNCRC was the
first international treaty distinctly prohibiting sexual exploitation of children. It
created a sense of awareness to both the general public and governments, setting
the foundation for more comprehensive regulations and opening the doors to
NGO's negotiation with different administrations.
Ill -AMENDING THE LAWS: ACTIONS TAKEN BY RECEIVING AND
SENDING COUNTRIES TO IMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Legal measures taken in receiving countries
Due to international pressures, and depending on the economical, political,
and social status of the receiving country, some governments have modified their
legislatures to take action against sexual exploitation of children. However, in
punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an
environment which fosters the health, self respect and dignity of the child.
78. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child Articles 34 and 35.
79. Heather C. Giordanella, Status of §2423(b): Prosecuting United States Nationals for Sexually
Exploiting Children in Foreign Countries, 12 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 133, 139 (1998) [hereinafter
Giordanella, Status of §2423(b)].
80. Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 985.
8 1. U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others art. 1 (1949).
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order to be able to pass new laws and to enforce them, the country needs a certain
political and economic stability. Only developing countries can afford the time
and resources needed to approve and apply new laws. Under-developed countries
are too poor and do not have enough political support to concentrate on child
exploitation.
Thailand
Thailand has ratified the UNCRC and ILO C 182, but reports estimate the
number of child prostitutes anywhere between 25,000 and 800,000.82 ECPAT
believes the figure to be between 200,000 and 250,000 children below the age of
18.83 Until 1956, prostitution was legal in Thailand, which highly profited from
sex tourism.
84
Today, the Thai Penal Code prohibits prostitution."' However, children
involved in the sex trade are not prosecuted and are treated as victims rather than
as suspects,86 even if they consented. In 1996, the government enacted the
Prostitution Prevention and Suppression Act ("Act") allowing the prosecution of
customers having intercourse with child prostitutes.8 7 The Act also permits the
prosecution of parents allowing their child to enter the sex trade. In 1997, the
government adopted the Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and
Children Act, which increased prison time and penalties for people guilty of
abducting and bringing to Thailand, women and children from China, Burma,
Laos, or Cambodia for slave labor or prostitution.8 Today, the country has passed
a statute, similar to statutory rape in the United States, that punishes sexual
intercourse with a minor under the age of sixteen by a fine and a prison term up to
twelve years.89
In addition to laws targeting the sexual exploitation or trafficking of children,
the government took steps to promote the rights and welfare of children. In 1998,
82. Vandana Rastogi, Preserving Children's Rights: the Challenges of Eradicating Child Sexual
Exploitation in Thailand and India, 22 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 259, 264 (1998) [hereinafter Rastogi,
Preserving Children's Rights].
83. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1862.
84. Rastogi, Preserving Children's Rights, supra note 82 at 264. "Some reports state that
prostitution brings in $1.8 to $2.2 billion per year to Thailand, while other reports estimate that amount
at approximately $20 billion per year."
85. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1884.
86. Jonathan Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators in U.S. Courts in an Effort to Reduce the
Sexual Exploitation of Children Globally, 9 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. I, 7 (1999) [hereinafter Todres,
Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators]. "It was not until 1996 that by law the Thai government recognized
child prostitutes as 'victims of the illegal sex trade' and that 'customers and procurers, not the victims,
should face punishment."
87. U.S. Department of State, Thailand Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Feb. 26, 1999 available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1998_hrpreport/thailand.html (last visited on Jan. 16,
2003) (hereinafter Thailand Report].
88. Id.
89. See Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1885.
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the compulsory education requirement was raised from six to nine years. 9° The
Social Welfare Plan for Underprivileged People doubled the budget for children's
programs for the years 1997-2001. 9' NGOs and the government collaborate to
provide shelter, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for children and women
involved in the sex industry. Since September 2000, the legislation requires a one-
year training period for children victim of any kind of abuse. 92
Thailand has taken important steps to prevent children from being victims of
the sex trade; it has enacted stronger laws against prostitution and trafficking.
Penalties are harsher on brothel procurers and parents guilty of profiting from
children engaged in the sex trade. However, the government faces the major
problem of corruption. Since the 1996 Act, 355 persons have been arrested for
violating this law; only 14 have been convicted and sentenced.94
Brazil
Reports estimate the number of child prostitutes in Brazil to be 250,000. 9'
However, because most of the children involved in the sex trade are street children
or come from Amazonian tribes - and therefore not counted during the national
census - real data are impossible to get. Hdlia Barbosa, working for ECPAT
Brazil, argues that millions of young girls and adolescents exchange sexual favors
for food and shelter.96 Brothel keepers and providers lie to the young women by
promising them work as nannies or household servants. Instead, they are sold by
auction in brothels until the owner releases them to the streets where they continue
to prostitute themselves in order to survive.
Even if the laws in Brazil prohibit sexual exploitation of children 97 and
promote the Rights of the Child,98 the country lacks enforcement power and
experiences too much corruption to be able to bring them into full effect. 99 In
90. Thailand Report, supra note 87.
91. ld
92. Id.
93. Rastogi, Preserving Children's Rights, supra note 82, at 271. "The police guard the brothels
and warn the owners about any possible raids."
94. Thialand Report, supra note 87.
95. Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 979.
96. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
97. Id. Article 227(4) of the Federal Constitution states, "the law will severely punish child and
adolescent abuse, violence or sexual exploitation." Articles 240 and 241 prohibit the use of children or
adolescent in pornographic productions. However, no means exist to really severely punish sexual
exploitation.
98. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14. Cf to note 36.
99. U.S. Department of State, Brazil Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Feb. 26, 1999, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998 hrpreport/brazil.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2003) [hereinafter Brazil Report]. In June 1998, federal authorities charged eight persons with
operating child prostitution rings in the city of Teresina. Among the accused clients of the rings were
police officers. In September, civil police of Alagoas uncovered a child prostitution ring involving
local judicial authorities. In October civil police of Maranhao uncovered a child prostitution ring
involving police, judicial authorities, and elected authorities.
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addition, prostitution rings are well organized involving the complicity of
nightclubs, motels, hotels, taxi drivers, travel agencies, and the parents. It is very
hard for the police to find people who are willing to talk.
Brazil has not yet implemented efficient legal and social instruments to
prevent the sexual exploitation of children. The state has not formulated public
policies for protection, defense and childhood promotion.'0° It neglects public
services for family, health and home assistance. 10 The Children and Adolescents
Defense Center (CEDECA) admitted that the governmental efforts to better protect
children were fruitless since crime against children is increasing.'0 2 There exist
some programs created in partnerships between NGOs and governmental entities,
but they lack monetary resources and human power to be totally effective. 103 Two
states, however - Pernambuco and Bahia - have adopted the legislation called
Specialized Criminal Justice of Childhood and Youths to prosecute and judge
crimes against children and adolescents. 10 4 Unfortunately, they are the only states
which dedicated special courts to such crimes and have implemented, with the
collaboration of NGOs, psychotherapeutic programs for the child victims.'0 5 We
can hope that other states will follow.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka counts between 10,000 and 15,000 child prostitutes, most of whom
are young boys. 1 6 Because of that factor, the government of Sri Lanka denied the
facts for a long time. It had to face up to the reality after the publication in 1980
by Terres des Hommes, of Tim Bond's report on child prostitution.'0° The
government immediately appointed a Review Committee to create new laws
prohibiting and preventing commercial sexual exploitation of children.108 Though,
when a draft of the new legislation was presented in 1987, the Minister of State
denied the necessity to adopt new laws curbing the commercial sexual exploitation
of children. 109
Until 1995, efforts and pressures made by national and international
organizations were fruitless." 0 In 1995, however, the Ministry of Media, Tourism
and Aviation created a special task force to study the problem of sex tourism and
related offenses."' The task force was abolished in 1997 and was replaced by a
100. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
101. Id.
102. Brazil Report, supra note 99.
103. Id.
104. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
105. Id.
106. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1863. See also Levesque, Sexual
Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 979, reporting that 30,000 boys aged six to fifteen are thought to work as
prostitute in Sri Lanka.
107. Seneviratne, Family, Social and Economic Perspective, supra note 16.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1885.
III. U.S. Department of State, Sri Lanka Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998,
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presidential task force. 12 A year later, the Parliament enacted the Child Protection
Authority ("CPA") statute and committee."13 The CPA encompassed all previous
laws for the protection of children, integrated the principles of the UNCRC and
made unlawful all forms of abuse against a child under the age of 18 years. The
law prohibits any form of abuse - sexual, violence, traffic, cruelty, and even
involvement in wars. It also proscribes the use of children in exploitative labor or
illegal activities, or in any way contrary to compulsory education, which is
obligatory to the age of 12. "'
In addition to the legislature, the CPA formed a special committee composed
of senior law enforcement officers, representatives from the educational, medical,
and legal professions. 1 5 Unfortunately by the end of 1998, the CPA committee
had not yet been constituted."
16
In general, the government of Sri Lanka is committed to protecting the
welfare and rights of children. It made education free, including university, and
compulsory up to the age of 12. It also provides free health care, including
immunization programs. 1 7 It welcomes the UNICEF and any child advocacy
organizations to work toward the abolition of child exploitation. It has ratified the
UNCRC and LIO C 182, hoping to resolve the problem. However, the major
obstacle the government has to face is a lack of enforcement due to the many
internal conflicts between ethnic groups, and with India. Resources are diverted;
law enforcement forces have many other pressing issues to solve.
Legal measures taken in sending countries
In 1987, 11 or 12 year-old Rosario Baluyot died in Philippines, after Dr.
Ritter, from Austria, forcibly inserted an electric vibrator in her vagina where it
broke. "8 Rosario endured seven months of agonizing pain and infection before
she collapsed in the street, with green bile coming out of her mouth. The doctors
removed a nine-centimeter rusty screw from her vagina. She died less than a week
later." 9 After the Philippine Supreme Court reversed his life sentence, Dr. Ritter
returned to Austria where he never faced charges.
20
To prevent such injustices, international organizations and NGOs have
pressured governments of industrialized countries to extend their legislatures in
order to allow prosecution of nationals acting outside their boundaries. Today,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Feb. 26, 1999, available at








118. See Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1852.
119. ld. at 1852 & note 7.
120. Id. at 1853.
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over 20 countries12' apply extraterritorial laws (ET) to sex tourists. However, not
all nations strictly apply their ET legislations122 and different countries have taken
different approaches. The ET legislations vary - some are extended application of
the countries' penal codes'23 while others are new laws specifically created to
target sex tourism. 24 Some laws require double criminality, while others enable
the sending country to prosecute a sex tourist regardless of whether or not the
person was already tried in the receiving country.'
25
European Union
All European countries have ratified the UNCRC and are bound by its
obligation under article 34, to take all appropriate measures to end child sexual
exploitation. After the Council of Europe condemned sex tourism and alleged the
responsibility of sending countries, it recommended to its member States to
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction to allow prosecution of nationals engaged in
sexual relations with minors in other states. 26 Many European states complied;
France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Denmark, the UK,
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Belgium, and Germany have adopted ET legislation in
hope to control their citizens' behavior outside their borders. All those countries
also have statutory rape status; however, the consenting age varies from 15 to 18
year-old.
Sweden used its own existing ET laws to prosecute Bengt Bolin, 66 year-old,
arrested in Thailand in bed with a 14 year-old boy.'2 7  The laws were not
constructed to apply specifically to sex tourists. Sweden extended its penal code
extraterritorially in 1962.128 The original purpose was to protect Swedish nationals
121. See Edelson, A Model for Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 496 & note 58,
listing the countries with ET legislation: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Netherlands, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States.
122. Id. at 499 & note 71. The UK has used its ET law only once, against its citizen Kenneth
Biden, owner of a vacation camp in France, frequented by English children. Biden pled guilty to three
counts of violating the UK's ET law, and received a three-year sentence. Japan has never prosecuted
any citizen for traveling overseas and sexually exploiting a child.
123. Id. at 496 & note 59. Countries that extraterritorially extend their national laws include Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
124. Id. at 496 & note 60. Certain countries enacted specific legislation against child sex tourism,
although these countries' laws already extend extraterritorially - including Belgium, France, and
Germany.
125. Id. at 495-96.
126. Id. at 502. In 1997, the council of Europe adopted a Joint Action Programme, calling member
states to review their laws and judicial procedures concerning child exploitation, and to enact and
enforce ET legislation against child sex tourist.
127. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1890.
128. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 503 -.04 & note 99:
Swed. Penal Code ch. 2, § 2 (Swed.) (Law 1972:812). The code reads:
Section 2: Crimes committed outside the Realm shall be adjudged according to Swedish
law and by a Swedish court where the crime has been committed:
L.by a Swedish citizen or an alien domiciled in Sweden,
2. by an alien not domiciled in Sweden who, after having committed the crime, has
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and to ensure them a fair trial and sentence in case of crimes committed outside the
country. 129  However, the law holds Swedish citizens and residents who travel
outside the borders liable for any sexual activity with children that would
constitute a crime within Sweden.
130
Nonetheless, the Swedish law is limited. It includes the requirement of
double criminality. Therefore, in order to be prosecuted in Sweden, the national's
activity must constitute a crime in both Sweden and the receiving country.
13 1
Additionally, the court will not impose a penalty greater than the maximum
penalty allowable under the laws of the country in which the crime occurred.
132
Critics also find the law too laxist since the Swedish penal code carries a maximum
sentence of four years imprisonment for sexual intercourse with a minor under the
age of 15.133 Lastly, a person will not be prosecuted in Sweden in cases where the
destination country already held a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of that
person.
134
The positive aspect of the Swedish approach is that it is "child-friendly."
Courts will allow videotaped testimony of the child victim rather than requiring
their physical presence. 35 They also will appoint free judicial counsel to children
and permit victims to recover damages from the defendant.'
36
The United Kingdom extraterritorially extended certain legislation to cover
British citizens and residents involved in sex tourism by enacting the Sex
Offenders Act in 1997.137 The Act however, requires double criminality for any
prosecution in British courts. 38 In addition, the country has implemented training
become a Swedish citizen or has acquired domicile in the Realm or who is a Danish,
Finnish, Icelandic, or Norwegian citizen and is present in the Realm, or
3. by any other alien, who is present in the Realm, and the crime under Swedish Law can
result in imprisonment for more than six months. The first paragraph shall not apply if
the act is not subject to criminal responsibility under the law of the place where it was
committed or if it was committed within an area not belonging to any state and, under
Swedish law, the punishment for the act cannot be more severe than a fine. In cases
mentioned in this Section, a sanction may not be imposed which is more severe than the
severest punishment provided for the crime under the law in the place where it was
committed.
129. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 504.
130. ld. at 504.
131. Id. at 505.
132. Id. at 505.
133. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1893 & note 277, citing Penal Code
ch.6, s 6 (Swed.). See also Edelson, A Model for Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 506,
relating that Bolin was sentenced only to three months incarceration following his trial in Sweden.
134. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 505.
135. Id. at 505.
136. Id. at 505.
137. Id. at 514.
138. Id. at 514, note 167. United Kingdom Sex Offenders Act 1997, ch. 51, part I1, at 7.1(a)(b)
states:
Subject to subsection (2) below, any act done by a person in a country or territory
outside the United Kingdom which (a) constituted an offence under the law in that
VOL. 31:4
COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
programs in destination countries, teaching police officers questioning techniques




In 1996, the United States actively participated in the ECPAT World
Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, 140 which aimed at
(1) giving international visibility to the issues, (2) bringing together decision-
makers from the relevant major disciplines, and (3) devising a plan of action to end
this form of abuse in all countries in the world.' 4' America also participated in the
Second World Congress held in Japan in December 2001.142 Despite the fact that
the United States has not ratified the UNCRC, it is involved with the international
community in order to fight sex tourism.
Amidst these international efforts, the Clinton Administration amended the
Mann Act of 1910, by adding the Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Act,' 43 to enable
American courts to prosecute nationals traveling to foreign countries for the
purpose of engaging in sexual acts with minors.'" The law does not explicitly
prohibit sexual intercourse with minors but traveling in foreign commerce, or
conspiring to do so, for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act with a person
under 18 years of age. 45 Therefore, in order to get a conviction, a prosecutor does
not need to prove that actual sexual act happened, but only the defendant's intent
to engage in such act with a minor.146  The law allows the United States to
country or territory; and (b) would constitute a sexual offence to which this section
applies if it had been done in England and Wales, or in Northern Ireland, shall constitute
that sexual offence under the law of that part of the United Kingdom.
139. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 515-16.
140. Giordanella, Status of §2423(b), supra note 79, at 144-45. The U.S. adopted the Declaration
and its Agenda.
141. ld, at 142-43. The World Congress was held in Stockholm. Delegates from 126 countries and
50 non-governmental organizations attended this conference.
142. The United States adopted the Stockholm Declaration and the Agenda for Action, which was
reaffirmed during the Second World Congress in Japan in 2001; see Country Adoption of the Stockholm
Declaration and Agenda for Action, ECPAT International, available at
http://www.Ecpat.net/eng/Ecpatinter/projects/monitoring/countryadoption.asp (last visited June II,
2003).
143. Giordanella, Status off2423(b), supra note 79, at 148.
144. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(b) (1994) reads:
Travel with intent to engage in sexual act with a juvenile:
A person who travels in interstate commerce, or conspires to do so, or a United States
citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in
foreign commerce, or conspires to do so, for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act
(as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in
violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
15 years, or both.
145. Id.
146. See United States v Stephen, 19 Fed. Appx. 196, (6"
h Cir. 2001) (Not selected for publication
in the Federal Reporter) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(b), finding the statute
2003
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
prosecute a child sex tourist even before he can harm a child. In addition, the
prosecution does not have to prove that sexual activity was the sole purpose of
traveling in foreign commerce; it only must show that "one of the defendant's
motives in traveling in foreign commerce was to engage in a sexual act with a
minor."' 147  Since many sex tourists go overseas for other purposes other than
engaging in sexual activities with minors, this interpretation of the statute grants a
wider jurisdiction over potential defendants. Finally, the amendment does not
contain a double criminality requirement. The major disadvantage of the U.S.
statute is that it does not fully protect children ages sixteen and seventeen, unless
the sexual conduct involves force, the serious threat of force, or other means to
incapacitate the victim. 148
Section 2423(b) has been successfully used in many cases against nationals
who travel in interstate commerce to engage in sexual acts with minors. 149 It has
also been used once against a U.S. citizen who traveled to Honduras to engage in
sexual activity with an underage boy 50 and once against a permanent resident who
traveled to Mexico to rape a 13 year-old girl.' 5' Both trials resulted in conviction
of multiple sexual offense charges.
Australia
Due to its proximity to Asia, the Australian government realized the degree of
involvement of its nationals with the sex trade. 52 Therefore, in 1994, Australia
passed the Child Sex Tourism Act.' 53  The Act is highly comprehensive,
did not violate Due Process while punishing for 'mere thought').
147. See United States. v Garcia-Lopez, 234 F. 3d 217, 219 (5"' Cir. 2000) (affirming the district
court's jury instruction) cert. denied, 532 U.S. 935, 121 S. Ct. 1389, 149 L.Ed.2d 313 (2001). See also
United States v. Miller, 148 F.3d 207, 211-13 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that illegal sexual acts with minor
must be dominant purpose of traveling in interstate commerce, but not sole, or most important reason).
The Miller court notes that every other circuit that has considered this issue has rejected the
interpretation suggested by Miller [that illegal sexual acts with a minor be the most important or sole
purpose of traveling in interstate commerce].
148. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1907, explaining that 18 U.S.C. §
2241 only legislates against sexual activity with a 16 or 17 year-old child if the sexual activity includes
force or the threat of force.
149. Giordanella, Status of §2423(b), supra note 79, at 150-52, relating examples of U.S.
government applying § 2423(b) against citizens lured by police forces, posing as teenagers on the
Intemet, into traveling in another state for the purpose to engage in sexual conduct with these teenagers.
150. See Edelson, A Model for Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13 at 529-32 & notes
267-88, relating the prosecution of Professor Marvin Hersh who traveled numerous times in Honduras
to engage in sexual conducts with young boys. Hersh was convicted of 10 child sex charges, including
§ 2423(b), and was sentenced to a total of 105 years of imprisonment.
151. United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F. 3d 217, 219 (5t, Cir. 2000).
152. See EPCAT Online Newsdesk, AFP, Australian brothels are making more than $630,000 a
week from Asian sex slave, The Bangkok Post, May 23, 1999, available at
http://www.ecpat.net/eng/Ecpatinter/IRC/newsdeskarticles.asp?SCID=282 (last visited Apr. 15,
2002) (on file with author). The Bangkok Post reported that Australian organized crime syndicates
smuggled hundreds of women from Asia to work as sex slaves in Australian brothels.
153. Edelson, A Model for Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 507. Crimes
Amendment Act, No. 105, 1994 (Austl.).
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prohibiting any citizen or resident from engaging in sexual intercourse or other
sexual activity with any person under the age of sixteen, anywhere in the world.
15 4
It also prohibits inducing, advertising, benefiting from, assisting, or encouraging
sexual acts between an Australian and a child under sixteen. 155 The Act carries a
maximum sentence of seventeen years of imprisonment.156 Because of the Act's
broad language, the Australian judicial system has retained jurisdiction not only
upon nationals traveling outside the country to engage in sexual activities with
minors, but also upon travel agents, brothel keepers, advertisers, or any person or
business benefiting from the commercial sexual exploitation of children. 5 7 Critics
have praised this ET legislation because it is the only one allowing prosecution of
corporations, having their principal place of business in Australia, implicated with
sex tourism. 58 Additionally, the law does not require double criminality, or the
physical presence of a child witness in court.
59
By May 1999, Australia had initiated nine prosecutions under the Child Sex
Tourism Act, which resulted in six convictions. 60 Among them, was the case of
John Arthur Lee, who was sentenced to twelve years in prison for 24 sex crimes
against children in Cambodia.' 6' This case rested entirely upon forensic
evidence, 62 showing the determination of the Australian government to apply a
policy of zero-tolerance with sex tourists.
Combined with its ET legislation, Australia conducts training programs for
police officers from receiving countries, ensuring their familiarity with their own
countries' laws against sexual exploitation of children and teaching non-
threatening methods of questioning child victims.
63
IV - LIMITS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In December 2001, ECPAT held the Second World Congress Against the
154. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1898.
155. Id. at 1898; see also Edelson, A Model for Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at
508.
156. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1898.
157. Id. at 1898. The provision enables Australia to prosecute businesses that promote child sex
tours.
158. Id. at 1898.
159. See Edelson, A Model for Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 508-09, explaining
that the ET legislation permits children to testify by video-link where personal appearance in court
would involve unreasonable expense or inconvenience, psychological harm, or sufficient stress to
prevent the children from testifying reliably.
160. See ECPAT Newsclippings, Australian child sex tourist sentenced, May 29, 1999, available at
htIp://www.ecpat.net/newsup/newsO/ausO5.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2001)(on file with author).
161. Id.
162. Id. The article explains that Lee was arrested after he showed a co-worker pictures of an
unidentified man having sex with girls as young as eleven. After the police went to Cambodia to find
the girls in the picture and failed to locate them, the main evidence against Lee were forensic since there
was no witness and the man in the photo did not show his face. Experts matched Lee's skin and
fingerprints from the photographs and identified the age of the girls.
163. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 509-10.
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Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, 64 during which 159 countries
reaffirmed their commitment to the Stockholm Agenda for Action,' 65 adopted in
1996 during the first World Congress. The Congress in Yokohama recognized and
welcomed the developments that had occurred since 1996, including a greater
emphasize on the rights of the child and a better implementation of the UNCRC,
the increasing mobilization of national governments and the international
community to safeguard the future of a child, and the adoption of multi-faceted
laws, regulations and programs aimed to protect a child from sexual
exploitation.166 The organization recognized though that much more was required
to fully protect children globally and expressed its concerns at the delays in the
adoption of needed measures in various part of the world. 67 In order to be more
effective against sexual exploitation of children, the Congress suggested that
governments be more effective in their implementation of the UNCRC, ratify and
apply ILOC 182, ensure adequate resource allocation to socialprograms and law
enforcement to prevent children from entering the sex trade, and commit to
promote co-operation between all key actors.
68
Receiving and sending countries are co-operating with NGOs to better protect
the children of the world but there are still some obstacles that must be overcome
in order to end the commercial sexual exploitation of children. Many countries
have adopted new legislation and awareness campaigns to deter the use of children
in the sex trade, but the occurrence continues to increase.' 69 The business is highly
lucrative and intimately connected to criminal organizations, making it more
difficult to eradicate.
Need offull cooperation between receiving countries, sending countries, and
NGOs
ECPAT lists poverty, family breakdown and abuse, gender bias, lack of law
enforcement, tourism, tradition and culture, unemployment, homelessness, and
HIV/AIDS as principal causes for commercial sexual exploitation of children.
70
Another report adds illiteracy, tradition and superstition, a caste system, lack of
economic opportunity, rural-urban migration, population growth, and political
164. See ECPAT, Second World Congress in Yokohama, Japan, Dec. 17 - 20, 2001, available at
http://ecpat.net/eng/index.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
165. Id.
166. ECPAT, The Yokohama Global Commitment 2001, available at http://www.ecpat.net/eng/
Ecpatinter/projects/monitoringwc2/yokohamacommitment.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators, supra note 86, at 1, indicating that the number of
children entering the sex trade amounts to one million per year. See also ECPAT, Commercial
Exploitation of Children for Sex Was Growing, Despite Promises From More Than 120 Countries to
Tackle the Flesh Trade, Pornography and Sex Tourism, According to Child-Rights Workers Gathered
in Bangkok, Associated Press, Sep. 21, 1999, available at http://www.ecpat.net/eng/Ecpatinter/
IRC/tmpNews.asp?SCID=320 (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
170. ECPAT, Causes of CSEC, available at http://www.ecpat.org/cseccauses.htm (last visited Apr.
16, 2002)(on file with author).
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instability to the reasons for the lack of legal provisions.' 71 Most of these socio-
economic issues could be targeted through the implementation of a long-term
social plan promoting education, family values, and equality between genders.
However, because of their status of being developing countries, the destination
nations lack the monetary and human resources necessary for social programs and
services. NGOs can help.' 72 Receiving countries must welcome the NGOs and
publicly support their missions in order to suggest to parents and children in
financial difficulties that alternatives to the sex trade exist to overcome poverty. 1
73
The status quo in destination countries relating to the position of the child must be
changed. Studies showed that most children involved in the sex trade were
neglected or abused by their own families.'174  In conjunction with NGOs,
governments can develop family counseling programs, centers for runaway
children, orphanages, and other institutions oriented toward promoting family
values.
Industrialized countries can also participate in supplementing the costs of a
social plan. Sweden for example, makes a defendant found guilty of sexual
conduct with a minor contribute to a fund for victims of sexual abuse. 7 5 Such
funds can then be used to finance different projects helping the social reintegration
of a child prostitute, providing psychological help, instruction of skills, housing,
etc.
There is a need for awareness and information; few people - including law
enforcement - know the laws of their home country and the risk they take if they
are involved with the sex trade. Therefore both sending and receiving countries
must organize public campaigns, advertising their penal codes to alert potential sex
tourists, brothel providers, parents selling their child, and any other participants to
what the impending consequences of their actions are. 176  If people fear
prosecution, they would probably think twice before acting. The campaign should
also inform the sex tourists of the risk to their health. Many perpetrators act under
the mistaken belief that having sex with young children will minimize the risk of
contracting the HIV virus. 77 This is a myth; doctors believe that sexually active
171. Kimberly Svevo, Expert Meeting on Sexual Abuse of Children, Child Pornography and
Pedophilia on the Internet, An International Challenge, at 6, UNESCO Global Report Child Abuse and
Neglect, Jan. 18-19, 1999 (Dec. 1998), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/001 1/001147/
1 14738eo.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
172. Rastogi, Preserving Children's Rights, supra note 82, at 281, relating how the organization
"Women of Tomorrow" implemented in Thailand a scholarship program, offering girls training and
jobs in the textile industry, gem cutting, and nursing assistantships. Such skills allow them to earn up to
$200 per month, more money than what most prostitutes in Southeast Asia make.
173. Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 980, explaining how poverty continues to play
an important role in the enrollment of children in the sex trade and how the evid6nce of good incomes
of many prostitutes encourage children to sell sex for a living.
174. Barbosa, Family Perspective, supra note 14.
175. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 505.
176. Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators, supra note 86, at 19, relating that Air France has
implemented in-flight projection of a documentary informing tourists that sexual activities with minors
are illegal and a French citizen or resident can face charges in a French court of law.
177. Erik Thomas Berkman, Responses to the International Child Sex Tourism Trade, 19 B.C. Int'l
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children are more likely to carry the virus than adults.178 Some reports indicate
that about 50% of underage exploited children have the AIDS virus and the
number is on the rise.' 79 Knowing the risk involved, an offender may reconsider
his behavior before engaging in sexual intercourse with children.
Finally, to facilitate evidence collection and successful prosecutions, some
suggest that countries adopt the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty ("MLAT").1
80
The suspect is usually arrested in the receiving nation, where the criminal sexual
act happened, where the witnesses are and where evidence can be gathered.
Therefore, if the sending country, the home of the suspect, is to try him, there must
be collaboration between the two countries. Most often, the lawyers and
prosecutors will have to go on site to interrogate people and verify the facts, which
raises the issues of translation and interpretation. The process depends heavily on
the diplomatic relations between the two countries and is also very costly. Until
now, voluntary and individual action has reduced the costs to a certain extent.18
Conversely, if the sending country decides to import the witnesses and evidence
rather than going to the receiving country, other issues are raised. Cost is still high
and the children involved might be scared off. Without MLATs, countries must
rely on these individual efforts to persuade courts and law enforcement to
cooperate. To be fully effective, the system should not depend on occasional
volunteers but on professionals, permanently working against sexual exploitation
of children, who are knowledgeable about the sex industry and sensitive to the
situation of the children. Special agencies could be created -composed of police
officers, child psychologists, interpreters, lawyers, and social workers - who would
dedicate their efforts and resources to dismantle the sex trade and protect the
children.
We have seen how some industrialized countries are already involved with
the destination country in developing joint programs and partnership - e.g.
Australia and the UK.' 8 2  Many more must get involved in training law
enforcement units and providing financing for police forces committed to combat
the sexual exploitation of children. Because sending countries depend heavily on
the co-operation with the police from the receiving country, there is a need of a
well-trained, uncorrupted force to provide adequate assistance.
& Comp. L. Rev. 397,399 (1996).
178. Id. at 399. See also Rastogi, Preserving Children's Rights, supra note 82, at 266, explaining
that young girls are more susceptible to contract AIDS than women because the sexual offenders will
likely tear the tissue in a young girl's body during intercourse.
179. Id. at 266 explaining that brothel owners are aware that the children have the virus but still
force them to work as prostitute. Rastogi also reports that in India, three to five million people have
contracted the disease and an estimated 10 million people will within the next decade.
180. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 513.
181. Pierre Dionne, Director-general International Bureau for Children's Rights, Legal and Judicial
aspects: extraterritorial law and extradition, at 6, available at http://www.unesco.org/
webworld/childscreen/documents/dionne.rtf (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
182. Anucha Charoenpo, The United States and Thailand will launch joint programmes to combat
smuggling of people for prostitution and illegal labour, The Bangkok Post, Feb. 11, 2002, ECPAT
Online Newsdesk, available at http://ecpat.net/eng/Ecpat_inter/IRC/tmpNews.asp?SCID=640 (last
visited Jan. 3, 2003)
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Model ET legislation
Countries that have already adopted ET legislation must ensure their
consistency with the UNCRC and ILO C 182 principles. Such laws are to enable
countries to prosecute a child sex tourist for activity in a receiving country which
would constitute a crime against a child in the sending country; 8 3 they must be
enforced unanimously. Unfortunately, too many offenders go unpunished. 8 4 It
has been suggested that all sending countries should implement a model ET
legislation.185 Such legislation would apply to both citizens and permanent residents
of a country, 1 6 to establish jurisdiction over a greater population. It would not
have a double criminality requirement, which frustrate the purpose of ET
legislation. 8 7 With this constraint, many children are left unprotected since the
consenting age significantly varies between countries.188  In addition, ET laws
should not require that victims make a formal complaint or that the receiving
government request prosecution. 89 On the contrary it should be child-friendly,
allowing video-link testimony, in order to limit the psychological harm to the child
victim.' 90 Children are often unaware that they may access the court system to
help their situation; they are often scared as well and not willing to collaborate
with the judicial system. Not all destination countries will file requests for
prosecution - sex tourism is too profitable for their economy. Finally, the ET
legislation should be modeled after the U.S. Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Act.' 9'
Such a statute penalizes persons traveling overseas with the intent to sexually
exploit children. There is no need of actual sex conduct and the sex tourist may be
inculpated even if sex was not the only reason for the trip; conviction can happen
even before a child is harmed.
In addition to applying jurisdiction over their nationals, sending countries
should enact ET legislation that would allow them to punish businesses and
corporations that benefit from sex tourism.' 92 Today, only Australia provides for
183. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 533.
184. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1853, relating how Dr. Ritter never
faced prosecution in Austria.
See also Roz Prober, Canada's Flawed Sex Tourism Legislation Puts All Kids at Risk, Tribune, Sept.
2000, Vol. 7, No. 2 & 3, available at http://www.hri.ca/children/texts/newindex.shtml (last visited Jan.
3, 2003). The article reported that a Canadian teacher escaped prosecution for the rape of a seventeen
year-old in Costa Rica since the act is not criminal in that destination country.
185. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 532-35.
186. Id. at 533.
187. Id. at 533-34.
188. Remy, La P4dophilie, supra note 1, at 80. The authors explain that the French statutory rape
laws concern children up to the age of 15 years. See also Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra
note 12, at 1853 & note 8, relating that the Philippines statutory rapes laws protect children up to the
age of 12 only. And Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 985-86, stating that many countries
either have no laws relating to emancipation or consider children as young as 13 to be sexually
emancipated.
189. Edelson, A Modelfor Amending Existing Legislation, supra note 13, at 534.
190. Id. at 535.
191. Id. at 533-34.
192. See generally Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators, supra note 86, explaining how the
2003
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the prosecution of corporations 193 and of nationals who operate brothels, bars, or
any businesses promoting sexual exploitation of children, regardless of their
location.1
94
Making commercial sexual exploitation of children a crime against humanity
In 1993, France and Australia presented the Draft Optional Protocol ("Draft")
to the UN Convention on the Right of the Child. 95 Under the Draft, states are
obligated to collaborate on the issue of commercial sexual exploitation of
children.196 In addition, Article I categorizes sexual exploitation and trafficking in
children as a crime against humanity.197 If that were the case, commercial sexual
exploitation of children would be under universal jurisdiction, in the same category
as genocide, torture, slave trade, piracy, attacks and hijacking of aircraft, and war
crimes. 1 8  Any state would have jurisdiction over the suspect, no matter his
nationality or the place of the sexual act. 99 Universal jurisdiction would resolve
the issues of dual criminality and discrepancy in the age of consent. It would also
facilitate the prosecution of many more sexual crimes against minors.
CONCLUSION
By the end of the year 1999, the Tribune reported that more than 70
prosecutions of sex tourists had occurred worldwide.2 °° Such trials were permitted
because of the efforts of NGOs pressuring governments to take action against the
commercial sexual exploitation of children. Since then, other suspects have been
brought to court and face responsibility, and many more will.
After the Second World Congress of Yokohama, 159 countries20 1 committed
or re-committed to the Stockholm Agenda for Action, which called all states to (1)
accord high priority to action against the commercial sexual exploitation of
children, (2) promote better cooperation between states to prevent children from
entering the sex trade, (3) criminalize and penalize the offenders, and (4) review
and enforce all laws, policies and programmes designed to protect children.2 °2
Mann Act and State laws of New York can be applied to prosecute sex tour operators in U.S. Federal
and State courts.
193. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists, supra note 12, at 1915.
194. Id. at 1915.
195. Id. at 1879.
196. Id. at 1879.
197. Id. at 1879. Draft Optional Protocol, art. 1(I).
198. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law § 404 (1986).
199. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law § 423 (1986).
200. Roz Prober, Mark Erik Hecht, Child Advocates Unite against a Global Rise in Child
Exploitation, Tribune, Dec. 1999, Vol. 6, No.4, available at http://www.hri.ca/
cftribune/templates/article.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2001)(on file with author).
201. ECPAT, Second World Congress Against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children,
available at http://ecpat.net/eng/Ecpat inter/projects/monitoring/WC2.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
202. Mark Hecht, The World Congress Against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children,
Tribune, Jan. 1997, Vol. 4, No. 7-9, available at http://www.hri.ca/children/texts/wcacsec.shtml (last
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This proves that nations are joining together to prevent the phenomenon from
spreading.
However, there are still millions of children who are involved in the sex trade
or who risk getting involved. It should no longer be controversial to propose that
there exists a developed body of customary and formal international law
constituting children's human rights to be protected from sexual maltreatment.
Countries are bound by the UNCRC and ILO C 182 to protect children of the
world from sexual exploitation. International law offers the necessary first step.20 3
It is now up to national governments to implement its principles and respect
Children's Human Rights.
visited Feb.19, 2001)(on file with author).
203. Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse, supra note 35, at 998.
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUDIOVISUAL REGULATION
INSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE TELEVISION




In early January of 2002, Jean-Marie Messier, the chief executive of French
audiovisual giant Vivendi Universal, held a press conference to discuss his
company's latest acquisition: American-based USA Network's media business.'
During the conference, a French journalist asked Messier whether this latest $10.8
billion purchase marked a shift toward the Americanization of French cinema.
2
While the answer to the question is debatable, Messier's response undoubtedly
marks a shift in the attitude of the private audiovisual sector in France, and perhaps
in the European Union as a whole. "The Franco-French cultural exception is
dead," he declared, referring to the notion that media product is cultural product,
and thus must be dealt with differently than other trade goods.3 The response was
an immediate and overwhelming criticism of Messier and the initiation of an
investigation, by France's highest administrative court, of Vivendi's shareholder
* The author is a third year law student at the University of Denver College of Law. B.A., English
Literature, 2000, University of Colorado at Boulder, summa cum laude. I would like to thank Tamra
Griffin as well as the staff of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
I. See generally, Jo Johnson, Defenders of French Culture Rally to Attack Vivendi Chief-
Remarks by Jean Marie-Messier Have Renewed Fears About an Americanisation of French Cinema,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2002; The French Cultural Exception is Dead-Is It?, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 15, 2002; James Harding & Jo Johnson, Messier Gambles on a Showdown: The Vivendi
Chiefs Decision to Sack the Chairman of Canal Plus Leaves Him Badly Exposed in France, FIN. TIMES
(London), April 17, 2002; James Harding & Jo Johnson, Vivendi's ego left facing fall-out from dual
sacking: Unions Denounce Messier, Cultural Icons May Follow Suit and Investors May Seek Brakes on
Chief Executive Over His Management Style, FIN. TIMES (London), April 17, 2002.
2. James Harding & Jo Johnson, Messier Gambles on a Showdown: The Vivendi Chiefs
Decision to Sack the Chairman of Canal Plus Leaves Him Badly Exposed in France, FIN. TIMES
(London), April 17, 2002.
3. A continuing source of conflict between the European Union and the United States has been
whether audiovisual products are goods (the U.S. view) or, particularly in the broadcasting context,
services (the E.U. view). See Jo Johnson, Defenders of French Culture Rally to Attack Vivendi Chief:
Remarks by Jean Marie-Messier Have Renewed Fears About an Americanisation of French Cinema,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2002, supra note 1.
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register to determine whether Vivendi's Pay-TV arm, Canal Plus, was more than
20 percent owned by non-European Union shareholders.4 After a turbulent summer
at the helm of Vivendi, Messier stepped down under fierce criticism in early July.5
The drama may be lost on American film and television consumers. The
American audiovisual industry has long enjoyed a position of dominance in the
global market which has, in many respects, insulated American consumers from
the kind of conditions inside the French and broader European markets that have
resulted in a sort of audiovisual dysfunction amongst the family of European
Union regulatory policies and Member State practices. The patriarch of this
family, the Television Without Frontiers Directive 6 (the "Directive") is under
renewed scrutiny from the Commission which, in November of 2002, published a
five-year evaluation of the Directive's effectiveness 7 expected to stimulate a new
debate in the coming months on possible amendments to the law.8 Messier's bell-
tolling episode and the resulting political fallout in many ways encapsulates the
underlying issues for audiovisual regulation inside the European Union. The
French view of media as culture is in no way aberrant; it is pervasive throughout
the European Union. 9 On the other hand, the United States, whose audiovisual
industry earned over $530 billion in 2001 (more than 5 percent of the U.S. GDP)
and exported $90 billion in audiovisual product overseas in the same year,'0 has
consistently argued that while media products have a cultural component, they
should be treated as goods rather than services for purposes of trade law." This
position is at odds with the Directive, which requires, among its other provisions,"
quotas for the broadcasting of European programming and independent European
production' 3-- quotas which would clearly be illegal under the General Agreement
4. See The French Cultural Exception is Dead-Is I0, supra note I.
5. In April of 2002, Messier fired Canal's chairman, Pierre Lescure, which led to even greater
political fallout and placed Messier under fire from both shareholders and government officials. See
Messier Gambles on a Showdown, supra note 1; See also Andrea R. Vaucher, Messier: Yanks for the
Memories, VARIETY, July 15, 2002, at 6; Meredith Amdur, Titan or Outcast? It's all in the Timing,
VARIETY, July 22, 2002, at 7.
6. Council Directive 89/552/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23. [hereinafter the Directive].
7. Fifth Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the Application of Articles Four and Five of Directive 89/552/EEC, "Television Without Frontiers," as
amended by Directive 97/36/EC, for the Period 1999-2000, COM(2002)612 final. [hereinafter the
November Report of the Commission].
8. See Ian Hargreaves, The Threat to Democracy: European Media Regulation is a Muddle, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 21, 2002 [hereinafter The Threat to Democracy]; Ian Hargreaves, The Media and
the Euro, FIN. TIMES (London), June 12, 2002; Dawn Haynes, A Closer Watch on all Channels:
MEDIA: the European Commission's Review of the Directive on Television May Seek to Extend the
Law to all Kinds of Networks, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2002 [hereinafter A Closer Watch on all
Channels].
9. See Lisa L. Garrett, Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle Between the United States and the
European Union Over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 553, 555 (1994)
[hereinafter Commerce Versus Culture].
10. See Pam McClintock, Creative Cargo, VARIETY, Apr. 29,2002, at 9.
I1. See Commerce Versus Culture, supra note 9 at 563.
12. The Directive also contains broad provisions for the regulation of advertising (Chapter IV) and
for the protection of minors (Chapter V), subjects which are beyond the scope of this paper.
13. See The Directive, supra note 6 at arts. 4-6.
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on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
14
But in the wake of the Commission's five-year report, both the effectiveness
and the purpose of the Directive are being questioned not just by the U.S.
audiovisual industry, but by those inside the European Union as well.' 5 Messier's
position embodies concerns within the European Union that liberalization of
audiovisual regulatory policies is necessary in order to develop a more competitive
European audiovisual sector. With the collapse of the public broadcasting model
across much of Europe (including France) and its gradual replacement by
commercial and pay-TV networks broadcasting a large quantity of American
programming suffused with American culture, it seems likely that in order to
address the cultural concerns embodied in the Directive, a more competitive
European audiovisual industry is needed. One viewpoint is that the audiovisual
sector need only be nurtured under European Union regulation in order for it to
become more competitive.1 6 Another is that liberalization is the only way to
compete. 17
This is, essentially, the question the European Union must now resolve:
whether protection of European culture is best accomplished by strengthening the
Directive or by liberalizing regulation. The last proposals to amend the Directive
in 1996 ultimately failed to shore up the loopholes its critics complain make it
ineffective. Quota provisions were kept at a mandatory 50 percent rather than
increased as some member states had called for, a proposal to eliminate the "where
practicable" clause from article four was rejected, leaving implementation of the
quotas themselves arguably non-mandatory, and an exception for sporting events,
news, and games was retained, thus effectively allowing broadcasters to continue
satisfying their quota requirements by broadcasting fare with, what some have
argued, is relatively little cultural worth. '8
Despite the implementation of the Directive, it seems that whatever threat to
European culture lurked in American audiovisual sector in the mid 1980's is still
there. Indeed, as media consumption inside the European Union has continued to
grow, the only question seems to be in what form will American dominance of
film and television next manifest itself. Given this dominance, how can the
European audiovisual sector hope to remain a viable cultural force? One of the
emerging threats to the effectiveness of the Directive-and if the preamble to the
Directive is to be taken at face value, to European culture itself-is exhibited in the
Vivindi-Universal fiasco of the past summer: the emergence of what Ian
Hargreaves has called an "oligopoly of global media companies, based upon the
14. GATT applies only to trade in goods rather than services. For an excellent discussion of the
history of GATT and the Television Without Frontiers Directive, see Commerce Versus Culture, supra
note 9 at 553.
i5. See generally, id.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Kevin M. McDonald, How Would You Like Your Television: With or Without
Borders and With or Without Culture-a New Approach to Media Regulation in the European Union,
22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1991 (1999) [hereinafter How Would You Like Your Television].
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American entertainment industry."' 19
Another threat is posed by the rapid development of new technologies not
envisioned by the 1989 law. Television on demand, satellite broadcasting, and
webcasting all threaten to eviscerate the meaningfulness of television broadcast
quotas as these forms of media consumption compete more and more with
traditional broadcasting. 20 The Commission is now considering two possible
approaches to the technology problem: one is to simply keep the law confined to
traditional television broadcasting and update various provisions such as the
"where practicable" language of article four, the other is to recast the Directive so
that it applies to all broadcast technologies.
2'
Regardless of the Commission's recommendations, it is questionable whether
the Directive can ever be effective. The market forces that are leading to the
conglomeration of media companies in both the United States and the European
Union cannot be effectively addressed by broadcasting legislation alone. Indeed, it
is not clear that they should be. Furthermore, if the Commission recommends
confining the Directive to the traditional television market, it is unclear that it can
remain an effective tool for cultural preservation while the consumption of other
forms of media-much of it dominated by non-EU culture-becomes more and
more prevalent. Even if the Directive were overhauled to apply to novel media
markets, and even if the new regulations go beyond the loopholes of the current
law to create a truly effective regulatory scheme, it is doubtful that the legislative
process can keep pace with technological development in the future. Furthermore,
given the broad range of regulatory bodies which will have the task of
implementing the directive inside individual member states, the dysfunction is
likely to continue.22 In short, the Directive may be a failed proposition.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE AMERICAN POISON.
To appreciate the current situation, one must consider the circumstances
leading to the implementation of the Directive in the mid and late 1980's. It was
during this period that the "American cultural threat" developed; American media
exports, particularly television exports, now began to appear frequently in Europe.
Many countries in Europe still had no experience with commercial broadcasting,
having initiated and operated their television broadcasting services under a public
model, and were wary of American style commercialism. 23 In many ways, the
19. See Ian Hargreaves, The Threat to Democracy, supra note 8.
20. See Dawn Haynes, A Closer Watch on all Channels, supra note 8.
21. Id.
22. Some member states, such as the United Kingdom, maintain a single regulatory body (the
Office of Communications Regulation, or Ofcom, in the case of the U.K.) tasked with enforcing media
regulations like the Directive, while others use a range of regulatory bodies. The argument on the one
hand is that a central body is more efficient and therefore more effective. On the other hand, countries
employing several regulatory bodies argue that it is easier to insulate the regulators from political
influence by disbursing their responsibilities. See Ian Hargreaves, The Threat to Democracy, supra
note 8.
23. See generally, KERRY SEGRAVE, AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD: HOLLYWOOD'S ATrEMPT
VOL. 31:4
AUDIOVISUAL REGULATION INSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION
1980's became a coming of age era for commercial television in Europe. In
Germany, the ZDF network was essentially forced to purchase cheap American
programming-despite its assertion that German viewers preferred other fare-as
a budget reduction coupled with inflationary woes forced the broadcaster to fill its
air-time with American re-runs and feature films.2 4  This scenario became
increasingly common throughout the European Economic Community.
25
In France, the chorus of voices objecting to American media imperialism was
just beginning to organize. In 1981, The Committee for National Identity placed
an ad in Le Monde advocating that a pre-existing 50 percent quota for French films
on television be raised to 60 percent.26  Later that year, French Film director
Gerard Blain characterized American media products as "the American Poison,"
and asserted "it is by films made in Hollywood that America infuses its venom into
the spirits of people, that it insidiously but deeply imposes its stereotypes and
literally saps their life force. 27 In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, a trend
toward the liberalization of regulatory policies was beginning. Richard Collins has
observed, "for the most part, the U.K.'s European audiovisual policy has been
conspicuous by its absence. '28 British officials often seemed to see the problem
not as one of cultural imperialism on the part of the United States, but as one of
ineffective competition or unassertiveness on the part of the U.K.'s audiovisual
sector. "Why do we pay the Americans to show their TV schlock when they could
be asked to pay to air ours?" asked British television executive Patrick
Dromgoole.29 In later years, the U.K. would export more television to the United
States than any member state in the European Union.30 The disparity between the
British and French approaches would lead directly to some of the most ineffective
aspects of the Directive.
Italy, like the United Kingdom, passively embraced, if not openly, advocated
a liberal policy. The public broadcaster, RAI, operated three channels in
competition with a relatively large commercial sector comprising around 400
outlets in 21 regional operations. 31 In 1982 the vast majority of Italy's imported
feature films and made-for-television movies-over 77 percent-were American.32
TO DOMINATE WORLD TELEVISION (1998) [hereinafter AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD]. In Holland,
for example, air-time on two stations was divided between various politically and religiously affiliated
broadcasters. Kerry Segrave observes, "In an attempt to warn Dutch viewers of the horrors of
American-style commercial television, the Socialist Station, VARA-TV aired a 'typical day' of
American television fare. It was meant to expose the 'crass commercialism' that could become more
prevalent in Holland in the future..." Id. at 197.
24. Id. at 198.
25. Id
26. Id. at 199.
27. Id. at 199-200.
28. Richard Collins, The European Union Audiovisual Policies of the U.K. and France, in
TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN, 198, 198-99 (Michael Scriven
& Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
29. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 202.
30. See Collins, supra note 28 at 206-07.
3 1. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 203.
32. Id. at 205. During 1982, Italy imported 1,827 feature films and made-for-TV movies, 1,418 of
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By the end of 1982, there were three major commercial networks in operation on a
national scale, two of which were owned by Silvio Berlusconi.33 On the eve of the
Directive, it seemed that Italy typified everything the French had feared. In 1987,
the Italians imported $300 million worth of foreign television programming, 80
percent of which came from the United States, 34 and Berlusconi's stations
broadcast about 62 percent American product.35
The situation in the rest of Europe was much the same. Total U.S. television
exports to Europe in 1987 were about $675 million, or 56 percent of total export
volume.36 In the then 12 European Community nations, at least 25 percent of all
programming hours came from U.S. producers.37 An American market research
company predicted that by the early 1990's that figure would increase to around 40
percent. 38 By 1989 the U. S. generated a stunning total of $1.7 billion in offshore
television sales, much of it destined for Europe.39 In response to the growing
domination of American television programming on European networks and to the
perceived threat this posed to the preservation of European culture, the
Commission issued its first Green paper on the matter in 1984.40 This paper
expressed the basic principles which came to guide formation of the Directive, and
constituted the basis for the first proposal for legislation in 1986. 4 1 The new
proposal advocated the preservation of European culture through the use of a
relatively moderate quota provision requiring only that European broadcasters
reserve 30 percent of their airtime for European works.42 The Council and
Parliament debated the issue for the next three years before finally adopting the
Directive in October of i 989. 43
Ill. BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE.
The Directive addressed three different fields: the protection of minors, the
regulation of advertising, and the protection of European culture through the means
which were from the United States. Id. The next largest competitor for Italy's import market was the
United Kingdom, which exported 133 films to Italy. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 207.
36. Id.
37. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 207.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 263.
40. See generally, Commission of the European Communities, Television Without Frontiers:
Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and
Cable, COM (84) 300 final [hereinafter 1984 Green Paper].
41. Shaun P. O'Connell, Television Without Frontiers: The European Union's Continuing
Struggle for Cultural Survival, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 501, 504 (1996) [hereinafter Continuing
Struggle]; Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation of Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Broadcasting
Activities, 1986 O.J. (C179) 4.
42. See Continuing Struggle, supra note 41 at 504.
43. Id.
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of quotas for the broadcasting of European works.44 Only the quota provisions are
dealt with here. The new legislation was, in some aspects, more stringent than the
Green Paper's initial recommendations, mandating that "broadcasters reserve for
European works, within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their
transmission time...,,45 Though this was a disappointment to some who had
advocated a more robust 60 percent requirement, it was a marked change from
what legislators, who had witnessed the rapid onslaught in their audiovisual
sectors, had recommended a few years earlier.46 Article 6 laid down what seemed
to be relatively simple guidelines for determining whether a work was of European
origin. In summary, a work satisfied the requirement if it: 1) originated in a
Member State, or 2) originated in other European states who were parties to
previous legislation regulating television broadcasting.47 Furthermore, the works
must either 1) be made by "one or more producers established in one or more of
those States," or 2) "supervised and actually controlled by one or more producers
established in one or more of those States," or 3) "the contribution of co-producers
of those states to the total co-production costs" must be "preponderant," and the
''co-production must not be controlled by one or more producers established
outside those States. '48 Of course, as could be expected, the specifications for
European works would come to be a point of tension in future years.
Two other key aspects of the Directive should be noted. First, article four,
which lays out the basic quota provisions, specifies that quotas should be required
only "where practicable and by appropriate means. '49 This provision has been
criticized for weakening the quota provisions to the point where they are
meaningless. 50 Second, article four allows Member States to exclude broadcast
time for sporting events, news, games, advertising and teletext services from the
airtime to which quotas must be applied.51 This provision has been criticized by
many who feel it allows for the satisfaction of quota requirement by broadcasting
material with little cultural worth.52 Together, the "where practicable language,"
the exemption for news and games, and the difficulty in defining and assuring that
a work is of European origin constitute the major weaknesses of the Directive.
5 3
44. See The Directive, supra note 6 at art. 4-22.
45. Id. at art. 4, 1.
46. Of course, the 50 percent requirement is only a floor, and individual Member States remain
free to establish more rigorous quotas. This is the case in France, which demands that 60 percent of
airtime be reserved for works of European origin.
47. The Directive, supra note 6 at art. 6, I. Section (b) refers to non-member States who are
parties to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television.
48. See ld at art. 6, 2.
49. See Id. at art. 4, .
50. See, e.g., How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2008 (referring to the quota
provisions as "toothless").
5 I. See the Directive, supra note 6 at art. 4,1 1.
52. See e.g., How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2006.
53. Id.
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IV. CULTURAL DOMINANCE THROUGH MEDIA: THE CASE FOR QUOTAS.
From the viewpoint of those who initiated and eventually legislated for the
Directive, it was a necessary response to the rapidly changing dynamics of
broadcast television in Europe during the late 1980's and early 1990's. The
necessity can be understood from two perspectives-one directly resting on
cultural concerns (a view embracing quota provisions more directly as an end in
themselves) and the other incorporating the intermediate assertion that strong
competition from the European audiovisual sector is necessary to stem the influx
of American programming, which will in turn protect European culture (a view
embracing quota provisions more as a means to effectuate a purpose).
Among the underlying assumptions of both perspectives is the view that
media is culture-a fairly uncontroversial proposition. Thomas Bishop, for
example, has argued that "film and television are crucial conveyors of cultural
express-in fact the most widely applied means of transporting a nation's culture
at the end of the twentieth century. 54 More controversial is the implication that
the vectors of cultural influence somehow operate more efficiently moving in the
direction from the media to the broader cultural body. 55 This view emphasizes the
potential threat imposed by the media upon culture rather than understanding the
media as a reflection of culture. Of course, the advocates of quotas would question
whose culture is being reflected, and probably conclude that it is the culture of
America, and not even a very broad sector of that culture. Another question is then
ripe for the asking: if American programming is coming to dominate broadcasting
in Europe, is it because of American cultural imperialism or because Europeans
prefer to view American (or at least American style) programming?
The latter proposition is highly doubtful. Jack Valenti, the former president
of the Motion Picture Association of America has argued that Europeans prefer
American programming, claiming that Europeans "like, admire, and patronize
what we offer them."56 Valenti has further asserted that the European taste for
American programming is evidence of the true motives of the European
Community, claiming, "the E.C. objection [to the dominance of American
audiovisual product] has nothing to do with culture. What it is really about is
commerce. The only way to force citizens not to watch American programs is to
keep those programs off the air.",57 But the converse is probably more accurate: the
only way to force European Union citizens to watch American programs is to keep
them on the air. In 1990, at the height of the perceived cultural crisis, for example,
a London based research firm, CIT concluded, "type for type domestically
produced shows usually received better ratings than U.S. imports."8 Another
study found that "most U.S. material is not suited to a European audience and has
54. Thomas Bishop, France and the Need for Cultural Exception, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
187 (1997).
55. See id.
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weaker ratings than similar domestic fare., 59 There are certainly other forces that
can account for the pervasiveness of American audiovisual product inside the
European Union. 60  More importantly, those forces may account for the
ineffectiveness of the Directive as well. While some of these questions are more
properly addressed in a paper of their own, they are important ones to keep in mind
while assessing the arguments for cultural protectionism, whether they view quotas
as an end point or a starting point.
Perhaps the best embodiment of the case for quotas is found in the French
perspective. Judith Beth Prowda has observed, "France, with the leading film
industry in Europe, has become the self-appointed defender of European culture.'
The French have expressed their wariness of the American cultural invasion
through legislation on other fronts than the audiovisual. The Loi Toubon (1994)
for example effectively banned the use of English (or other language) words in all
official and most commercial contexts, 62 thus attempting to safeguard the French
language, considered by many to be France's greatest cultural resource.63 Inspired
by the Loi Toubon, another regulation went into effect in January of 1996
implementing a 40 percent quota for French songs between the hours of 6:30 AM
and 10:30 PM on French music stations. 64 From the French perspective, the
justification is that without such cultural protectionism, French culture (and in the
context of the Directive, European culture) would wither.65 Indeed, these fears
often seem bolstered by reality. If French protectionism of the audiovisual sector
sometimes appears questionable, it is only fair to remain cognizant of statistics
observed by industry critics like Richard Collins, who notes French author P.
Moeglin's findings that in 1990, "of twelve transnational European television
channels, five transmitted in English," and of "ninety-six national and regional
television channels in the European Community, twenty-four used English, more
than used any other single language." 66
It is important to remember that the French in no way embody the thinking of
all Member States. In countries like Italy and the United Kingdom, the concern is
quite different. These countries are better characterized by saying that they
advocate a system of quotas primarily as a means to protect commercial concerns,
and that cultural protection is the secondary goal, maybe even incidental. Collins
observes, "it would be too neat to state that the U.K. has been the principal
proponent of liberalisation and France the principal opponent... better to say that
59. Id. at 259.
60. Id.
61. Judith Beth Prowda, U.S. Dominance in the "Marketplace of Culture" and the French
"Cultural Exception, "29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 199 (1997) [Hereinafter U.S. Dominance].
62. Id. at 206.
63. See id. Toubon himself, for example, explained that "this law is not an attack on English, but
an attempt to preserve this [French] language, this irreplaceable capital. If it is not preserved, it will
die." Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally, id.
66. See Collins, supra note 28 at 212-13.
2003
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the U.K. has gone with the flow of the policies of integration and liberalisation." 67
Collins argues that the U.K.'s tack often coincides with the goals of countries like
Germany and Denmark who sometimes favor liberalization as a counterweight to
what they feel are encroachments on independent liberties and freedom of speech
imposed by creeping E.U. regulation.68 Italy, like the United Kingdom, deregulated
early, 69 and has used a single regulatory body to oversee both broadcasting and
telecommunications, managing a private sector that has often broadcast more
American than European content. In characterizing the stance of countries like the
United Kingdom and Italy, the importance of competitiveness first cannot be
overlooked. Of course, neither can the language factor in the case of the United
Kingdom, which manages to export more programming to America 70 and more
programming to the rest of the European Union than any other Member State.7'
Some have argued that this success is not the result of liberal British regulatory
policies making the British audiovisual sector more competitive, but simply the
fact that Americans are loath to suffer through dubbed or subtitled product 7 2 as
well as the fact that English is widely spoken on the continent.
But there is another persuasive argument for the maintenance of the Directive
that is ostensibly independent of any political or cultural rationale: there is at least
some evidence that it has actually been effective. The terms of the Directive
mandate a periodic report on its effectiveness.73 The report covering the period
between 1997 and 1998 found a significant increase in the broadcast of European
works during this period, and that the major French, German and Italian channels
were broadcasting around 70 percent European content.74
The most recent report, issued in November of 2002 and covering the years
1999-2000, was largely a positive review of the Directive's effectiveness. 75 The
Commission came to four general conclusions. First, the Commission observed
that the total number of channels had increased significantly during the period in
76question. Second, The Commission concluded that, generally, average
transmission time reserved for European works by channels with the highest
viewer ratings grew during the period in question.77 More specifically, the
proportion of European works actually broadcast, in terms of number of channels,
67. See id. at 199.
68. Id.
69. STYLIANOS PAPATHANASSOPOLOUS, EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE: ISSUES,
DYNAMICS AND REALITIES 15 (2002) [hereinafter EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE]. The
United Kingdom actually deregulated in 1954. Though Italy followed some twenty-two years later, no
other country in Europe deregulated until 1982. Id.
70. See Collins, supra note 28 at 206-07.
71. Id.
72. See U.S. Dominance, supra note 61 at 201.
73. See The Directive, supra note 6 at art. 4, 1 6.
74. See EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 18.
75. See generally, November Report of the Commission, supra note 7.
76. See the November Report of the Commission, supra note 7 at 5-6. According to the
Commission, the total number of channels to which articles four and five of the Directive apply
increased from approximately 550 in January of 1999 to around 820 in January of 2001. Id.
77. Id. at 7.
VOL. 3 1:4
AUDIOVISUAL REGULATION INSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION
increased in twelve Member States, remained stable in one, and fell in two.
78
Third, the Commission concluded that the number of Member States achieving the
"majority proportion of their transmission time of European works" was growing
steadily. 79 During the years in question, the average compliance rate among all
European channels in all Member States increased by 3.93 percent.8 0 Finally, the
Commission found that the scheduling (as opposed to actual broadcast) of
European works increased during the period in question in fourteen Member
States.8 1
Taken at face value, the Commission's report would seem to suggest that the
Directive is achieving its goal of at least increasing the amount of European
material broadcast on European air waves, if not the goal of protecting European
culture itself (it is important to keep in mind, after all, that this is the goal
specifically set out in the Directive's preamble).8 2 However, there are some
important qualifications to the data. Most obviously, and perhaps most
significantly, the Commission itself recognizes that the data are incomplete,
explaining that "some Member States still failed to provide full information,
particularly with regard to cable and/or satellite television channels (which are
often omitted from national reports)."8'3 In fact, before discussing most of its
conclusions, the Commissioners felt obligated to reiterate the exclusion from their
evaluation of much information concerning cable and satellite channels. 8 4 Quite
often, the Member States simply omitted these data from their reports to the
Commission. 5 This omission is significant because satellite and cable channels
are arguably the two fastest growing formats for broadcasting8 6; an assessment of
the Directive's effectiveness which focuses on terrestrial broadcasting while
largely ignoring these formats is anachronistic. As we will see, satellite broadcasts
pose particularly difficult challenges to the achievement of the Directive's goals.
At best, the Commission's most recent report glosses over this fact; at worst it is
rendered largely irrelevant by it.
Another important factor in evaluating the Commission's data is the exclusion
of statistics for channels that commanded less than a three percent audience share
during the period in question.8 7 As the number of channels increases dramatically
(an observation made by the Commission itself) the audience share of each channel
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See the November Report of the Commission, supra note 7 at 7.
81. Id.
82. See generally, id.
83. id at 6.
84. See, e.g., The November Report of the Commission, supra note 7 at 23, 25. For example, both
the Commission's "General Considerations" regarding the requirement to broadcast a majority
proportion of European works as it functioned at a national level, and the assessment (at the
community level) of the requirement for broadcasting of works by independent producers are qualified
with the observation that satellite and cable channel data are often simply omitted from the reports of
individual Member States.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id.
87. Seeid. at7, n.14.
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will necessarily diminish. Over time, less data will be involved in the
Commission's assessments. Arguably, the statistics for the 2002 report (which
considered 820 channels) are less reliable than those for the 2000 report (which
considered only 670). Furthermore, should the Directive be amended to apply to
non-traditional media platforms like direct TV and TV on demand (one of the
options currently up for consideration), the exclusion of channels with less than a
three percent audience share will necessarily work to exclude a vast proportion of
the material broadcast inside the European Union.
Furthermore, the report is often simply spun in a direction favorable to the
Commission. Factors the Commission interprets as indicating a slight improvement
can also be interpreted to indicate a negative trend, calling into question their
meaningfulness. For instance, though the conclusions of the Commission are,
broadly speaking, positive concerning the overall compliance rate8 8 (defined as the
percentage of channels achieving or exceeding the majority proportion
requirement"9 ), it should be noted that the country which saw the greatest growth
in number of channels (the United Kingdom 9°) also saw the second lowest growth
in its rate of compliance, which actually fell by two percent. 9' More broadly
speaking, the compliance rate either did not grow or actually decreased during the
period in question in six of the fifteen Member States.92 Taken together, the
incompleteness of the data, its limited nature and its questionable interpretation
cast doubt on the accuracy of any of the Commission's conclusions.
V. MARKET FORCES: THE MAJOR CHALLENGE TO EFFECTIVE CULTURAL
PROTECTIONISM.
There are two implicit positions from which the Directive is advocated: one
embraces a quota system as a direct method of insuring the protection of European
culture, while the other finds that cultural protection is probably best effectuated
by economic means.93 But the proponents of quotas as a method of nurturing the
European audiovisual sector often seem to confuse the legitimacy of the goal of
cultural protection with the means used to achieve that goal. It is difficult to
contradict the assertion that European culture should be acknowledged,
preserved--even revered. The question of whether those goals can be achieved
through the imposition of television broadcast quotas, however, is a murky one at
best. Given the economic forces that shaped the European broadcast environment
in the 1980s and their continued persistence, it seems unlikely.
Of course the question to ask is why, even in countries like France that stands
staunchly opposed to the American television invasion, was American
88. Id. at 41.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. This fact is even more significant when one considers that the United Kingdom produced
19 of the total of 48 new channels produced throughout the E.U. during the period in question. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Growth was static in Austria, Germany, Ireland, and Finland. Growth was negative in
Denmark (-8.6%) and the United Kingdom (-2.0%).
93. See Commerce Versus Culture, supra note 9 at 562-570.
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programming in the 1990's becoming easier and easier to find? Why, despite a 60
percent quota for European Community programming, was its television industry
gradually becoming more and more commercial and typifying all the things it had
feared? Several political and economic forces can be identified which are arguably
the root-cause of the European television transformation. First, the so-called "Iron
Law" of television,94 which dictates that liberalization leads invariably to a flood of
cheap imports.9  As the European broadcast industry deregulated and became
more privatized, newcomers to the marketplace found it difficult to compete with
established broadcasters. More and more they found themselves faced with a
choice of paying astronomical costs for European productions or filling their
airtime with extremely cheap U.S. imports. To stay afloat, they chose the latter
option. Second, the early focus in most European countries on establishing state
broadcasters resulted in a focus on preventing state-monopolies and resultant
abuses of power.97 This can be contrasted with the United States, which was more
concerned with maintaining a competitive economic marketplace.98 That focus
arguably led to an American audiovisual sector that could simply outperform the
Europeans in economic terms. Perhaps most importantly, the audiovisual sector in
Europe (and the United States) is experiencing a wave of concentration that leaves
production in the hands of ever larger conglomerates whose joint ventures with
American interests and increasing need to be competitive ultimately result in
homogeneous or Americanized product. Finally, convergence is operating not just
in economic, but also in technological pathways, forcing regulatory legislation to
adapt or become ineffective.
The key question overlying all of these problems is whether the Directive can
effectively protect European programming from assuming a smaller and smaller
corner of the market. More important and more problematic is the question of
whether it can preserve anything recognizably European in the European
programming that manages to compete successfully with inexpensive American
fare.
A. Economic Realities of Production and Market Entry
It cannot be doubted that the American audiovisual industry, particularly the
television industry, had the good fortune of maturing early. The advanced state of
America's private broadcast sector allowed Hollywood to achieve a sophistication
(at least in economic terms) and efficiency in its production that Europe arguably
still has not managed.99 Raymond Kuhn and James Stayner observe, "For much of
94. See How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2010-11.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Harvey B. Feigenbaum, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Publis Power to Private
Actors: Public Policy and the Private Sector in Audiovisual Industries, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1770-
72 (2002) [hereinafter Public Policy and the Private Sector in Audiovisual Industries].
98. Id.
99. See Raymond Kuhn & James Stanyer, Television and the State, in TELEVISION
BROADCASTING IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN 2, 2 (Michael Scriven & Monia Lecomte,
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television's history the state [in Britain and France] strictly controlled market
entry, with the result that the growth in the supply of television was slow and
incremental."100 Britain and France were by no means anomalous. One result of
this is that production costs in America compared with those inside the European
Union are startlingly small. In 1986, at the height of the first deregulation phase in
Europe, the average cost of producing a one-hour drama in Europe was around $4
million.'0 ' In the United States it was only $350,000. 102 More to the point, while
newcomers to the private sector like Italy's RAI could spend the $4 million to
develop a new one-hour program with European producers, actors, writers and
directors, they could also opt to purchase a one-hour program from the Americans
for around $12,000.103 Assuming for the sake of argument that Italians didn't care
for American programming, at these prices it didn't matter. RAI could afford
slightly lower ratings if it meant its overall broadcast costs were that much lower.
What it could not afford was to produce European material. Italy was not alone;
the situation was much the same throughout Europe. In 1989 the New York Times
observed, "European television stations can buy rights to an hour-long American
show for less than one-tenth the cost of financing an hour-long domestic
production. '104
In the European film industry, things may be worse. The industry is
important to the television market and therefore important in assessing the
effectiveness of the Directive for at least two reasons. First, film production is
often financed by television broadcasters'0 5 and second, film accounts for a large
proportion of programming on European television stations.3 6  Unfortunately,
between 1970 and 1990 film production slumped from a high of 778 features to
just 500.107 Given the enormous lag in production capabilities between the United
States and the various members of the European Union, it seems fair to assume
these forces will operate, both in film and television, for quite some time.
Kevin McDonald has argued that we can expect more struggle along these
lines in the European audiovisual sector as more and more private, commercial,
and pay-TV channels sprout in the deregulated hothouse of the Union. 108 New
networks, he argues, must invariably purchase the cheaper imports in order to
eds., 1999). While Britain privatized in 1954 with the introduction of Independent Television (ITV),
the effect of introducing one channel was negligible. France, on the other hand, effectively maintained a
state monopoly on broadcasting until the 1980's. Id.
100. Id.
101. See AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 200-01.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 205.
104. See Steven Greenhouse, The Television Europeans Love and Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 1989, at 24.
105. See generally, Anne Jackel, Broadcasters' Involvement in Cinematographic Co-production, in
TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN 175, 175-96 (Michael Scriven
& Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
106. See generally, id.
107. See How Would You Like Your Television, supra note 18 at 2009-10.
108. See generally, id.
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compete with the already established networks doing the same thing.'0 9 As the
number of networks increases, programming becomes more expensive, driving
stations to spend more on imports and leaving them with even less for original
production."10 The consequence of all this, of course, is that more American
programming fills more European airtime. The airwaves are full of homogenized
American product and low-quality European product as a result of drained budgets.
This is the so-called "Iron Law" of television, and it results, McDonald argues, in a
cultural uniformity which blots out difference and threatens European language
and identity."'
This is one face of the schizoid European audiovisual policy. As the
marketplace itself moves toward privatization and liberalization, how can the
European Union realistically expect to maintain regulatory policies that move in
the opposite direction? If cheap content is needed and the only source of that
content right now is low-brow American programming, so loathed by the
Commission that it is in many respects out-lawed, then how can European
networks hope to satisfy their quota requirements and remain economically viable?
One answer, ironically, is that European media corporations have become
much more like their American counterparts. Television companies in Europe now
more resemble American corporations than they do their public-model parents.'2
Film production, on the other hand, has increasingly become more of a global
rather than a national endeavor, and is now commonly executed in multiple
countries with multinational crews." 3 Examples of this phenomenon include The
Fifth Element Enemy at the Gates, and The Lord of the Rings." 4 This situation
makes the article six provisions defining what constitutes a European work largely
irrelevant.
Alliances between media companies are beginning to sprout and, argues
Harvey Feigenbaum, are in some ways shaping national cultural policy by
themselves quite successfully."' 5 What is more, the number of these alliances
continues to grow, further weakening the distinction between American and
European works. Examples include Sony pictures, which signed a $60 million
deal with Germany's Babelsberg Studios as well and beleaguered Vivindi, which
now owns Seagram's Universal along with Canal Plus and, since January of 2002,
USA Network's media business." 6 Article six of the Directive aside, cross-
pollination on this scale casts doubt on any attempt to define a European Work.
With American television shows like Big Brother and Survivor selling not
individual episodes but, rather, their bare formats to European producers," 7 even
109. Id at 2010-11.
110. Id
III. Id. at 2011-13.
112. See Public Policy and the Private Sector in Audiovisual Industries, supra note 97 at 1776-77.
113. Id.
114. Idat 1779.
115. Id. at 1778.
116. Id. at 1779.
117. Id.
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point systems like those delineated by the European Convention of
Cinematographic Co-production" I8 seem likely to prove ineffective. Would the
political infighting and bickering of an all-European cast on a French island
somewhere in the Mediterranean directed by an Italian and jointly funded by
British and German media conglomerates be a European work? Answering 'yes'
to the question, as one must under the guidelines of the Directive, illustrates the
problem. The Commission might call such works European, but the protection of
European culture is slowly losing meaning as that culture is itself transformed-
partly by economic forces and partly by viewers themselves. Even if programming
itself is not American, in the highly competitive new European audiovisual sectors,
selecting the right programming resembles a more American process, leaving the
average hour of airtime more commercialized and more revenue oriented. It has
become "a central and strategic function for the most part inspired by the
American example: programs [are] designed or purchased in keeping with goals
determined by audience ratings."'"19 This phenomenon is beyond the reach of the
Directive, which makes no distinction between crass American commercialism and
crass European commercialism.
The problems posed by alliances between European and American media
corporations are mirrored internally by the problems posed by convergence within
The European Union's audiovisual sector. More and more, programming diversity
is being sacrificed for streamlined competitiveness among the shrinking number of
media corporations. Again, the effect is to give Europeans a more American-
looking product. Media conglomerates based inside the European Union are faced
with the additional difficulty of translating their products across multiple language
barriers. The result is often an end product that favors action over plot and
movement over dialogue. The other alternative is to favor English, which, though
spoken widely, effectively alienates non-English speakers and countries like
France who view the provisions of the Directive as one of the key tools in their
arsenal to protect their own language.
Merger activity in the sector is widespread and occurs on a significant
economic scale. In 1996, for example, German media giant Bertlesmann merged
with Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Td61diffusion (CLT) to form CLT-Ufa,
which came to dominate the German audiovisual marketplace.' 20 The first half of
2000 saw merger activity of around $35 billion with notable deals including the
merger of CLT-Ufa with Pearson TV, ProSieben with Satl in Germany, and the
takeover of Dutch production company Endemol Entertainment by Telefonica.1
2 1
Other mergers included Kirch (Germany) with BSkyB (United Kingdom), which
18. See Council of Europe, European Convention on Cinematographic Co-Production (ETS No.
147) at appendix II. This provision of the Convention awards points for various European elements of a
production, requiring a minimum point total in order for the work to satisfy the definition of a European
co-production.
119. Regine Chaniac, Two Programming Models, in TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN
CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN 58-70, 59 (Michael Scriven & Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
120. EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 107.
121. Id. at 108.
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was cleared by the European Commission in March of 2000,122 and the takeover of
Canalsatellite Numdrique in France by Canal Plus and Lagard~re in June of the
same year. 1
23
In January of 2002, the European Union reaffirmed its commitment to a
strengthened audiovisual sector, explaining that the media "constitutes not only an
expression of creativity, particularly of identities, and a fundamental means of
promoting democracy, but also an economic activity of growing importance,"' 124 a
statement which captures the two conflicting influences at work within the Union
and the audiovisual sector. From one perspective, the Commission is charged with
eliminating barriers to competition within the Economic Community. From
another, it often assumes responsibility for safeguarding the cultural heritage of the
European Union. In purely economic terms, this has translated into the situation
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos has observed: "The Commission, on the one hand,
favours mergers, acquisitions and the creation of joint ventures to provide new
television (notably pay-TV) services," he argues, "and, on the other, examines
whether these moves can eliminate competition. This is not an easy task, since the
one goal contradicts the other."'125 Furthermore, it seems unlikely, in the face of
piecemeal regulation, that the Commission can do much to stop the decline in the
number of competitors. "In short," argues Papathanassopoulos, "the European
Union seems powerless to regulate the issue of concentration, apart from
scrutinizing the mergers and acquisitions under the competition law."' 126 While the
Directive is not intended to regulate competition or insure that mergers and
acquisitions occur in a democratic fashion, it is unquestionable that the
effectiveness of the Directive is impacted by the trend of convergence.
B. Technological Complications.
There is an impact not only from convergence in the traditional sense, but also
from technological convergence, both in terms of service and content. From the
service angle, companies that previously operated exclusively in one form of
media are expanding their activities into new media realms. Cable companies are
providing telecommunications service and Internet access, while Internet service
providers are delving into the traditional territory of the television broadcaster,
offering services like TV on demand and web TV.' Patrick Vittet-Philippe
argues, "functioning traditionally on separate markets, these players are now
increasingly encroaching on each other's turf. In all cases, these new services are
122. See Commission Decision of 21/03/2000 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the
Common Market (Case no IVM.0037-*/*** B SKY B/KIRCH PAY TV) according to Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 2000 O.J. (C 110).
123. See EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 122.
124. See Council Resolution of 21 January 2002 on the Development of the Audiovisual Sector,
a, 2002 O.J. (C 032).
125. See EUROPEAN TELEVISION IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 69 at 117.
126. Id. at 115.
127. See Patrick Vittet-Philippe, Beyond Digital Television, in TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN
CONTEMPORARY FRANCE AND BRITAIN, 120, 124-25 (Michael Scriven & Monia Lecomte, eds., 1999).
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considered a strategic extension of core competence and a crucial source of
revenues in the years to come."' 28 Some commentators suggest that the traditional
European television market will soon face stiff competition from entertainment
offered over the web. 29 The response from European media corporations like
Canal Plus is to offera so-called digital multimedia broadcasting as a cheap means
to implement broadband distribution of video and high-speed data. 30
From the content angle, these companies are not just shaping how media is
consumed, but what media is consumed. One way this is happening is through the
development of interactive television scenarios which essentially combine browser
like features with television style content.13' The opposite approach is being taken
by computer-based media companies offering video through the Internet. 32 Both
scenarios not only provide access to content, but actually shape content according
to the medium through which it is offered.
These new 'broadcast platforms' provide a particularly vexing problem for
legislation aimed at cultural protection. As it is, the Directive does not directly
address any quota for European content on cross-media platforms. From a
practical standpoint, how could such regulation ever be effective? Furthermore,
there are other complicating factors such as the difficulty in regulating satellite
broadcasts. Kerry Segrave's observation that "it will become very difficult if not
impossible, to police the reception of satellite television ,133 might just as well be
applied to the other new media platforms currently being developed by companies
like Canal and MSNBC. The Commission's observation that even now many
Member States do not provide complete data on satellite transmissions for
purposes of assessing the Directive's effectiveness is a foreshadowing of
difficulties to come. The basic problem is fairly simple: as more audiovisual
consumption is carried out in the realm beyond terrestrial television, the
Directive's focus must move into that realm or the Directive itself will become
increasingly irrelevant.
This is one of the larger problems the European Union faces as it begins to
debate possible changes to the Directive in the coming months. One option is to
leave things as they are and possibly attempt other regulation aimed at the new
media. Currently, when consumers watch programming that must be downloaded,
like that available from video-on-demand and mobile video service, they are
considered to be in a regulation free zone. 34 Another option is to extend the
Directive so that it applies to all networks whether they broadcast by traditional
means, satellite, or via some kind of new media platform. While this sounds
attractive, its implementation could take years, during which time further
technological complications will undoubtedly force another reconsideration of the
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 125.
131. See id. at 124-25.
132. Id.
133. AMERICAN TELEVISION ABROAD, supra note 23 at 249.
134. See A Closer Watch on All Channels, supra note 8.
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effectiveness of the legislation. Given the inevitable lag between technological
innovation and legislative response, it seems reasonable to suppose a
corresponding lag between legislative response and effective legislative response.
The problem casts doubt on the ability of any quota system, however broadly
applied, to effectively dictate European content.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arguably, in heralding the death of the Franco-French cultural exception Jean
Marie-Messier was doing nothing more than reporting on the state of the
audiovisual marketplace. A policy that attempted to exclude audiovisual products
from the constraints of GATT and WTO efforts at free trade-a policy that
justified a quota regime on grounds that they applied to cultural services rather
than economic products-seems to make little sense in the current climate. The
Commission seems to favor concentration in the audiovisual sector in the hope that
it will create a more competitive industry within the Union. Ironically, the very
policies designed to enhance the cultural content of European airwaves are now
working as a barrier to companies seeking to become more competitive. As
European audiovisual companies try to enhance their market share, they
increasingly find they must do so by crossing borders to form alliances with other
companies. Yet this is increasingly difficult in light of the Directive's provisions.
As Vivindi, for example, acquired its interest in USA Networks, the old forces of
cultural protectionism swept in to hamper the process. On the one hand, the
European Union embraces a more competitive audiovisual sector as a means to
protect European culture. On the other, the Directive, with its quotas and
definitions of what constitutes European works, makes it difficult for the
audiovisual sector to form the alliances it must in order to reach parity with the
Hollywood machine.
More importantly, convergence within the audiovisual sector is leading to a
loss of plurality and a homogeneity of exactly the sort feared by the innovators of
the Directive. European culture is not simply threatened by external forces, but is
susceptible to erosion from within as well-a process that the Directive is
powerless to deal with. While the Commission's 2002 report on the effectiveness
of the Directive, might support the bare conclusion that more European works are
being broadcast inside the Member States (a conclusion with which it is easy to
take exception), it cannot refute the fact that the quality of that programming is
changing-probably for the worse. European culture, never a well-defined
concept to begin with, is becoming the culture of those Member States who have
the most competitive media corporations-France, the United Kingdom, and
Germany. After the Union's recent expansion, it is particularly appropriate to
question whether the American cultural imperialism of the 1980s and 1990s will
look any different from the coming culture clash between the comparatively well-
developed audiovisual sectors of Western Europe and the embryonic sectors of the
new Member States.
Finally, convergence in the technological realm continues to effect both the
context and content of media consumption inside the European Union. Regulation
2003
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in this realm is virtually nonexistent now and, at best, can hope only to lag
significantly far behind the pace of change. As more and more consumers turn to
media platforms outside the traditional television broadcast scenario, the Directive
will come to resemble the flailing of a traffic cop in a deserted parking lot. The
effectiveness of the Directive must be evaluated independently of any claims to the
success of its individual provisions. It must be evaluated on the basis of whether
or not it can succeed at the goal set forth in its preamble-the protection of
European culture. In light of the difficulties set forth above, this seems doubtful.
UPDATE
In December 2003, the Commission Published The Future of European
Regulatory Audiovisual Policy, 35 a communication from the Commission to the
Council and other EU governing bodies describing recent changes in the European
audiovisual marketplace and conglomerating the findings of the Fourth Report on
the Application of the Directive 36 as well as the European Parlaiment's recent
"Report on Television without Frontiers."'137 The Commission has concluded, "the
Directive is generally being applied satisfactorily, the free movement of television
broadcasting services within the Community having essentially been insured.' 38
However, public comment on the Directive during 2003 highlighted some
shortcomings in the legislation. While the Commission found that broadband
services and satellite technology have been adopted more slowly than first
expected, it also explained that "a thorough revision of the Directive might be
necessary to take account of technological developments and changes in the
structure of the audiovisual market."'
' 39
As the Commission reports, most of the parties commenting on the Directive
favored no changes to the legislation, though a minority advised strengthening its
provisions. The most frequent recommendations from those questioning the
Directive's effectiveness were to introduce "an explicit quantitative objective
[ranging from 51 percent to 75 percent] instead of the expression 'a majority
proportion of its transmission time," and "clarifying the obligation by deleting the
135. Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; The Future of European
Regulatory Audiovisual Policy, COM(03)784 final. [herinafter The Future of European Regulatory
Audiovisual Policy].
136. COM(03)778 final. This "fourth report" should not be confused with the "Fifth
Communication From the Commission to the Council and the Eruopean Parlaiment on the Application
of Articles Four and Five of Directive 89/552/EEC," supra note 7. The "fourth report" deals with the
Directive as a whole, while the "Fifth Communication" addresses only articles four and five. The fourth
report of the Commission essentially established a schedule for continued public meetings and
discussion throughout 2003. The Future of European Regulatory Policy is an attempt to summarize
these reports and public discussions.
137. Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport, Report on Television without
Frontiers, EUR. PARL. DOC. (A5-0251/2003).
138. The Future of European Regulatory Policy, COM(03)778 final at 6.
139. Id. at 14.
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wording 'Where practicable and by appropriate means."' 140  In the end, the
Commission decided to order further independent studies and scheduled focus
groups to meet in 2004.141
The fallout from Jean-Marie Messier's tenure as Vivendi chief continues. In
September of 2003, General Electric's NBC announced it was entering into
exclusive negotiations with Vivendi Universal in order to precipitate a merger
between the two firms.' 4 2  On October 8th, General Electric reached a final
agreement to acquire Vivendi's assets. 143 The new entity, NBC Universal, will be
80% owned by General Electric with Vivendi retaining the remainder of company
assets. Vivendi investors are to receive $3.8 billion in cash through the issuance of
about 125 million shares in G.E. stock, and G.E. will take on $1.7 billion in
Vivendi debt. The total value of the new enterprise is estimated at $43 billion.
14
The FTC continues to review the merger, while the European Union, invoking its
abbreviated merger analysis after concluding that the deal would have little effect
on its markets, has already approved the action.1
45
140. Id. at 17.
14 1. Id. at 24-25.
142. See generally, John Tagliabue, Vivendi Posts Twenty Percent Rise in Operating Profit for
First Half, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003 at WI.
143. See generally, Bill Carter, G.E. Finishes Vivendi Deal, Expanding Its Media Assets, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003 at Cl.
144. Id.
145. See Prior Notification of a Concentration (Case COMP/M.3303-GEfVivendi Universal
Entertainment), 2003 O.J. (C285) 26; Commission Notice on a Simplified Procedure for Treatment of
Certain Concentrations under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (C 217), 29.7.2000;
see also, EU Regulators Clear NBC-Vivendi Deal, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003 at Al. The EU's
simplified antitrust procedure "clears mergers or acquisitions after one month if no objections are raised
by third parties." Id. See also, Meredith Amdur, EU Clears GE-Viv U Deal: Sale has only limited
impact on Euro film and TV, VARIETY, Dec. 21, 2003.
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It has become something of a clich6 to say that the events of Septmenber 11,
2001 changed the world, at least in terms of how Americans view the world. One
of the more notable areas of change has been in law, particularly in national
security law. Changes occur almost weekly in this area of the law as U.S. courts
consider issues ranging from the status of tort claims by survivors and relatives of
victims of the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings to claims about the
legal status of Afghan war detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to the striking
down of legal barriers between domestics and foreign intelligence collection means
in the recording of terrorist communications.
Even changes in the law, however, do not occur in a vacuum. They occur in a
specific context. And in this case, the context is broader than the events of 9-1 1.
The broad context is inclusive of elements such as international relations, strategy,
and law.
One good survey of this broader context is found in the new, well-received
work by Philip Bobbitt, entitled The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the
Course of History. Bobbitt's work in broad strokes is about the modem state-
. John D. Becker is a third-year law student at the University of Denver, where he is also pursuing a
Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies. A retired Army officer, he has served on the
faculties of the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy. Mr. Becker also serves as an
adjunct faculty member for the University of Phoenix Online and for the MBA program at Regis
University.
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how it came into being, how it was developed, and in what directions can it be
expected to change. Bobbitt's position includes looking at recent changes in the
state through the lenses of both military strategy and constitutional law. His
conclusion is that the relationship between strategy and the legal order has shaped
and transformed the modem state and the society composed of states, resulting in
the emergence of a new state- the market state.
Bobbitt's text is broken into two books - Book One titled "State of War"
which focuses on history and the future of war and Book Two is called "States of
Peace," which discusses history and the future of international society. In turn,
each book is broken into three parts; each part with a general thesis is set forth as
an overture to the narrative argument that is then provided. The argument can be
set forth as follows:
Book I- Part I: "The Long War of the Nation-State," argues that the (global)
war that began in 1914 (with the beginning of World War 1) did not end until 1990
(with the demise of the Cold War).' Rather than a traditional war, it was an
epochal war not unlike the Greek Peloponnesian War.2 Epochal wars put the
constitutional basis of the participants into play and do not truly end until the
underlying constitutional questions are resolved. Thus, the Long War was fought
to determine which alternative-communism, fascism, or parliamentarianism-
would replace the imperial constitutional orders of the nineteenth century.
Book 1-Part I1: "A Brief History of the Modem State and the Constitutional
Order, "asserts that epochal wars have brought about profound changes in the
constitutional order of states through a process of innovation and mimicry.3 In
order to survive, some states are innovative in their constitutional reforms while
other states copy those innovations when they prove decisive in resolving the
epochal conflict of an era.
Book I-Part III: "The Historic Consequences of the Long War" argues that
the Long War of the twentieth century was another such epochal war and that it
has brought about the emergence of another form of the state, the market-state.
Focusing on one of the first market-states, the United States, Bobbitt looks at
possible changes-both constitutionally and strategically - as the new
constitutional order comes to maturity.4
Book l-Part 1: "The Society of Nations," deals with the states in which we
currently live. It traces the origins of this society to the abortive peace following
World War I and the American attempt to superimpose the U.S. Constitution
model on the society of states.5 The argument continues by bringing the plan
forward to the collapse of Bosnia in the 1990's and concludes that the society of
I. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY
xxviii Alfred A. Knopf 2002.
2. Id. at 19. Epochal wars can be marked by several conflicts that might be considered separate
wars and periods of apparent peace and often do not maintain the same lineup of enemies and allies
throughout the epoch.
3. See id. at 67.
4. Seeid. at211.
5. Id. at 365.
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nation-states is rapidly collapsing.6 The difference between Bobbitt's claims and
other similar claims 7 lies in his conclusion that the dying and regeneration of
constitutional orders are a periodic part of the history of the modem state.
Book Il-Part I!: "A Brief History of the Society of States and the
International Order," examines the historic conflicts that have shaped the modem
state (and also looked at in Book I, Part II). The focus, however, is on the peace
agreements following those conflicts. The claim is made that the society of
modem states has had a series of constitutional reforms which are the result of the
peace congresses that ended epochal wars, from the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) to
the Peace of Paris (1990).8
Book II - Part III: "The Society of Market-States" discusses the future of the
society of states by hypothesizing various possible worlds. The various
possibilities are adapted by methods pioneered by Royal Dutch Shell Corporation. 9
Book 11 closes with the conclusion that by varying the degrees of sovereignty
retained by the people, different societies develop different forms of the market
state. These include the mercantile state, the entrepreneurial state, and the
managerial state. Bobbitt sees the challenge of the future to lie in developing rules
for cooperation between these different forms of market states, less conflict
develop which could threaten the survival of some states. 10
Bobbitt's text is insightful in a number of ways. First, he recognizes that the
process of shaping states is a function of the fusing of the inner and outer
dominions of authority: law and strategy. In this way, he is following the Roman-
Machiavellian tradition." He also acknowledges the sometimes forgotten point
that war is a product as well as a shaper of culture.'
2
Second, he identifies modem developments that can call into doubt the basis
for the existing international orders of states. These developments include the
universal recognition of human rights as a norm that requires legal adherence,
regardless of internal laws or customs; the widespread deployment of weapons of
mass destruction; the proliferation of global and transnational threats, such as
environmental pollution, migration, population growth, disease and famine; the
growth of a world economic regime that can ignore borders in the movement of
capital investment, effectively curtailing state management of their economic
affairs; and the creation of a global communication network that penetrates borders
6. See Bobbitt's charts of international orders at 346, which include the princely state, the kingly
state, territorial state, state-nation, and the nation-state.
7. For example, Francis Fukuyama in The End of Man and the Last Man and Paul Kennedy's
The Rise and Fall of Great Powers.
8. See BOBBITT at 479.
9. See id. at 718-19.
10. See id. at xxx.
11. Arms and laws were the strengths of ancient Romans, both in the Republic and the Empire,
later recognized in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. Few texts draw across disciplines for this type
of analysis, which is why Bobbitt's is unique.
12. See BOBBITT at xxxi. War has often been recognized as having cultural aspects, most often in
the role it has in shaping cultures, including by Michael Howard and John Keegan.
2003
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
electronically and threatens languages, customs, and cultures.
Finally, he acknowledges that futures are functions of choices that are made
by peoples and their leaders, not simply the result of the forces of history,
technology, or time. These possible worlds are even now being shaped by the
choices we are now making and will make in the future.
If The Shield ofAchilles suffers any shortcomings it may be the lack of cross-
cultural comparisons and models. At the end, Bobbitt argues the text is not-
Eurocentric for it is only in Europe (and the West) that we see the state as a
political idea and the nation-state as an idea in particular. And yet, in his own
analysis of the types of market-states, he draws upon cultural aspects, including for
defining the mercantile state.' 3 Clearly, cultural factors play a key role in the
development of the changes in states and systems that Bobbitt discusses at length.
And if conflict is as much a matter of cultural clashes as inner and outer authority,
then it should be acknowledged accordingly.14
With this broader framework as background, the two law texts can better be
put into perspective. National Security Law (3rd Edition), by Stephen Dycus,
Arthur Bemey, William Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen, starts by noting that the
horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September II,
2001, did not "change everything" in this area of the law.' Issues like electronic
surveillance of suspected terrorists, the role of the military after an attack, the use
of secret evidence in trials, extraterritorial jurisdiction and the arrest of terrorist
suspects, and the legality of assassination as a counterterrorist tool had been
considered previously.
Instead, what the aftermath of September 11 th did change is the way we look
at national security law; the white lights of the plane crash explosions highlighted
overlooked aspects of the law and also revealed connections that were once
overlooked.' 6 And in much the same way as the federal government has been
reorganized to coordinate a national homeland defense, the text has been
rearranged to facilitate the teaching of national security law through the lenses of
counterterrorism laws. Fortunately, however, it has not been changed too much.
Dycus et al. recognize that at the heart of national security law lays an
understanding and appreciation for both the law-domestic and international-and
for war- general, imperfect, and other forms of war. 17
13. Japan is an illustrative example, given its literature and educated people, restrictive
immigration, trade, and currency laws and policies, and the desire to but the greater communal good
before all else. See Id. at 284-85.
14. See for example, Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and Culture Matters for a
discussion of the role of culture in civilizations and societies. My own stronger claim is that culture
shapes worldviews, patterns of thought, communication, and courses of actions.
15. Certainly an allusion to the general claims made after 9-11 about many areas of life and
society. See DYCUS ET. AL at xxix.
16. In other words, the importance of different areas of national security shifted in view of new
and different attacks by previously unimportant groups and tactics. Id.
17. Given the connections between the 9-11 attacks and the war on Afghanistan, a possible war (at




National security law is acknowledged here to be complex and difficult, given
that the political and legal issues are perennially contentious and there are few
settled answers. And yet, not many other topics are as current and provocative.'
8
Dycus et al. organize their text into four major parts. These include: I) The
Framework of Separate Branches with Shared National Security Powers, 2)
Maintaining National Security Abroad, 3) Fighting Terrorists and International
Criminals, and 4) Protecting National Security Information in a Democratic
Society.
Part One presents the relevant cases of sources of authority for national
security law. Starting with the U.S. Constitution and key cases, like Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., up
cases like Dellums v. Bush, the authors wade through the issue of separations of
national security powers. At the heart of this issue is the delicate balance between
liberty and security. 19 They also look at the specific Article One and Article Two
powers for the President and the Congress, the role the judiciary has taken, and the
domestic effect of international law. Overall, it establishes a legal and political
framework for national security subjects later in the text.
20
Part Two address the important questions of U.S. military involvement
abroad, in both functional and categorical terms. First, it looks at general or "high-
intensity''21 war through the lenses of recent wars, specifically Korea, Vietnam,
and the Persian Gulf War. Issues include the legality and legitimacy of wars,
limits on the scope of wars, and ending wars. Additional consideration is given to
both authority of the War Powers Resolution and the Charter of the United
Nations. Second, imperfect wars of limited or low-intensity conflicts are
considered. Cases include U.S. operations in Iran, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and
the NATO intervention in Kosovo, including hostage rescue missions,
peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian interventions. 22 Final consideration is
given to intelligence operations, including the covert use of force in cases like Iran-
Contra.
Part Three is the major revision in the text, coming as it does after September
I Ith. It starts with an overview of terrorism--causes and types and responses.
Following is an examination of the laws concerning terrorism, including
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory frameworks for domestic and international
investigations, and the tough, thorny issues of profiling and preventative
18. See DYcus ET AL. at xxx.
19. Id. at I. The connection between domestic and international issues is drawn clearly by that
phrase.
20. Id. at 4. Dycus is very much like Franck and Glennon in this regard, but the two texts differ in
their respective emphasis on selected cases.
21. Of course, the intensity of war very much depends on where you sit. To a soldier or Marine
being shot at, all wars are high-intensity ones.
22. Recent interventions by the United States have covered what I have called a continuum of
national security in previous articles, suggesting actions from localized terrorist acts up to and including
global thermal nuclear warfare. See for example, Warfare, Strategies and Tactics, in The Encyclopedia
ofApplied Ethics, Volume 4, Academic Press, San Diego, CA, 507.
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detention.23 Subsequent consideration is given to "consequence management,"
with roles and responsibilities of government agencies and issues of related civil
liberties. Attention is also paid to the special problems of trying international
terrorists, including territorial jurisdiction, extradition, and rendition, ranging from
removal proceedings to military tribunals and international courts.24 At the end of
this part, some treatment is paid to special threats to civil liberties in a crisis, in
cases like Korematsu v. US. and Ex parte Milligan.
Finally, Part Four addresses the question of access to national security
materials by citizens, the media, and Congress. In turn, it looks at what
government restraints can be imposed on that access by various means, including
classification, statute, and court action. In a democratic society, and in one that
strives to be so, this question is significant, relevant, and important. 25
The materials drawn up in the text are very traditional ones, including case
studies, primary legal materials (such as judicial opinions, executive orders,
statutes, and legislative histories), and descriptive texts. The authors also suggest
the reader supplement the text with regular perusal of a national newspaper,
something vital due to the constant judicial opinions coming out now in national
security law.26
Overall, Dycus et al. is helpful for establishing a solid grounding in national
security law. They have introduced both simulations and exercises to help develop
the reality of applying the law to particular patterns of facts in this important area.
Of course, the primary purpose of any legal text is to present the law and Dycus et
al. do that in a professional, relatively unbiased manner.
Similarly, Foreign Relations and National Security Law (2nd Edition), by
Thomas Franck and Michael Glennon, provides a thorough treatment of the law of
foreign relations (or national security law).27 In the introduction, Franck and
Glennon note that this area of law stands at the intersection of constitutional,
criminal, and international law. Specifically, the text looks at the interaction
between the conduct of United States foreign relations and the constitutional
distribution of powers, prerogatives, and rights within the nation.28
That distribution is overlapping to a large degree, between the President (and
the executive branch), the Congress, the states, and the people.29 Constitutional
entitlements - repositories of rights and duties - are another way to understand
these distributions. They have been acknowledged and mitigated, in practice, by
23. DYcuS ET AL. at 561-62. This section is called "crisis management" by the authors, which
may or may not be apt.
24. What is interesting is to compare the legal and political treatment of terrorists with that of war
criminals - how we deal with a Milosevic as opposed to a Bin Laden.
25. This clearly appears to be a key consideration, in light of legislation like the Patriot's Act.
26. Not to mention national security issues in general.
27. Franck's and Glennon's text was written in 1993, prior to 9-1I, and thus uses the older phrase,
law of foreign relations inside but national security on the outside cover.
28. See FRANCK & GLENNON, at v.
29. Interestingly, they leave out the courts as a key player here, but later recognize that the courts
role here includes inventing rules of adjustment or adjudication in cases.
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the conduct of parties to actual disputes. In short, the actual practice has reduced
the problems of unclear assignments of constitutional entitlements.
Foreign relations law has been accorded special status in the political and
judicial arenas because of the recognition that all else depends upon the survival of
the Republic. One connected issue then becomes whether the system of checks
and balances found in domestic law would necessarily apply in the foreign
relations arena, which as might be expected has been subject to a great deal of
debate.30
Franck's and Glennon's text is organized into eight chapters, with at least one
simulation allocated per chapter. The chapter headings include: Foreign Relations
and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, The Law of Nations as Incorporated Into
United States Law, Treaties and Other International Agreements, The War Power,
The Power Over the Purse, Federalism, Justiciability of Foreign Relations Issues,
and National Security and Freedom of Expression.
In many ways, this covers much the same ground that Dycus et aL does and
certainly the case law is the same (i.e, Youngstown Sheet, Curtis-Wright,
Korematsu, and Chada).3 1 Likewise, other relevant references, like treatises, the
Restatement, and clarifying notes are found in both texts. But the application of
the materials to simulations does change the equation a bit in Franck and Glennon,
at least it would appear to do so in the classroom environment.32
For example, one simulation has the United States having a cultural exchange
with Mexico. One of the proposed exchange groups involves a theater group with
a politically charged production, which has been denied visas by virtue of
Presidential order. The entertainment group representing the theater group in the
United States brings suit, seeking to have the Presidential order voided. Students
are to play the roles of District Court judge and counsel for both sides and consider
listed materials, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.33 Simulations appear to be the strength of the text.
One major shortcoming of the text is that no revision has been put forth in the
past decade and given all the significant events which have happened in national
security, including September 1 1Ph, that is troublesome.
In sum, surveying these three texts reveals that national security law is of
continuing relevance and importance in today's increasingly connected world.
With the advent of non-state players, like terrorist networks like AI-Qaida, and the
continuing transformation of state players into market-states and other significant
factors like technology, migration, and culture, the international arena is in flux.
As a result, national security issues will remain on the front pages-hard copy and
digital--of newspapers and national security law will remain at the forefront of our
30. See FRANCK & GLENNON, at vi. Do we bend the rules to save them or not? In national
security law, the answer seems to be, it depends.
31. The biggest distinction is the editing of cases. In Dycus et al., Curtis- Wright is given in total,
with additional clarifying whereas Franck and Glennon similar case is heavily edited.
32. In my own teaching experiences, simulations can be helpful but sometimes fall flat.
33. See generally FRANCK & GLENNON, at 108
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legal system. And accordingly, texts like Bobbitt's, Dycus et al., and even
Franck's and Thomas's will remain relevant and significant for both legal students
and international lawyers.
THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE, Aegis Research Corp., Falls Church, VA
(2000); ISBN: 0-9670326-I-X; 497 pp. (hardcover).
Despite having authored a string of well-received law review articles,' The
Law of Information Conflict is Thomas C. Wingfield's first full-length book. Mr.
Wingfield is Principal National Security Policy Analyst for the Aegis Research
Corporation, which specializes in security consulting on information technology
issues. Accordingly, The Law of Information Conflict is focused on the question of
how international law applies to military and intelligence operations in cyberspace.
The book is divided into four main parts. Part I contains the book's
introduction, including a brief comparison between the evolution of international
law concerning aerial warfare and cyber warfare, and a chapter analyzing the
military applications of cyberspace. This latter chapter is a superficial overview
that, while useful for persons not familiar with information operations, could be
skipped by those who have previous experience with the subject.
Part II of The Law of Information Conflict is also divisible into two major
portions. The first three chapters are devoted primarily to a summary of the
current status of international law concerning the outbreak of hostilities, with
discussion of the principles of necessity, proportionality, avoidance of unnecessary
collateral damage and anticipatory self-defense. Particular attention is paid to the
implications of U.N. Charter Articles 2(4), 39 and 51 and Geneva Convention
Article 2. This section is capped off with "a linear model for a heuristic use of
force analysis" that lays out a range of possible diplomatic and military responses
against a spectrum of interstate relations reaching from peace to open warfare. The
second portion of Part 1I applies the principles drawn from the previous chapters'
analyses of international law to possible acts of cyberwarfare (such as jamming
telecommunications) to establish what sorts of response would be appropriate.
This section ends with a flowchart setting out the questions that must be answered
to determine whether an information operation would constitute a use of force
under international law and another linear model for a heuristic use of force
analysis, this time fleshing out the model with specific sorts of state conduct
previously discussed in the second section.
Part Ill of the book is devoted to the subject of the law of armed conflict. It
opens with a detailed overview of key principles in the law of armed conflict,
including discrimination between civilian and military targets, military necessity
and prevention of unnecessary suffering, proportionality of response and the law of
1. Including Taking Aim at Regime Elites: Assassination, Tyrannicide, and the Clancy Doctrine,
22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 287 (1999) and Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. L.
REV. 439 (2000).
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chivalry. This is followed by a compilation of commentary on, and excerpts of,
key documents on the subject of the law of armed conflict. These range from the
1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law to the 1981 U.N. Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
The final section of Part III is a survey of particular legal doctrines covering
information warfare in the context of the specialized theaters of sea, air and space,
as well as the implications of the domestic laws of the state targeted for a hostile
information operation.
The Law of Information Conflict concludes with Part IV, which offers a
chapter distinguishing computer network espionage (a permissible activity under
international law) from computer network attack, and a chapter summarizing the
key points of international law relating to cyberwarfare developed through the
course of the book. Also included in the book's final pages are a glossary of legal
and intelligence terminology and no fewer than six appendices. The appendices
cover, inter alia, the sources of international law, excerpts of the U.N. Charter and
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the definition of interstate
"aggression," and selected U.S. government documents on rules of military
engagement and information operations.
Published on a limited in-house basis by the security consulting firm Aegis
Research Corporation, The Law of Information Conflict is, in fact, more than a
mere book, it is a conceptual multi-media extravaganza. In addition to the actual
book, discussed above, Aegis also offers a CD-ROM on the subject of information
warfare, which includes the full text of the book, as well as workshops that build
on themes discussed in the book.
In conclusion, although not necessarily of use to a skilled practitioner or
advanced student of international law or cyberwarfare, The Law of Information
Conflict is a useful introduction to a topic that will become ever more important in
the Twenty-First Century.
Stephen D. Rynerson*
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